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ssw-mvp/docs/e2e/cases/TC-CONTROL_API-002.mjs
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/**
* TC-CONTROL_API-002 · 条件不满足时不能办理控制策略下发
* REQ-058 [FL-6.9] 反向/状态迁移 P0
*
* 前置:1. 通过已认证的调用方连接器调用「控制策略下发」接口可以正常打开
* 2. 已准备无权限账号或错误数据
* 步骤:1. 打开通过已认证的调用方连接器调用「控制策略下发」接口
* 2. 使用无权限账号或错误数据办理控制策略下发
* 3. 点击提交,查看提示和数据
* 预期:系统不允许办理控制策略下发,并说明原因。原有数据和状态不变。
*
* 实现说明:
* 控制策略下发(PolicyConflict/Check)的合法响应是 { pass, conflicts[] }。
* 「不能办理」的判定条件是 pass=false 且 conflicts 非空。
* 用例构造同一资源/执行点上既有 ALLOW 又有 DENY 的策略集合,
* 验证后端能正确识别冲突并拒绝通过。
*/
export const meta = {
tc: 'TC-CONTROL_API-002',
req: 'REQ-058',
title: '条件不满足时不能办理控制策略下发',
type: '反向/状态迁移',
priority: 'P0',
route: '',
needs: ['be']
}
export async function run(t) {
await t.login()
const productId = t.uid('E2E-POL-CONFLICT')
await t.step('反向 1:同一资源同时 ALLOW 与 DENY → pass=false,conflicts 非空', async () => {
const policy = JSON.stringify([
{ policyCode: 'USE_COUNT_LIMIT', action: 'ALLOW', resource: 'table.user', enforcePoint: 'DELIVERY' },
{ policyCode: 'USE_COUNT_LIMIT', action: 'DENY', resource: 'table.user', enforcePoint: 'DELIVERY' }
])
const r = await t.api('POST', '/api/ssw/tds/PolicyConflict/Check', {
productId,
policyContent: policy
})
t.assert(r.code === 200, `接口返回成功但应判定为冲突(code=${r.code})`)
const data = r.data ?? {}
t.assert(data.pass === false, `判定为冲突 pass=false(实际 ${data.pass})`)
t.assert(Array.isArray(data.conflicts) && data.conflicts.length > 0, `conflicts 非空(${JSON.stringify(data.conflicts)})`)
t.assert(data.conflicts.some((c) => /ALLOW|DENY|资源|执行点/.test(c)), `冲突说明描述具体冲突维度(首条:${data.conflicts[0]})`)
})
await t.step('反向 2:同一执行点同时 ALLOW 与 DENY → pass=false', async () => {
const policy = JSON.stringify([
{ policyCode: 'TIME_WINDOW', action: 'ALLOW', resource: 'table.a', enforcePoint: 'EXPORT' },
{ policyCode: 'IP_WHITELIST', action: 'DENY', resource: 'table.b', enforcePoint: 'EXPORT' }
])
const r = await t.api('POST', '/api/ssw/tds/PolicyConflict/Check', {
productId,
policyContent: policy
})
t.assert(r.code === 200, `接口返回成功(code=${r.code})`)
t.assert(r.data?.pass === false, `执行点冲突 pass=false(实际 ${r.data?.pass})`)
t.assert(r.data?.conflicts?.length > 0, `conflicts 非空(${JSON.stringify(r.data?.conflicts)})`)
})
await t.step('反向 3:策略 JSON 格式异常 → 不抛异常,pass=false 并说明无法解析', async () => {
const r = await t.api('POST', '/api/ssw/tds/PolicyConflict/Check', {
productId,
policyContent: 'this-is-not-json'
})
t.assert(r.code === 200, `接口返回成功(code=${r.code})`)
t.assert(r.data?.pass === false, `解析失败 pass=false(实际 ${r.data?.pass})`)
t.assert((r.data?.conflicts || []).some((c) => /解析|无法|format/i.test(c)), `冲突说明指出解析失败(首条:${r.data?.conflicts?.[0]})`)
})
await t.step('核对原有数据未被脏写:再次以正确策略检测仍可通过', async () => {
const policy = JSON.stringify([
{ policyCode: 'TIME_WINDOW', action: 'ALLOW', resource: 'table.user', enforcePoint: 'DELIVERY' }
])
const r = await t.api('POST', '/api/ssw/tds/PolicyConflict/Check', {
productId,
policyContent: policy
})
t.assert(r.code === 200 && r.data?.pass === true, `合法策略重新检测 pass=true(实际 ${r.data?.pass})`)
})
}