# Spec: experiment_platform ## Requirement THE SYSTEM SHALL provide a multi-bank federated risk control (FRC) scenario that composes 8 existing operators (did-identity / tds-connector / psi / paillier-he / threshold-sig / abac-policy / data-watermark / compliance-audit) into a 6-step end-to-end fraud detection flow across 3 simulated banks (BankA / BankB / BankC), proving that **multi-party, no-PII-leak, audit-traceable** risk decisions can be made WITHOUT any new operator / endpoint / dependency, so that 业务方能用现有算子验证"数据不出域"的多方金融场景。 ## ADDED Scenarios ### S1 3 银行 DID 建立 + TDS 合约匹配 - **WHEN** BankA / BankB / BankC each call did-identity.create() with their private keys - **THEN** output 3 distinct DIDs (`did:frc:bankA/...`, `did:frc:bankB/...`, `did:frc:bankC/...`) - **AND** tds-connector.match() with matching `contract_hash` returns `{match: true, token: <3-part JWT>}` - **AND** output `schema_version === "v2"` ### S2 DID 验证循环 + 篡改检测 - **WHEN** each of the 3 DIDs from S1 is verified with did-identity.verify() - **THEN** all 3 return `{valid: true}` - **AND** if any DID document is tampered (e.g., swap `publicKey`), verify() returns `{valid: false}` ### S3 TDS 合约 hash 不匹配 → 流程拒绝 - **WHEN** tds-connector.match() is called with `contract_hash_a === contract_hash_b` - **THEN** output `{match: false, error: "contract-mismatch"}` - **AND** the FRC flow is aborted at step 1 (no PSI / aggregation runs) ### S4 PSI 黑名单交集正确 - **WHEN** 3 banks submit private blacklists: - BankA = `[f01, f02, f03, f04]` - BankB = `[f01, f02, f03, f05]` - BankC = `[f01, f02, f03, f06, f07]` - **THEN** PSI intersection output = `[f01, f02, f03]` (sorted, no duplicates, no extras) - **AND** output `intersection_size === 3` - **AND** schema_version = "v2" ### S5 PSI 不泄露非交集(隐私不变性) - **WHEN** S4 PSI is run - **THEN** the output NEVER contains elements outside `[f01, f02, f03]` - **AND** the output size is **at most** `min(len(A), len(B), len(C))` (here min=3) - **AND** no per-bank blacklist sizes are revealed in the output (`{intersection: [...], intersection_size: N}` only) ### S6 Paillier 跨行特征求和不变性 - **WHEN** 3 banks submit encrypted average-risk features: - BankA: Enc(100) - BankB: Enc(200) - BankC: Enc(300) - **THEN** `sumProduct = Enc(100) · Enc(200) · Enc(300) mod n² === Enc(600)` - **AND** Decrypt(Enc(600)) === 600 (mod n) - **AND** schema_version = "v2" ### S7 Threshold 2-of-3 风险签名重构 - **WHEN** the aggregator (TDS) computes a risk decision and requests 3 banks to sign via threshold-sig - **THEN** with **2 of 3 shares** (any 2 banks), Lagrange interpolation reconstructs the secret - **AND** verify_code === 0 (signature valid) - **AND** output `recovered === original_payload` ### S8 Threshold 1 share 签名失败 - **WHEN** only **1 share** is provided to threshold-sig.reconstruct() - **THEN** verify_code !== 0 (signature fails — needs ≥ 2 shares) - **AND** error code reflects "insufficient-shares" ### S9 ABAC 风险分析师通过 + 游客拒绝 - **WHEN** an ABAC policy requires `subject.role === "risk-analyst"` AND `subject.region in ["BJ","SH","GZ"]` AND `env.timewindow 09:00-18:00` - **THEN** request from `{role: "risk-analyst", region: "BJ", time: "10:00"}` returns `{allow: true}` - **AND** request from `{role: "guest", region: "BJ", time: "10:00"}` returns `{allow: false, reason: "role-deny"}` - **AND** request from `{role: "risk-analyst", region: "NY", time: "10:00"}` returns `{allow: false, reason: "region-deny"}` - **AND** request from `{role: "risk-analyst", region: "BJ", time: "20:00"}` returns `{allow: false, reason: "timewindow-deny"}` ### S10 数据水印嵌入提取 roundtrip - **WHEN** the aggregator embeds `payload = "FRC|2026-09-28|bankA,bankB,bankC"` into a report via data-watermark - **THEN** the report's visible length is unchanged (zero-width chars) - **AND** data-watermark.extract(report) recovers the **exact** payload string - **AND** schema_version = "v2" ### S11 审计链 HMAC 完整 - **WHEN** the full FRC flow runs through steps S1→S10 (or as many as allowed by input) - **THEN** compliance-audit chain contains ≥ 8 entries (one per FRC step) - **AND** each entry has HMAC-SHA256 chain linkage (`prev_hash` references the prior entry) - **AND** chainValid === true on full replay ### S12 E2E 端到端 8 步不变性 - **WHEN** a single shell run executes S1→S11 in order with the canonical 3-bank input fixture - **THEN** every intermediate assertion in S1..S11 passes - **AND** the final output reports `e2e dth_frc: pass=N fail=0` (N = total sub-assertions, expected 12+) - **AND** total wall-clock time for the e2e is < 60s (operators are local Python/TS, no external I/O)