4.8 KiB
4.8 KiB
Spec: experiment_platform
Requirement
THE SYSTEM SHALL provide a multi-bank federated risk control (FRC) scenario that composes 8 existing operators (did-identity / tds-connector / psi / paillier-he / threshold-sig / abac-policy / data-watermark / compliance-audit) into a 6-step end-to-end fraud detection flow across 3 simulated banks (BankA / BankB / BankC), proving that multi-party, no-PII-leak, audit-traceable risk decisions can be made WITHOUT any new operator / endpoint / dependency, so that 业务方能用现有算子验证"数据不出域"的多方金融场景。
ADDED Scenarios
S1 3 银行 DID 建立 + TDS 合约匹配
- WHEN BankA / BankB / BankC each call did-identity.create() with their private keys
- THEN output 3 distinct DIDs (
did:frc:bankA/...,did:frc:bankB/...,did:frc:bankC/...) - AND tds-connector.match() with matching
contract_hashreturns{match: true, token: <3-part JWT>} - AND output
schema_version === "v2"
S2 DID 验证循环 + 篡改检测
- WHEN each of the 3 DIDs from S1 is verified with did-identity.verify()
- THEN all 3 return
{valid: true} - AND if any DID document is tampered (e.g., swap
publicKey), verify() returns{valid: false}
S3 TDS 合约 hash 不匹配 → 流程拒绝
- WHEN tds-connector.match() is called with
contract_hash_a === contract_hash_b - THEN output
{match: false, error: "contract-mismatch"} - AND the FRC flow is aborted at step 1 (no PSI / aggregation runs)
S4 PSI 黑名单交集正确
- WHEN 3 banks submit private blacklists:
- BankA =
[f01, f02, f03, f04] - BankB =
[f01, f02, f03, f05] - BankC =
[f01, f02, f03, f06, f07]
- BankA =
- THEN PSI intersection output =
[f01, f02, f03](sorted, no duplicates, no extras) - AND output
intersection_size === 3 - AND schema_version = "v2"
S5 PSI 不泄露非交集(隐私不变性)
- WHEN S4 PSI is run
- THEN the output NEVER contains elements outside
[f01, f02, f03] - AND the output size is at most
min(len(A), len(B), len(C))(here min=3) - AND no per-bank blacklist sizes are revealed in the output (
{intersection: [...], intersection_size: N}only)
S6 Paillier 跨行特征求和不变性
- WHEN 3 banks submit encrypted average-risk features:
- BankA: Enc(100)
- BankB: Enc(200)
- BankC: Enc(300)
- THEN
sumProduct = Enc(100) · Enc(200) · Enc(300) mod n² === Enc(600) - AND Decrypt(Enc(600)) === 600 (mod n)
- AND schema_version = "v2"
S7 Threshold 2-of-3 风险签名重构
- WHEN the aggregator (TDS) computes a risk decision and requests 3 banks to sign via threshold-sig
- THEN with 2 of 3 shares (any 2 banks), Lagrange interpolation reconstructs the secret
- AND verify_code === 0 (signature valid)
- AND output
recovered === original_payload
S8 Threshold 1 share 签名失败
- WHEN only 1 share is provided to threshold-sig.reconstruct()
- THEN verify_code !== 0 (signature fails — needs ≥ 2 shares)
- AND error code reflects "insufficient-shares"
S9 ABAC 风险分析师通过 + 游客拒绝
- WHEN an ABAC policy requires
subject.role === "risk-analyst"ANDsubject.region in ["BJ","SH","GZ"]ANDenv.timewindow 09:00-18:00 - THEN request from
{role: "risk-analyst", region: "BJ", time: "10:00"}returns{allow: true} - AND request from
{role: "guest", region: "BJ", time: "10:00"}returns{allow: false, reason: "role-deny"} - AND request from
{role: "risk-analyst", region: "NY", time: "10:00"}returns{allow: false, reason: "region-deny"} - AND request from
{role: "risk-analyst", region: "BJ", time: "20:00"}returns{allow: false, reason: "timewindow-deny"}
S10 数据水印嵌入提取 roundtrip
- WHEN the aggregator embeds
payload = "FRC|2026-09-28|bankA,bankB,bankC"into a report via data-watermark - THEN the report's visible length is unchanged (zero-width chars)
- AND data-watermark.extract(report) recovers the exact payload string
- AND schema_version = "v2"
S11 审计链 HMAC 完整
- WHEN the full FRC flow runs through steps S1→S10 (or as many as allowed by input)
- THEN compliance-audit chain contains ≥ 8 entries (one per FRC step)
- AND each entry has HMAC-SHA256 chain linkage (
prev_hashreferences the prior entry) - AND chainValid === true on full replay
S12 E2E 端到端 8 步不变性
- WHEN a single shell run executes S1→S11 in order with the canonical 3-bank input fixture
- THEN every intermediate assertion in S1..S11 passes
- AND the final output reports
e2e dth_frc: pass=N fail=0(N = total sub-assertions, expected 12+) - AND total wall-clock time for the e2e is < 60s (operators are local Python/TS, no external I/O)