From 6409d42817a73cb3ee63d8559aedbfedc68098c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ssw Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2026 22:06:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?feat(sso):=20MaxKey/JNPF/uc=20=E8=BF=81?= =?UTF-8?q?=E7=A7=BB=20P0=20=E4=BF=AE=E5=A4=8D?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - /sign/api/oauth/v20/me 归一化盲区:补 /api/oauth/v20/me 路由别名 - scope 逗号+空白切分(authorize 与 has_openid 同口径,避免逗号串吞 id_token) - mobile 身份字段走 User.extra 全链(check_mobile/create/set_profile/claims/me), me 补 MaxKey 别名字段 id/userId/displayName/fullName - 单点注销:/logout、/sign/logout 别名 + redirect_uri 302 回跳 (client 白名单,未登记 400;302 同时清会话 cookie) - 管理员重置密码入口统一过 accounts::check_password - e2e 互通套新增 A2b/A2c/A2d/A2e/A8b 六条断言,六套回归 rc=0 --- docs/roadmap.md | 12 ++++ source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/accounts.rs | 35 +++++++++- source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/api.rs | 17 +++++ source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/oauth.rs | 69 ++++++++++++++++--- tests/oauth2-maxkey-e2e.sh | 25 +++++++ 5 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/roadmap.md b/docs/roadmap.md index bd8213d..ba5a87b 100644 --- a/docs/roadmap.md +++ b/docs/roadmap.md @@ -177,3 +177,15 @@ > 顺带的收益:iPass 与 SSO 原先各有一份 `oauth.rs`(差异 425 行)、`users.rs`(525 行)、 > `models.rs`(234 行),内核化后只保留一份。 > 架构论证(为什么不拆多 .so)见 `docs/plugin-architecture-analysis.md`。 + +## [x] v3:MaxKey/JNPF/uc 迁移 P0 补齐(2026-09-13 完成) + +> 背景与逐项依据:`docs/maxkey-to-ipass-migration-gap.md`(§0.5 执行状态表)。 + +- [x] `/sign/api/oauth/v20/me` 路由别名(MaxKey 真实 userinfo 路径,归一化盲区 404) +- [x] scope 逗号+空白切分(authorize 校验与 `has_openid` 同口径;逗号串原先直接 invalid_scope 且吞 id_token) +- [x] `mobile` 身份字段(`User.extra` 通道,check_mobile 校验,create/set_profile/管理台/claims/me 全链) +- [x] me 响应 MaxKey 别名字段:`id`/`userId`/`displayName`/`fullName`(uc 按 maxkey_user_id 建档依赖) +- [x] 单点注销:`/logout`、`/sign/logout` 别名 + `redirect_uri` 302 回跳(client 白名单,未登记 400;302 同时清会话 cookie) +- [x] 管理员重置密码入口统一过 `check_password`(原可绕过插件层 8 位策略) +- [x] e2e:互通套新增 A2b/A2c/A2d/A2e/A8b 六条断言,六套 rc=0 diff --git a/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/accounts.rs b/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/accounts.rs index a5be759..a89c627 100644 --- a/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/accounts.rs +++ b/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/accounts.rs @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ const HIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS: &[&str] = &["totp_secret"]; pub const EXTRA_EMAIL: &str = "email"; pub const EXTRA_DEPARTMENT: &str = "department"; pub const EXTRA_GROUPS: &str = "groups"; +pub const EXTRA_MOBILE: &str = "mobile"; pub const EXTRA_FAILED_COUNT: &str = "failed_count"; pub const EXTRA_LOCKED_UNTIL: &str = "locked_until"; @@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ pub const EXTRA_LOCKED_UNTIL: &str = "locked_until"; pub trait UserExt { // ---- 读 ---- fn email(&self) -> &str; + fn mobile(&self) -> &str; fn department(&self) -> &str; /// 用户组(同时接受 `["a","b"]` 数组与 `"a,b"` CSV 两种存量写法) fn groups(&self) -> Vec; @@ -74,6 +76,7 @@ pub trait UserExt { fn extra_str_list(&self, key: &str) -> Vec; // ---- 写(在 `store::update_users` / `users::update_extra` 闭包内用)---- fn set_email(&mut self, v: &str); + fn set_mobile(&mut self, v: &str); fn set_department(&mut self, v: &str); fn set_groups(&mut self, v: Vec); fn set_failed_count(&mut self, v: i64); @@ -84,6 +87,9 @@ impl UserExt for User { fn email(&self) -> &str { self.extra_str(EXTRA_EMAIL) } + fn mobile(&self) -> &str { + self.extra_str(EXTRA_MOBILE) + } fn department(&self) -> &str { self.extra_str(EXTRA_DEPARTMENT) } @@ -144,6 +150,10 @@ impl UserExt for User { fn set_email(&mut self, v: &str) { self.extra.insert(EXTRA_EMAIL.to_owned(), Value::String(v.to_owned())); } + fn set_mobile(&mut self, v: &str) { + self.extra + .insert(EXTRA_MOBILE.to_owned(), Value::String(v.to_owned())); + } fn set_department(&mut self, v: &str) { self.extra .insert(EXTRA_DEPARTMENT.to_owned(), Value::String(v.to_owned())); @@ -214,6 +224,22 @@ pub fn check_email(raw: &str) -> Result { Ok(v) } +/// 手机号:宽松校验(国际号允许 + 前缀),不接受控制字符与空白—— +/// 它会进 OIDC claims 与接入方建档(uc_user.phone)。 +pub fn check_mobile(raw: &str) -> Result { + let v = util::trim(raw).to_owned(); + if v.is_empty() { + return Ok(v); + } + if v.len() > 32 || v.chars().any(|c| c.is_control() || c.is_whitespace()) { + return Err("手机号格式不正确".to_owned()); + } + if !v.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit() || c == '+') { + return Err("手机号只能包含数字与 + 前缀".to_owned()); + } + Ok(v) +} + /// 部门名:禁止控制字符。 pub fn check_department(raw: &str) -> Result { let v = util::trim(raw).to_owned(); @@ -259,6 +285,7 @@ pub fn create( password: &str, role: &str, email: &str, + mobile: &str, department: &str, groups: &str, ) -> Result { @@ -273,6 +300,7 @@ pub fn create( let display_name = check_display_name(&display_name)?; check_password(password)?; let email = check_email(email)?; + let mobile = check_mobile(mobile)?; let department = check_department(department)?; let groups = check_groups(groups)?; let role = if role == "admin" { "admin" } else { "user" }.to_owned(); @@ -294,6 +322,7 @@ pub fn create( extra: BTreeMap::new(), }; user.set_email(&email); + user.set_mobile(&mobile); user.set_department(&department); user.set_groups(groups); @@ -315,11 +344,13 @@ pub fn create( pub fn set_profile( username: &str, email: &str, + mobile: &str, department: &str, groups_raw: &str, display_name: Option<&str>, ) -> Result { let email = check_email(email)?; + let mobile = check_mobile(mobile)?; let department = check_department(department)?; let groups = check_groups(groups_raw)?; let display_name = match display_name { @@ -330,6 +361,7 @@ pub fn set_profile( store::update_users(move |users: &mut UserTable| { let user = users.get_mut(username).ok_or("账号不存在")?; user.set_email(&email); + user.set_mobile(&mobile); user.set_department(&department); user.set_groups(groups); if let Some(d) = display_name { @@ -493,6 +525,7 @@ pub fn view(user: &User) -> Value { "role": user.role, "is_admin": user.is_admin(), "email": user.email(), + "mobile": user.mobile(), "department": user.department(), "groups": user.groups(), "groups_csv": user.groups_csv(), @@ -510,7 +543,7 @@ pub fn view(user: &User) -> Value { continue; } // 身份字段已按强类型透出,不重复塞第二份 - if matches!(k.as_str(), EXTRA_EMAIL | EXTRA_DEPARTMENT | EXTRA_GROUPS | EXTRA_FAILED_COUNT | EXTRA_LOCKED_UNTIL) { + if matches!(k.as_str(), EXTRA_EMAIL | EXTRA_MOBILE | EXTRA_DEPARTMENT | EXTRA_GROUPS | EXTRA_FAILED_COUNT | EXTRA_LOCKED_UNTIL) { continue; } obj.insert(k.clone(), val.clone()); diff --git a/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/api.rs b/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/api.rs index 9d8c44a..c5ecbd3 100644 --- a/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/api.rs +++ b/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/api.rs @@ -130,7 +130,15 @@ fn route(method: &str, uri: &str) -> Option<(Guard, Handler)> { ("POST", "/oauth/v20/token") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_token_v20), ("GET", "/oauth/v20/me") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_me_v20), ("POST", "/oauth/v20/me") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_me_v20), + // MaxKey 真实 userinfo 路径挂在 /sign/api 下(不是 /sign/authz): + // `/sign/api/oauth/v20/me` 经归一化剥掉 `/sign` 后落到这里。 + // JNPF yml 的 userInfoUrl 与照抄 MaxKey 文档的客户端默认推导都是该路径。 + ("GET", "/api/oauth/v20/me") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_me_v20), + ("POST", "/api/oauth/v20/me") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_me_v20), ("GET", "/oauth/v20/logout") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_logout), + // 单点注销的裸路径:`/sign/logout`、`/maxkey/logout` 经归一化剥前缀后落到这里。 + ("GET", "/logout") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_logout), + ("POST", "/logout") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_logout), ("GET", "/oauth2.0/authorize") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_authorize), ("GET", "/oauth2.0/accessToken") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_token_v20), ("POST", "/oauth2.0/accessToken") => (Guard::Public, h_oauth_token_v20), @@ -636,6 +644,7 @@ fn h_admin_user_create(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t, actor: Actor) -> Status { p.get("password").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), p.get("role").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or("user"), p.get("email").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), + p.get("mobile").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), p.get("department").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), p.get("groups").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), ) { @@ -677,6 +686,7 @@ fn h_admin_user_profile(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t, actor: Actor) -> Status { match accounts::set_profile( &username, p.get("email").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), + p.get("mobile").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), p.get("department").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), p.get("groups").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""), display_name, @@ -806,6 +816,13 @@ fn h_admin_user_password(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t, actor: Actor) -> Status { let username = p.get("username").map(|s| util::trim(s).to_owned()).unwrap_or_default(); let password = p.get("password").map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""); + // 密码策略统一在插件层入口把关:内核 set_password 只管共性(最小 6 位), + // 这里用本插件的收紧策略(8 位 + 无控制字符),管理员重置也不例外—— + // 否则「管理员图省事重置成 123」绕过策略,账户锁定防线形同虚设。 + if let Err(e) = accounts::check_password(password) { + return http::fail(r, HTTPStatus::BAD_REQUEST, &e); + } + match users::set_password(&username, password) { Ok(()) => { audit::log("admin.user.password", actor.admin_name(), &username, true, &http::remote_addr(r), &http::header(r, "user-agent").unwrap_or_default(), ""); diff --git a/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/oauth.rs b/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/oauth.rs index e50b36b..56afe30 100644 --- a/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/oauth.rs +++ b/source/rust/crates/plugin-sso/src/oauth.rs @@ -411,6 +411,7 @@ fn mint_access_token( name: &str, groups: &[String], department: &str, + mobile: &str, client_id: &str, scope: &str, now: i64, @@ -426,6 +427,8 @@ fn mint_access_token( "preferred_username": sub, "name": name, "email": email, + // 手机号:接入方(uc_user.phone 等)建档依赖;空值也写键,保证 claim 形状稳定 + "mobile": mobile, "department": department, "groups": groups, "scope": scope, @@ -626,8 +629,10 @@ pub fn authorize(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t) -> Status { if response_type != "code" { return oauth_error(r, HTTPStatus::BAD_REQUEST, "unsupported_response_type", "仅支持 code"); } - // scope 必须全部在白名单内 - for s in scope.split_whitespace() { + // scope 必须全部在白名单内。按逗号与空白一起切:MaxKey 文档示例与 + // ssw-admin/JNPF 客户端实际发的是 "openid,profile,email"(逗号分隔), + // 只按空白切会把整串当一个 scope,精确匹配必挂 invalid_scope。 + for s in scope.split(|c: char| c == ',' || c.is_whitespace()).filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) { if !client.allows_scope(s) { return oauth_error(r, HTTPStatus::BAD_REQUEST, "invalid_scope", &format!("不允许的 scope: {s}")); } @@ -771,7 +776,7 @@ fn token_impl(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t, bare: bool) -> Status { } let scope = p.get("scope").cloned().unwrap_or_else(|| "openid".to_owned()); let Some(access) = mint_access_token( - &client.client_id, "", &client.name, &[], "", &client.client_id, &scope, now, + &client.client_id, "", &client.name, &[], "", "", &client.client_id, &scope, now, ) else { return oauth_error(r, HTTPStatus::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "server_error", "令牌签发不可用"); }; @@ -842,17 +847,18 @@ fn issue_tokens( bare: bool, ) -> Status { let user = users::get(sub); - let (email, name, groups, department) = match &user { - Some(u) => (u.email().to_owned(), if u.display_name.is_empty() { u.username.clone() } else { u.display_name.clone() }, u.groups(), u.department().to_owned()), - None => (String::new(), sub.to_owned(), vec![], String::new()), + let (email, name, groups, department, mobile) = match &user { + Some(u) => (u.email().to_owned(), u.display_or_username(), u.groups(), u.department().to_owned(), u.mobile().to_owned()), + None => (String::new(), sub.to_owned(), vec![], String::new(), String::new()), }; let (Some(access), Some(refresh)) = ( - mint_access_token(sub, &email, &name, &groups, &department, &client.client_id, scope, now), + mint_access_token(sub, &email, &name, &groups, &department, &mobile, &client.client_id, scope, now), mint_refresh_token(sub, &client.client_id, now), ) else { return oauth_error(r, HTTPStatus::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "server_error", "令牌签发不可用"); }; - let has_openid = scope.split_whitespace().any(|s| s == "openid"); + // 与 authorize 的切分口径保持一致(逗号分隔串里 "openid" 不在空白边界上) + let has_openid = scope.split(|c: char| c == ',' || c.is_whitespace()).any(|s| s == "openid"); let mut body = json!({ "access_token": access, "token_type": "Bearer", @@ -909,14 +915,24 @@ pub fn userinfo_v20(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t) -> Status { None => return oauth_error(r, HTTPStatus::UNAUTHORIZED, "invalid_token", "令牌无效或过期"), }; let g = |k: &str| claims.get(k).cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null); + // 手机号:access_token claims 带 mobile(签发时从用户档案取),空则透出 null。 + let mobile = g("mobile"); let out = json!({ // MaxKey 语义:username / userid 是**登录账号**,realname 才是真实姓名。 // 显示名塞进 username 会让第三方系统按账号查找用户时匹配不上。 "username": g("sub"), "userid": g("sub"), + // `id`/`userId`:MaxKey /me 返回用户主键,uc 等接入方按它做全局身份 + // 映射(maxkey_user_id)。本网关以 username 为稳定主键(不可改), + // 与 `sub`/`userid` 同值。 + "id": g("sub"), + "userId": g("sub"), + // `displayName`/`fullName`:MaxKey 客户端的展示名取值顺序里常见的键。 + "displayName": g("name"), + "fullName": g("name"), "realname": g("name"), "email": g("email"), - "mobile": Value::Null, + "mobile": mobile, // ---- 标准 OIDC 声明 ---- "sub": g("sub"), "preferred_username": g("preferred_username"), @@ -1149,12 +1165,46 @@ pub fn login_post(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t) -> Status { /// POST /oauth/logout —— 销毁 SSO 会话。 pub fn logout(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t) -> Status { + // 清共享内存里的 SSO 会话(顺带取用户名写审计)。 + let now = util::now(); + let mut who = String::new(); if let Some(tok) = parse_cookie(http::header(r, "cookie").as_deref(), OAUTH_SESSION_COOKIE) { + if let Some(payload) = crate::oauth_state::get_oauth_session(&tok, now) { + who = payload.split('\n').next().unwrap_or("").to_owned(); + } crate::oauth_state::remove_oauth_session(&tok); } let cleared = format!( "{OAUTH_SESSION_COOKIE}=deleted; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0" ); + let ip = http::remote_addr(r); + let ua = http::header(r, "user-agent").unwrap_or_default(); + + // 单点注销回跳:消费方(JNPF/uc)登出时把浏览器 302 到这里, + // 带上 `redirect_uri` 让 IdP 清完会话再跳回业务侧。 + // 开放重定向防线:必须是 http(s) 绝对地址,且命中任一已登记 client + // 的回调白名单——登出页不该是免费跳板。 + let p = http::params(r); + let back = p.get("redirect_uri").or_else(|| p.get("redirect")).map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""); + if !back.is_empty() { + let allowed = (back.starts_with("http://") || back.starts_with("https://")) + && oauth_clients::all().iter().any(|c| c.allows_redirect(back)); + if allowed { + audit::log("oauth.logout", &who, back, true, &ip, &ua, "slo"); + // 302 的同时必须把会话 cookie 清掉:Location 跳转不吞 Set-Cookie, + // 漏了它浏览器侧会话残留,下次点 SSO 登录会静默重登录。 + return http::send_with( + r, + HTTPStatus(302), + "{\"code\":302,\"msg\":\"redirect\"}", + &[("Location", back), ("Set-Cookie", cleared.as_str())], + ); + } + audit::log("oauth.logout", &who, back, false, &ip, &ua, "redirect 拒绝"); + return http::fail(r, HTTPStatus::BAD_REQUEST, "redirect_uri 未登记,拒绝回跳"); + } + + audit::log("oauth.logout", &who, "", true, &ip, &ua, ""); http::ok_with(r, json!({}), "已退出登录", &[("Set-Cookie", &cleared)]) } @@ -1205,6 +1255,7 @@ pub fn iap_identity(r: *mut ngx_http_request_t) -> Option<(String, String, Strin &name, &groups.split(',').filter(|s| !s.is_empty()).map(|s| s.to_owned()).collect::>(), &department, + "", IAP_TOKEN_AUDIENCE, IAP_TOKEN_SCOPE, now, diff --git a/tests/oauth2-maxkey-e2e.sh b/tests/oauth2-maxkey-e2e.sh index 2f60c95..aebc369 100755 --- a/tests/oauth2-maxkey-e2e.sh +++ b/tests/oauth2-maxkey-e2e.sh @@ -144,6 +144,26 @@ for P in "/maxkey/oauth/v20/authorize" "/sign/authz/oauth/v20/authorize" "/oauth if [ "$CODE" = "302" ]; then ok "GET $P 命中(context-path 归一化)"; else bad "GET $P 期望 302,实得 $CODE"; fi done +# A2b. `/sign/api/oauth/v20/me`:MaxKey 真实 userinfo 路径挂在 /sign/api 下 +# (不是 /sign/authz)——曾是 context-path 归一化盲区,404 回归线 +CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$IDP/sign/api/oauth/v20/me")" +if [ "$CODE" != "404" ] && [ "$CODE" != "000" ]; then ok "GET /sign/api/oauth/v20/me 命中(${CODE},非 404)"; else bad "/sign/api/oauth/v20/me 404,归一化盲区回归($CODE)"; fi + +# A2c. 逗号分隔 scope(MaxKey 文档示例写法 "openid,profile,email"): +# 校验应通过(未登录 → 302 跳登录),而不是 invalid_scope 400 +CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$IDP/sign/authz/oauth/v20/authorize?client_id=demo-system&response_type=code&redirect_uri=$REDIRECT&scope=openid,profile,email")" +if [ "$CODE" = "302" ]; then ok "authorize 逗号 scope 通过(302 跳登录)"; else bad "逗号 scope 被拒(期望 302,实得 $CODE)"; fi + +# A2d. 单点注销裸路径:/sign/logout 经归一化命中 +CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$IDP/sign/logout")" +if [ "$CODE" != "404" ] && [ "$CODE" != "000" ]; then ok "GET /sign/logout 命中(${CODE})"; else bad "/sign/logout 未命中($CODE)"; fi + +# A2e. 注销回跳:已登记 redirect_uri → 302;未登记 → 400 拒绝(开放重定向防线) +CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$IDP/sign/logout?redirect_uri=$REDIRECT")" +if [ "$CODE" = "302" ]; then ok "logout 带已登记 redirect_uri → 302 回跳"; else bad "logout 回跳期望 302,实得 $CODE"; fi +CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$IDP/sign/logout?redirect_uri=http://evil.example.com/cb")" +if [ "$CODE" = "400" ]; then ok "logout 未登记 redirect_uri 被拒(400)"; else bad "开放重定向防线失效(期望 400,实得 $CODE)"; fi + # A3. token 端点别名存在(缺参数应 4xx,而不是 404) CODE="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "$IDP/sign/authz/oauth/v20/token" -d 'grant_type=authorization_code')" if [ "$CODE" != "404" ] && [ "$CODE" != "000" ]; then ok "POST /sign/authz/oauth/v20/token 命中(${CODE},非 404)"; else bad "token 别名未命中(${CODE})"; fi @@ -197,6 +217,11 @@ fi ME2="$(curl -s "$IDP/oauth2.0/profile?access_token=$AT")" if [ "$(tj "$ME2" username)" = "alice" ]; then ok "GET /oauth2.0/profile 别名命中"; else bad "/oauth2.0/profile 别名异常:$ME2"; fi +# A8b. /me 的 MaxKey 别名字段:id/userId(全局身份映射键)+ displayName +U_ID2="$(tj "$ME_JSON" id)" +U_DN="$(tj "$ME_JSON" displayName)" +if [ "$U_ID2" = "alice" ] && [ -n "$U_DN" ]; then ok "/me 别名字段 id/userId/displayName 正常"; else bad "/me 别名字段异常(id=$U_ID2, displayName=$U_DN)"; fi + # A9. 标准端点不受影响(回归):Bearer 头 + userinfo 信封 STD="$(curl -s "$IDP/oauth/userinfo" -H "Authorization: Bearer $AT")" if [ "$(printf '%s' "$STD" | python3 -c "