Files
ssw-mpc/tools/selftest-link.py
T
admin 362db1d7a8 feat(tee): 两层控制面、宿主控制面独立 crate 与会话级链路层
- 拆出 crates/mpc-hostd(axum/tokio/reqwest),mpc-tee 保持零 crates.io 依赖,保住 OP-TEE SDK 离线交叉编译
- mpc-hostd 提供 e2b 兼容 API + TeeRuntime + /attestation 四布尔分开报;站点侧 session_admit 产 TeeRequirement
- 新增 mpc link plan|verdict|credential:EasyTier 三档中继策略,凭据由管理节点签发,框架不生成
- OP-TEE 补跨设备/跨重启验证编排与判据逻辑自测,真机验收延后
- 主门禁 11→13 条:新增 hostd 端到端(33 判据)与链路层桩自测(53 判据)
- 同步 catalog 守卫测试、CLAUDE.md、INTEGRATION_ANALYSIS.md 与 OPTEE_VERIF_PLAN.md
2026-11-07 16:10:42 +08:00

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""会话级链路层(EasyTier)端到端自测 —— 主门禁第 13 条。
# 为什么需要桩
本机没有 EasyTier 二进制,也没有联盟管理节点。但「没装」不等于「判据可以跳过」:
链路层最容易出的事故恰恰是**静默的**——
- argv 里漏了 `--secure-mode` / 混进 `--network-secret`,网络照起,分级授权没了;
- `easytier-cli peer` 有多行,只判第一行就把 relay 藏成 p2p;
- `allowlist` 白名单为空却生成出等于 open 的配置;
- 凭据输出格式变了,签发器解析出半份凭据还当成功。
所以这里生成两个**桩**(fake-easytier-cli / fake-easytier-core),
用真实的 `mpc link` 子命令跑完整链路:argv 生成 → 桩进程收参 → 凭据签发 →
peer 采样 → 三档判定 → 绑定摘要。判的是**框架自己的契约**,
不是 EasyTier 的实现;真机联调另算,不能拿「本机没装」当通过。
# 判据纪律
- 每条负向用例都带**期望的拒绝特征**且必须匹配 ——
只判「失败」不判失败原因,分不清「按设计拒绝」和「碰巧崩了」。
- 失败就非零退出,不 `|| true` 吞掉。
- 「进程真起真回收」的判据在 Rust 单测里(`LinkRuntime` 持 `Child` + `try_wait`
收割),本脚本显式再跑一次,确保它真的进了主门禁的执行路径,
而不是只在某个开发机上偶尔跑过。
"""
import json
import os
import stat
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
REPO = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
BIN = os.path.join(REPO, "target", "debug", "mpc")
PASS = "\033[32m ok\033[0m"
FAIL = "\033[31m FAIL\033[0m"
failures = []
def check(name, cond, detail=""):
if cond:
print(PASS, name)
else:
print(FAIL, name, "-", str(detail)[:400])
failures.append(name)
def run(*args, env=None):
r = subprocess.run(
[BIN, *args], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30, env=env
)
return r.returncode, r.stdout + r.stderr, r.stdout
def denied(name, out, rc, expected):
"""负向判据:必须非零退出,**且**带期望的拒绝特征。"""
check(
name,
rc != 0 and expected in out,
"rc={} expected={!r} out={!r}".format(rc, expected, out[:300]),
)
FAKE_CLI = r'''#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os, sys
args = sys.argv[1:]
# 剥掉 -r <portal>,其余原样记进日志。
clean, i = [], 0
while i < len(args):
if args[i] == "-r":
i += 2
continue
clean.append(args[i])
i += 1
log = os.environ.get("MPC_FAKE_LOG", "")
if log:
with open(log, "a") as f:
f.write(" ".join(clean) + "\n")
if clean[:2] == ["credential", "generate"]:
print("credential_id: cred-fake-001")
if not os.environ.get("MPC_FAKE_INCOMPLETE"):
print("credential_secret: 'ZmFrZS1zZWNyZXQta2V5'")
sys.exit(0)
if clean[:2] == ["credential", "revoke"] and len(clean) == 3:
sys.exit(0)
sys.stderr.write("桩不认识的命令: " + " ".join(clean) + "\n")
sys.exit(2)
'''
FAKE_CORE = r'''#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json, os, sys
args = sys.argv[1:]
out = os.environ.get("MPC_FAKE_ARGV_OUT", "")
if out:
with open(out, "w") as f:
json.dump(args, f)
# 桩自己也要把守这些边界:argv 真喂给进程时,漏一项就是配置没生效。
if "--network-secret" in args:
sys.stderr.write("桩拒绝:argv 含 network_secret\n")
sys.exit(3)
if "--secure-mode" not in args or "--credential" not in args:
sys.stderr.write("桩拒绝:缺 secure-mode / credential\n")
sys.exit(4)
sys.exit(0)
'''
SESSION_HEX = "03" * 32
UD_HEX = "09" * 32
SECRET = "YWRlbW8tc2VjcmV0LWtleQ=="
PEER = "tcp://relay.example.com:11010"
def main():
if not os.path.isfile(BIN):
print("找不到 {},先跑 cargo build -p mpc-cli".format(BIN))
return 1
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="mpc-link-selftest-") as td:
cli = os.path.join(td, "fake-easytier-cli")
core = os.path.join(td, "fake-easytier-core")
for path, body in [(cli, FAKE_CLI), (core, FAKE_CORE)]:
with open(path, "w") as f:
f.write(body)
os.chmod(path, 0o755)
log = os.path.join(td, "fake-cli.log")
argv_out = os.path.join(td, "fake-core-argv.json")
cred = os.path.join(td, "credential.json")
issued = os.path.join(td, "issued.json")
env = dict(os.environ)
env["MPC_FAKE_LOG"] = log
env["MPC_FAKE_ARGV_OUT"] = argv_out
def cred_file(path, cid="cred-demo-1", secret=SECRET, expires=4102444800):
with open(path, "w") as f:
json.dump(
{
"credential_id": cid,
"credential_secret": secret,
"expires_at": expires,
"allow_relay": False,
"session_id": SESSION_HEX,
},
f,
)
cred_file(cred)
base = ["--peer", PEER, "--credential-file", cred]
# ---------- 1. argv 生成与凭据边界 ----------
# --argv* 的输出必须只取 stdout:--argv 会往 stderr 打私钥警告。
rc, out, stdout = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "open", *base, "--argv-redacted")
redacted = None
try:
redacted = json.loads(stdout.strip())
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 - 判据要报出解析失败的原因
check("脱敏 argv 是合法 JSON", False, "{}: {!r}".format(e, out[:200]))
if redacted is not None:
check("脱敏 argv 是合法 JSON", isinstance(redacted, list))
check("脱敏 argv 隐藏私钥", "<redacted>" in redacted and SECRET not in redacted,
redacted)
check("脱敏 argv 不含 network_secret", "--network-secret" not in redacted)
check("脱敏 argv 显式开 secure-mode", "--secure-mode" in redacted)
check("RPC 白名单收紧到回环", "127.0.0.1/32" in redacted)
check("默认不建 TUN", "--no-tun" in redacted)
check("默认开 private-mode", "--private-mode" in redacted and "true" in redacted)
rc, out, stdout = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "open", *base, "--argv")
real = None
try:
real = json.loads(stdout.strip())
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001
check("真实 argv 是合法 JSON", False, "{}: {!r}".format(e, out[:200]))
if real is not None:
check("真实 argv 是合法 JSON", isinstance(real, list))
check("真实 argv 含凭据私钥(部署层要用)", SECRET in real)
check("真实 argv 绝不分发 network_secret", "--network-secret" not in real)
check("真实 argv 不含被禁 flag",
not any(x in real for x in ["--relay-all-peer-rpc", "--disable-encryption", "-u"]))
# 三档映射:每档的独有 flag 必须出现,别档的必须不出现。
open_argv = json.loads(run("link", "plan", "--policy", "open", *base, "--argv")[2].strip())
al_argv = json.loads(
run("link", "plan", "--policy", "allowlist", "--whitelist", "union",
*base, "--argv")[2].strip()
)
p2p_argv = json.loads(
run("link", "plan", "--policy", "p2p-only", *base, "--argv")[2].strip()
)
check("open 档不加任何 relay 限制",
"--p2p-only" not in open_argv and "--relay-network-whitelist" not in open_argv)
check("allowlist 档下发白名单且值准确",
al_argv[al_argv.index("--relay-network-whitelist") + 1] == "union"
and "--p2p-only" not in al_argv)
check("p2p-only 档下发 --p2p-only 且不下发白名单",
"--p2p-only" in p2p_argv and "--relay-network-whitelist" not in p2p_argv)
# 白名单项含空格会被 EasyTier 当成两个网名 —— 悄悄扩权。
rc, out, _ = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "allowlist", "--whitelist",
"union public", *base, "--argv")
denied("白名单项含空格被拒(防止悄悄扩权)", out, rc, "空白")
rc, out, _ = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "allowlist", *base, "--argv")
denied("allowlist 白名单为空被拒(空名单≠全放行)", out, rc, "白名单为空")
rc, out, _ = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "open", "--rpc", "0.0.0.0:15888",
*base, "--argv")
denied("RPC portal 绑公网被拒", out, rc, "回环")
rc, out, _ = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "quantum", *base)
denied("未知 policy 被拒", out, rc, "不认识的值")
rc, out, _ = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "open", "--plocy", "x", *base)
denied("拼错的参数被拒(不静默忽略)", out, rc, "不认识的参数")
# 不完整凭据文件:形状校验要挡住半份配置。
broken = os.path.join(td, "broken.json")
with open(broken, "w") as f:
json.dump({"credential_id": "x"}, f)
rc, out, _ = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "open", "--peer", PEER,
"--credential-file", broken, "--argv")
denied("凭据文件缺字段被拒", out, rc, "缺少")
bad_secret = os.path.join(td, "bad-secret.json")
cred_file(bad_secret, secret="abc;rm -rf /")
rc, out, _ = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "open", "--peer", PEER,
"--credential-file", bad_secret, "--argv")
denied("凭据含非法字符被拒(argv 注入入口)", out, rc, "base64")
# ---------- 2. argv 真喂给进程 ----------
rc, out, stdout = run("link", "plan", "--policy", "p2p-only", *base, "--argv")
argv = json.loads(stdout.strip())
r = subprocess.run([core, *argv], capture_output=True, text=True,
timeout=20, env=env)
check("生成的 argv 能被 easytier-core 桩接受", r.returncode == 0,
r.stdout + r.stderr)
with open(argv_out) as f:
landed = json.load(f)
check("进程收到的 argv 与生成的一致", landed == argv)
check("进程收到的 argv 含 --p2p-only", "--p2p-only" in landed)
# ---------- 3. 凭据签发 / 撤销(走桩 easytier-cli) ----------
rc, out, _ = run("link", "credential", "issue", "--ttl", "3600",
"--session-id", SESSION_HEX, "--out", issued,
"--cli", cli, "--now", "1000", env=env)
check("credential issue 成功", rc == 0, out)
check("issue 的 stdout 不含私钥", "ZmFrZS1zZWNyZXQta2V5" not in out, out)
check("issue 报出 credential_id", "cred-fake-001" in out, out)
if os.path.isfile(issued):
with open(issued) as f:
body = f.read()
check("issue 把私钥写进文件", "ZmFrZS1zZWNyZXQta2V5" in body)
check("issue 写 ttl 换算出的 expires_at", '"expires_at":4600' in body, body)
mode = stat.S_IMODE(os.stat(issued).st_mode)
check("凭据文件权限是 0600", mode == 0o600, oct(mode))
else:
check("issue 生成凭据文件", False, "文件不存在")
with open(log) as f:
issue_log = f.read()
check("issue 真的调了 credential generate --ttl 3600",
"credential generate --ttl 3600" in issue_log, issue_log)
check("issue 默认不带 --allow-relay(最小权限)",
"--allow-relay" not in issue_log, issue_log)
rc, out, _ = run("link", "credential", "issue", "--ttl", "3600",
"--session-id", SESSION_HEX, "--out", os.path.join(td, "relay.json"),
"--allow-relay", "--cli", cli, "--now", "1000", env=env)
check("显式 --allow-relay 才下发给管理节点", rc == 0 and "--allow-relay" in open(log).read())
incomplete_env = dict(env)
incomplete_env["MPC_FAKE_INCOMPLETE"] = "1"
rc, out, _ = run("link", "credential", "issue", "--ttl", "60",
"--session-id", SESSION_HEX, "--out", os.path.join(td, "nope.json"),
"--cli", cli, "--now", "1000", env=incomplete_env)
denied("签发输出缺 credential_secret 被拒(不返回半份凭据)",
out, rc, "credential_secret")
rc, out, _ = run("link", "credential", "revoke", "--id", "cred-fake-001",
"--cli", cli, env=env)
check("credential revoke 成功", rc == 0, out)
check("revoke 真的把 id 传给了 easytier-cli",
"credential revoke cred-fake-001" in open(log).read())
# ---------- 4. verdict:三档 × 实际路径 ----------
def peer_file(name, rows):
p = os.path.join(td, name)
with open(p, "w") as f:
f.write("peer_id hostname cost\n" + rows)
return p
p2p = peer_file("p2p.txt", "| 111 | alice | p2p |\n")
relay = peer_file("relay.txt", "| 222 | bob | relay |\n")
mixed = peer_file("mixed.txt", "| 111 | alice | p2p |\n| 222 | bob | relay |\n")
unknown = peer_file("unknown.txt", "| 111 | alice | local |\n")
empty = peer_file("empty.txt", "")
def verdict(policy, pf, extra=(), cf=cred):
return run("link", "verdict", "--policy", policy, "--peer-output", pf,
"--credential-file", cf, "--user-data-first32", UD_HEX,
"--now", "1000", *extra)
rc, out, _ = verdict("open", p2p)
check("open + p2p 通过且 link=p2p", rc == 0 and "link=p2p" in out, out)
check("open + p2p 不报元数据暴露", "relay_visible=false" in out, out)
rc, out, _ = verdict("open", relay, ("--relay-network", "public-relay"))
check("open + relay 通过但如实报实际路径",
rc == 0 and "link=relay:public-relay" in out, out)
check("open + relay 明说元数据可见",
"relay_visible=true" in out and "元数据" in out and "看不到明文" in out, out)
check("verdict 给出可上链核对的绑定摘要", "binding=" in out, out)
rc, out, _ = verdict("allowlist", relay,
("--whitelist", "union", "--relay-network", "union"))
check("allowlist + 名单内 relay 通过", rc == 0 and "link=relay:union" in out, out)
rc, out, _ = verdict("allowlist", relay,
("--whitelist", "union", "--relay-network", "public"))
denied("allowlist + 名单外 relay 被拒", out, rc, "不在联盟白名单")
rc, out, _ = verdict("allowlist", relay, ("--whitelist", "union"))
denied("allowlist + 中继网名缺失被拒", out, rc, "未报出中继网络名")
rc, out, _ = verdict("p2p-only", relay)
denied("p2p-only + relay 被拒", out, rc, "p2p-only")
rc, out, _ = verdict("open", unknown)
denied("解析不出的 cost 被判 Unknown 并拒绝", out, rc, "链路类型未知")
rc, out, _ = verdict("open", empty)
denied("空的 peer 输出被拒", out, rc, "没有可解析的数据行")
# ★ 回归探针:第一条 p2p、第二条 relay,绝不能报 link=p2p(曾经的真实假绿)。
rc, out, _ = verdict("p2p-only", mixed)
denied("混合 peer 取最严路径(第一条 p2p 不能藏掉第二条 relay)",
out, rc, "p2p-only")
expired = os.path.join(td, "expired.json")
cred_file(expired, expires=999)
rc, out, _ = verdict("open", p2p, cf=expired)
denied("过期凭据被拒", out, rc, "过期")
rc, out, _ = run("link")
denied("无子命令给出用法且非零退出", out, rc, "用法")
# ---------- 5. 进程真起真回收(Rust 单测,显式再跑一次) ----------
r = subprocess.run(
["cargo", "test", "-p", "mpc-hostd",
"link::tests::runtime_start_then_stop_reaps_the_child", "--", "--exact"],
cwd=REPO, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=180,
)
probe_out = r.stdout + r.stderr
check("LinkRuntime 真起真杀并收割子进程(不依赖 ps / /proc)",
r.returncode == 0 and "1 passed" in probe_out,
probe_out[-400:])
if failures:
print("\n{} 条判据失败:".format(len(failures)))
for f in failures:
print(" -", f)
return 1
print("\n全部通过")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())