- 内核只有 lib:启动装配 → crates/sspf-admin(bin sspf-admin);37 个集成测试 → crates/tests(package sspf-tests)。
- demo/shop/books 的 spec/菜单/DDL/面 B 路由搬进 packs/{demo,shop,books};内核 modules/*.rs 只剩「面 A 适配器 + pub use」⇒ 内核零业务知识,示例可整目录搬走。面 A 与前端零改动。
- 示例表 DDL 按平台规则补 f_tenant_id + 复合主键(spec 不加 ⇒ JSON 键与响应逐字不变)。
- 修 is_builtin_table 只认 schema.sql 的漏洞:包表(含 asset_data_resource)此前可被建模页删除/改;现为「平台 DDL ∪ 包表」。
- sspf-compat-online_dev → onlinedev(包名/模块/文件/路由别名同步);6 个 5 行转发壳合并为 forward.rs。
- 新增 AR16 闸门 + lib.rs「30 秒地图」+ src/backend/README.md;pack-sync 补两处判据(module_key=None 的 urlAddress、apiFile 查存在性)。
- 回归:704 tests / 6 道静态闸门全绿;health 181 表;四个包面 A/面 B 运行时全部 200。
715 lines
32 KiB
Bash
715 lines
32 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# ssw-platform —— 【面 B:官方 JNPF 契约面】冒烟脚本(23 条断言)
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#
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# 这是**第二把尺子**。第一把是 scripts/perm-smoke.sh(32 条,测面 A = ssw 契约)。
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# 本脚本测**官方形状**:同一个后端进程,按官方请求头 + 官方路径 + 官方响应形状断言。
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#
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# 用法:
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# bash scripts/perm-smoke-jnpf.sh
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# B=http://127.0.0.1:30010 bash scripts/perm-smoke-jnpf.sh
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# ENC_BIN=/path/to/ssw-platform bash scripts/perm-smoke-jnpf.sh
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# JQ_BIN="" bash scripts/perm-smoke-jnpf.sh # 强制走 python3 兜底路径(两条路径判据一致)
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#
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# 前置:后端已启动,且处于**初始种子状态**(admin / 123456)。
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# 退出码:0 = 全绿(面 B 覆盖 23/23) / 1 = 有 FAIL 或有 SKIP(未全覆盖) / 2 = 前置错误
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#
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# 🔴 **面 B 的判别规则**(见 JNPF_COMPAT_SURFACE.md §2.2):
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# 请求头带 `Vue-Version: 3` ⇒ 走官方形状;否则走面 A。
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# 官方前端**必然**带这三个头(jnpf-web-apps-main/src/api/request.ts:109-112),
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# 但本仓 React 前端**也发** `App-Code` 与 `Jnpf-Origin: pc`(同款),
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# **只有 `Vue-Version` 不发** ⇒ 判别只能用它 ⇒ 零歧义、零配置。
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#
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# 🔴 **本脚本不假装全过**:面 B 尚未落地的能力记 **SKIP**(计入"未覆盖",不算 PASS)。
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# 结尾打印 **面 B 覆盖 N/M**(M = 23)。
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# 判定规则:**整组未落地**(路由 404 / 共享路由仍是面 A 形状)⇒ 该组逐条记 SKIP;
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# **整组已落地但细节不对** ⇒ 该组逐条 FAIL。
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#
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# 🔴 不依赖 node:cipher 用后端 `--enc` 自证;JSON 取值用 jq(无则 python3 兜底)。
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# 🔴 所有 curl 都带 `--noproxy '*'`(本机 curl 走系统代理,不加会打不通 loopback)与 `--max-time 10`。
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# 🔴 所有含中文的变量引用一律写 `${VAR}`(变量名后紧跟中文时,bash 会把中文并进变量名 ⇒ set -u 下 unbound variable)。
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set -u
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if [ "${1:-}" = "-h" ] || [ "${1:-}" = "--help" ]; then
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sed -n '2,26p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
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exit 0
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fi
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ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
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# 🔴 记住「B 是不是用户显式给的」—— 显式给了就不自起隔离后端(尊重外部后端)
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B_RAW="${B:-}"
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B="${B:-http://127.0.0.1:30010}"
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ENC_BIN="${ENC_BIN:-$ROOT/target/release/sspf-admin}"
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TMP="$(mktemp -d)"
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# 🔴 退出时先停掉**自起的**隔离后端,再删临时目录(助手提供 kill;没自起就是空操作)
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trap 'smoke_backend_kill 2>/dev/null || true; rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
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# 隔离后端自启动助手(被 source;提供 ensure / kill)
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# shellcheck source=scripts/smoke_backend.sh
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. "${ROOT}/scripts/smoke_backend.sh"
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# 🔴 JQ_BIN / PY_BIN **允许从环境覆盖**(与面 A 尺子同形):
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# 用 `${VAR-default}`(只在未设置时取默认)⇒ `JQ_BIN="" bash …` 能强制走 python3 路径。
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JQ_BIN="${JQ_BIN-$(command -v jq 2>/dev/null || true)}"
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PY_BIN="${PY_BIN-$(command -v python3 2>/dev/null || true)}"
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pre_fail() {
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echo "❌ 前置错误:${1}"
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exit 2
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}
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# ---- 契约期望值(唯一真源:docs/contract.md 附录 A)----
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# 🔴 本尺子的**期望条数**从契约读 ⇒ 契约改了尺子不用改;
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# 尺子被改弱(条数对不上)⇒ 结尾的自证会失败。
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CE_PY="$ROOT/scripts/contract_expect.py"
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if [ ! -f "$CE_PY" ]; then
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pre_fail "找不到 ${CE_PY}(契约期望值读取器)。"
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fi
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if ! command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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pre_fail "找不到 python3(读契约期望值用)。"
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fi
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CE_EXP_ASSERTIONS="$(python3 "${CE_PY}" ruler perm-smoke-jnpf.sh 2>/dev/null)" || CE_EXP_ASSERTIONS=""
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if [ -z "${CE_EXP_ASSERTIONS}" ]; then
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pre_fail "读契约的 [RULER] 区段失败(perm-smoke-jnpf.sh 的期望条数)。"
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fi
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# ---- 前置 1:JSON 取值工具(jq 优先,python3 兜底;两个都没有 ⇒ 退 2)----
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if [ -z "$JQ_BIN" ] && [ -z "$PY_BIN" ]; then
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pre_fail "jq 与 python3 都没装,无法解析 JSON。"
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fi
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# ---- 前置 2:cipher 自证二进制(--enc 必须在,脚本不依赖 node)----
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if [ ! -x "$ENC_BIN" ]; then
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pre_fail "找不到可执行的 ${ENC_BIN}(先 cargo build --release,或用 ENC_BIN= 指定)。"
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fi
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ENC_PROBE="$("$ENC_BIN" --enc '123456' 2>/dev/null || true)"
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if [ -z "$ENC_PROBE" ]; then
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pre_fail "${ENC_BIN} --enc 自证失败(无输出)。"
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fi
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if ! printf '%s' "$ENC_PROBE" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-fA-F]+$'; then
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pre_fail "${ENC_BIN} --enc 输出不是 hex。"
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fi
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# ---- python3 兜底的取值小工具(jq 在时不用它)----
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# 🔴 本文件每个 mode 的 **jq 表达式与 python 实现必须给出同一个判据**,
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# 否则 `JQ_BIN=""` 会跑出与 jq 路径不同的结论。改一处必须改两处。
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PY_HELPER="$TMP/jget.py"
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cat >"$PY_HELPER" <<'PYEOF'
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import json
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import sys
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CUR_KEYS5 = ["menuList", "permissionList", "userInfo", "currentSystemId", "sysConfigInfo"]
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CUR_KEYS2 = ["userInfo", "menuList"]
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PL_KEYS = ["pagination", "list"]
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PAG_KEYS = ["currentPage", "pageSize", "total"]
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MENU_KEYS = [
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"id", "fullName", "enCode", "parentId", "icon", "hasChildren",
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"urlAddress", "pageAddress", "linkTarget", "children", "type",
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"propertyJson", "sortCode", "systemId", "isData",
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]
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def out(v):
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if v is None:
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print("null")
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elif v is True:
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print("true")
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elif v is False:
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print("false")
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elif isinstance(v, str):
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print(v)
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else:
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print(json.dumps(v, ensure_ascii=False))
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def d_obj(d):
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v = d.get("data")
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return v if isinstance(v, dict) else {}
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def d_list(d):
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v = d_obj(d).get("list")
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return v if isinstance(v, list) else None
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def jtype(v):
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if v is None:
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return "null"
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if isinstance(v, bool):
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return "boolean"
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if isinstance(v, (int, float)):
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return "number"
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if isinstance(v, str):
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return "string"
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if isinstance(v, list):
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return "array"
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if isinstance(v, dict):
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return "object"
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return "other"
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def count_present(container, keys):
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if not isinstance(container, dict):
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return 0
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return sum(1 for k in keys if k in container)
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def adm_type(d):
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items = d_list(d)
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if items is None or not items or not isinstance(items[0], dict):
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return "missing"
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if "isAdministrator" not in items[0]:
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return "missing"
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v = items[0]["isAdministrator"]
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if v is None:
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return "null"
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if isinstance(v, bool):
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return "boolean"
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if isinstance(v, (int, float)):
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return "number"
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return "string"
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def secret_leak(d):
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items = d_list(d) or []
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n = 0
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for it in items:
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if not isinstance(it, dict):
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continue
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for k in ("password", "secretkey", "f_password", "f_secretkey"):
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if k in it:
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n += 1
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break
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return n
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def menu_keys_ok(d):
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ml = d_obj(d).get("menuList")
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if not isinstance(ml, list) or not ml or not isinstance(ml[0], dict):
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return "missing"
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miss = [k for k in MENU_KEYS if k not in ml[0]]
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if not miss:
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return "ok"
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return "missing:" + ",".join(miss)
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def perm_list_type(d):
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obj = d_obj(d)
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if "permissionList" not in obj:
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return "missing"
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return jtype(obj.get("permissionList"))
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def str_array(d):
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v = d.get("data")
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if not isinstance(v, list):
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return ""
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return ",".join(str(x) for x in v if isinstance(x, str))
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# 🔴 单条详情(**不是** PageListVO):`data` 直接是对象 ⇒ 不能复用 list 系的助手。
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def data_id(d):
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v = d_obj(d).get("id")
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return "" if v is None else str(v)
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def secret_leak_detail(d):
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obj = d_obj(d)
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for k in ("password", "secretkey", "f_password", "f_secretkey"):
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if k in obj:
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return "leak"
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return "clean"
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def detail_str(d, key):
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v = d_obj(d).get(key)
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return "" if v is None else str(v)
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def main():
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mode = sys.argv[1]
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raw = sys.stdin.read()
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try:
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d = json.loads(raw)
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except Exception:
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print("ERR")
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return
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if not isinstance(d, dict):
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print("ERR")
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return
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try:
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if mode == "code":
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out(d.get("code"))
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elif mode == "msg":
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out(d.get("msg"))
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elif mode == "token":
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v = d_obj(d).get("token")
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print("" if v is None else v)
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elif mode == "sysid":
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# 🔴 多应用(面 B 口径):`currentSystemId` 在信封 data 内(官方 PcUserVO 的兄弟键)
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v = d_obj(d).get("currentSystemId")
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print("" if v is None else v)
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elif mode == "dkeys5":
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out(count_present(d_obj(d), CUR_KEYS5))
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elif mode == "dkeys2":
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out(count_present(d_obj(d), CUR_KEYS2))
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elif mode == "dkeys_pl":
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out(count_present(d_obj(d), PL_KEYS))
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elif mode == "pkeys3":
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out(count_present(d_obj(d).get("pagination"), PAG_KEYS))
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elif mode == "listlen":
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items = d_list(d)
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out(0 if items is None else len(items))
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elif mode == "total_ge_list":
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p = d_obj(d).get("pagination")
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total = p.get("total") if isinstance(p, dict) else None
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items = d_list(d)
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n = 0 if items is None else len(items)
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if not isinstance(total, (int, float)) or isinstance(total, bool):
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print("no")
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else:
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print("yes" if total >= n else "no")
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elif mode == "admtype":
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print(adm_type(d))
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elif mode == "secretleak":
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out(secret_leak(d))
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elif mode == "menutkeys":
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print(menu_keys_ok(d))
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elif mode == "permlisttype":
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print(perm_list_type(d))
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elif mode == "datatype":
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print(jtype(d.get("data")))
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elif mode == "listisarray":
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items = d_list(d)
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print("yes" if isinstance(items, list) else "no")
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elif mode == "strarray":
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print(str_array(d))
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elif mode == "dataid":
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print(data_id(d))
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elif mode == "pwdleak":
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out(secret_leak_detail(d))
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elif mode == "dranks":
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out(detail_str(d, "ranks"))
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elif mode == "denabled":
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out(detail_str(d, "enabledMark"))
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else:
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print("ERR")
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except Exception:
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print("ERR")
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main()
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PYEOF
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# ---- 取值小工具:json_get <模式> <JSON 文本> ----
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json_get() {
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local mode="${1}" body="${2}" expr=""
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case "$mode" in
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code) expr='.code' ;;
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msg) expr='.msg' ;;
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token) expr='(.data // {}) | .token // ""' ;;
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# 🔴 多应用(面 B 口径):当前应用 id 由 `App-Code` 头解析,位置 = 信封 data 内
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sysid) expr='(.data // {}) | .currentSystemId // ""' ;;
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dkeys5) expr='(.data // {}) as $d | ["menuList","permissionList","userInfo","currentSystemId","sysConfigInfo"] | map(. as $k | select($d|has($k))) | length' ;;
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dkeys2) expr='(.data // {}) as $d | ["userInfo","menuList"] | map(. as $k | select($d|has($k))) | length' ;;
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dkeys_pl) expr='(.data // {}) as $d | ["pagination","list"] | map(. as $k | select($d|has($k))) | length' ;;
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pkeys3) expr='(.data.pagination // {}) as $p | ["currentPage","pageSize","total"] | map(. as $k | select($p|has($k))) | length' ;;
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listlen) expr='(.data.list // []) | length' ;;
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total_ge_list) expr='(.data.pagination.total // 0) as $t | (.data.list // []) as $l | (($t|type)=="number" and $t >= ($l|length)) | if . then "yes" else "no" end' ;;
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admtype) expr='(.data.list // []) as $l | (if ($l|length)>0 and ($l[0]|type)=="object" then $l[0] else null end) as $it | if $it == null then "missing" elif ($it|has("isAdministrator")|not) then "missing" else ($it.isAdministrator | if . == null then "null" else type end) end' ;;
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secretleak) expr='[(.data.list // [])[] | select(type=="object") | select(has("password") or has("secretkey") or has("f_password") or has("f_secretkey"))] | length' ;;
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menutkeys) expr='(.data.menuList // []) as $m | (if ($m|length)>0 and ($m[0]|type)=="object" then $m[0] else null end) as $it | if $it == null then "missing" else (["id","fullName","enCode","parentId","icon","hasChildren","urlAddress","pageAddress","linkTarget","children","type","propertyJson","sortCode","systemId","isData"] as $need | ($need - ($it|keys)) as $miss | if ($miss|length)==0 then "ok" else "missing:"+($miss|join(",")) end) end' ;;
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permlisttype) expr='(.data // {}) as $d | if ($d|has("permissionList")) then ($d.permissionList|type) else "missing" end' ;;
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datatype) expr='.data | type' ;;
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listisarray) expr='(.data.list // null) | if . == null then "no" else (type == "array" | if . then "yes" else "no" end) end' ;;
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strarray) expr='(.data // []) as $d | if ($d|type)=="array" then ($d|map(select(type=="string"))|join(",")) else "" end' ;;
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# ---- 单条详情(data 是对象,不是 PageListVO)----
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dataid) expr='(.data // {}) | .id // ""' ;;
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# 🔴 `a|has(x) or b|has(y)` 在 jq 里会被 `|` 抢走结合 ⇒ **必须**先把候选键筛出来再判空。
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pwdleak) expr='(.data // {}) | [keys[] | select(. == "password" or . == "f_password" or . == "secretkey" or . == "f_secretkey")] | if length > 0 then "leak" else "clean" end' ;;
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dranks) expr='(.data // {}) | .ranks // ""' ;;
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denabled) expr='(.data // {}) | .enabledMark // "" | tostring' ;;
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*) echo "ERR"; return 0 ;;
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esac
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if [ -n "$JQ_BIN" ]; then
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printf '%s' "$body" | "$JQ_BIN" -r "$expr" 2>/dev/null || echo 'ERR'
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else
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printf '%s' "$body" | "$PY_BIN" "$PY_HELPER" "$mode" 2>/dev/null || echo 'ERR'
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fi
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}
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PASS=0
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FAIL=0
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SKIP=0
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ok() {
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echo " ✅ ${1}"
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PASS=$((PASS + 1))
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}
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bad() {
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echo " ❌ ${1}"
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FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
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}
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skipped() {
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echo " ⏭ ${1} —— 面 B 未落地(不计入 PASS)"
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SKIP=$((SKIP + 1))
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}
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# assert1 <说明> <0|1 判定结果> <细节>
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assert1() {
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local desc="${1}" good="${2}" detail="${3}"
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if [ "$good" -eq 1 ]; then
|
||
ok "${desc}(${detail})"
|
||
else
|
||
bad "${desc} 实际=${detail}"
|
||
fi
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# check <期望> <实际> <说明>(支持 ">=N" 数值比较)
|
||
check() {
|
||
local exp="${1}" act="${2}" desc="${3}" good=0
|
||
case "$exp" in
|
||
'>='*)
|
||
local num="${exp#>=}"
|
||
if printf '%s' "$act" | grep -Eq '^[0-9]+$' && [ "$act" -ge "$num" ]; then
|
||
good=1
|
||
fi
|
||
;;
|
||
*)
|
||
if [ "$exp" = "$act" ]; then
|
||
good=1
|
||
fi
|
||
;;
|
||
esac
|
||
if [ "$good" -eq 1 ]; then
|
||
ok "${desc}(实际=${act})"
|
||
else
|
||
bad "${desc} 期望=${exp} 实际=${act}"
|
||
fi
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# skip_group "<描述1>|<描述2>|…" —— 整组未落地 ⇒ 逐条记 SKIP
|
||
skip_group() {
|
||
local descs="${1}" d
|
||
local IFS='|'
|
||
for d in ${descs}; do
|
||
skipped "${d}"
|
||
done
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# 端点是否"未落地":HTTP 404 或 body code=404(本仓的未知路由兜底)
|
||
route_missing() {
|
||
local http="${1}" body="${2}"
|
||
if [ "$http" = "404" ]; then
|
||
return 0
|
||
fi
|
||
local c
|
||
c="$(json_get code "$body")"
|
||
if [ "$c" = "404" ]; then
|
||
return 0
|
||
fi
|
||
return 1
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# 官方形状的请求头(官方前端必带的三个头;**判面 B 的依据是 `Vue-Version: 3`**)
|
||
HDR_B=(-H 'Jnpf-Origin: pc' -H 'Vue-Version: 3' -H 'App-Code: ssw-platform')
|
||
|
||
# cipher 自证:enc <明文> ⇒ hex 密文
|
||
enc() {
|
||
"$ENC_BIN" --enc "${1}"
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
# 登录一次,输出 body 到 stdout
|
||
login() {
|
||
curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -X POST "$B/api/oauth/Login" \
|
||
"$@" \
|
||
-H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
|
||
--data-urlencode "account=admin" \
|
||
--data-urlencode "password=$(enc '123456')" \
|
||
--data-urlencode "grant_type=password"
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
echo "== ssw-platform 面 B(官方 JNPF 契约面)冒烟(目标 ${B})=="
|
||
|
||
# ---- 前置 3:后端可达且确实是本仓后端(不通 ⇒ 退 2,不是逐条假失败)----
|
||
# 🔴 **后端不可达时自动自起一个隔离实例**(独立数据目录 + 空闲端口)⇒
|
||
# ① 不用先手工起服务(CI 可跑)② 跑完不留脏数据 ③ 两把尺子互不污染。
|
||
# 但**用户显式给了 B** ⇒ 不自起(那个后端是用户自己的,不该替他关)。
|
||
smoke_backend_ensure "${ENC_BIN}" "${B_RAW}"
|
||
if [ "${BACKEND_ISOLATED}" = "1" ]; then
|
||
echo "ℹ️ 已自起隔离后端:${B}(数据目录 ${BACKEND_TMP}/pg,跑完即删)"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# 判据:无 token 打 /api/oauth/CurrentUser ⇒ 本仓恒返回 {code:600}。
|
||
PROBE_BODY="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 "$B/api/oauth/CurrentUser" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||
PROBE_CODE="$(json_get code "$PROBE_BODY")"
|
||
if [ "$PROBE_CODE" != "600" ]; then
|
||
pre_fail "后端不可达或不是 ssw-platform(${B} 返回 code=${PROBE_CODE:-无},期望 600=未登录)。先起服务,或用 B=<url> 指定目标后重试。"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G0 · 面 A 未被面 B 破坏(断言 1–2)—— 恒可跑
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
A_LOGIN="$(login)"
|
||
A_TOKEN="$(json_get token "$A_LOGIN")"
|
||
A_AUTH="Authorization: bearer ${A_TOKEN}"
|
||
A_CU="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 "$B/api/oauth/CurrentUser" -H "$A_AUTH")"
|
||
A_K2="$(json_get dkeys2 "$A_CU")"
|
||
A_PERM="$(json_get permlisttype "$A_CU")"
|
||
if [ "$A_K2" = "2" ] && [ "$A_PERM" = "missing" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 1 · 面 A CurrentUser 仍是 2 字段形状(userInfo + menuList,无 permissionList)" 1 "keys=${A_K2}, permissionList=${A_PERM}"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 1 · 面 A CurrentUser 仍是 2 字段形状(userInfo + menuList,无 permissionList)" 0 "keys=${A_K2}, permissionList=${A_PERM}"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
A_CODE="$(json_get code "$A_LOGIN")"
|
||
if [ "$A_CODE" = "200" ] && [ -n "$A_TOKEN" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 2 · 面 A 登录(无 Vue-Version 头)仍通" 1 "code=${A_CODE}, token 长度=${#A_TOKEN}"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 2 · 面 A 登录(无 Vue-Version 头)仍通" 0 "code=${A_CODE}, token 长度=${#A_TOKEN}"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G1 · 面 B 登录(断言 3)—— 共用路由,恒可跑
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
B_LOGIN="$(login "${HDR_B[@]}")"
|
||
B_TOKEN="$(json_get token "$B_LOGIN")"
|
||
B_AUTH="Authorization: bearer ${B_TOKEN}"
|
||
B_CODE="$(json_get code "$B_LOGIN")"
|
||
if [ "$B_CODE" = "200" ] && [ -n "$B_TOKEN" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 3 · 面 B 登录(带 Vue-Version: 3)⇒ code=200 且拿到 token" 1 "code=${B_CODE}, token 长度=${#B_TOKEN}"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 3 · 面 B 登录(带 Vue-Version: 3)⇒ code=200 且拿到 token" 0 "code=${B_CODE}, token 长度=${#B_TOKEN}"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G2 · 面 B CurrentUser 形状(断言 4–6)—— 共用路由;仍是面 A 形状 ⇒ 整组 SKIP
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
B_CU="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 "$B/api/oauth/CurrentUser" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
B_K5="$(json_get dkeys5 "$B_CU")"
|
||
if [ "$B_K5" != "5" ]; then
|
||
skip_group "断言 4 · 面 B CurrentUser 顶层 5 字段齐全|断言 5 · 面 B menuList 节点是 AllMenuSelectVO 形状|断言 6 · 面 B permissionList 是数组(不能 null)"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 4 · 面 B CurrentUser 顶层 5 字段齐全" 1 "命中 5/5"
|
||
MK="$(json_get menutkeys "$B_CU")"
|
||
if [ "$MK" = "ok" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 5 · 面 B menuList 节点是 AllMenuSelectVO 形状(15 字段)" 1 "15/15 齐全"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 5 · 面 B menuList 节点是 AllMenuSelectVO 形状(15 字段)" 0 "${MK}"
|
||
fi
|
||
PL="$(json_get permlisttype "$B_CU")"
|
||
if [ "$PL" = "array" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 6 · 面 B permissionList 是数组(不能是 null)" 1 "type=array"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 6 · 面 B permissionList 是数组(不能是 null)" 0 "type=${PL}"
|
||
fi
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G3 · 面 B 鉴权码 602 + 未知路由 404(断言 7–8)
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
UNAUTH_HTTP="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -o "$TMP/unauth.json" -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||
"$B/api/permission/Users" "${HDR_B[@]}")"
|
||
UNAUTH_BODY="$(cat "$TMP/unauth.json" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||
if route_missing "$UNAUTH_HTTP" "$UNAUTH_BODY"; then
|
||
skipped "断言 7 · 面 B 无 token ⇒ 返 602(token 失效),不是 600/401"
|
||
else
|
||
check 602 "$(json_get code "$UNAUTH_BODY")" "断言 7 · 面 B 无 token ⇒ 返 602(token 失效),不是 600/401"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
check 404 "$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||
"$B/api/permission/NotExistJnpfRoute" "${HDR_B[@]}")" \
|
||
"断言 8 · 面 B 未知路由 HTTP 404 不被吞掉"
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G4 · 面 B 用户列表 = PageListVO(断言 9–13)
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
U_HTTP="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -o "$TMP/ulist.json" -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||
"$B/api/permission/Users?pageSize=20¤tPage=1" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
U_BODY="$(cat "$TMP/ulist.json" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||
if route_missing "$U_HTTP" "$U_BODY"; then
|
||
skip_group "断言 9 · 面 B 用户列表 data 是 PageListVO(含 pagination + list)|断言 10 · 面 B pagination 三字段齐全|断言 11 · 面 B pagination.total 是总条数|断言 12 · 面 B 列表项不含 password/secretkey|断言 13 · 面 B 列表项 isAdministrator 是数字(0/1,不是布尔)"
|
||
else
|
||
check 2 "$(json_get dkeys_pl "$U_BODY")" "断言 9 · 面 B 用户列表 data 是 PageListVO(含 pagination + list)"
|
||
check 3 "$(json_get pkeys3 "$U_BODY")" "断言 10 · 面 B pagination 三字段齐全(currentPage/pageSize/total)"
|
||
check "yes" "$(json_get total_ge_list "$U_BODY")" "断言 11 · 面 B pagination.total 是总条数(≥ list 长度)"
|
||
check 0 "$(json_get secretleak "$U_BODY")" "断言 12 · 面 B 列表项不含 password/secretkey"
|
||
check "number" "$(json_get admtype "$U_BODY")" "断言 13 · 面 B 列表项 isAdministrator 是数字(0/1,不是布尔)"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G5 · 面 B 角色列表 = PageListVO(断言 14)
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
R_HTTP="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -o "$TMP/rlist.json" -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||
"$B/api/permission/Role?pageSize=20¤tPage=1" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
R_BODY="$(cat "$TMP/rlist.json" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||
if route_missing "$R_HTTP" "$R_BODY"; then
|
||
skipped "断言 14 · 面 B 角色列表 data 是 PageListVO"
|
||
else
|
||
check 2 "$(json_get dkeys_pl "$R_BODY")" "断言 14 · 面 B 角色列表 data 是 PageListVO"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G6 · 面 B 组织列表支持 AsyncList/{id}(断言 15)
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
O_HTTP="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -o "$TMP/olist.json" -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||
"$B/api/permission/Organize/AsyncList/0" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
O_BODY="$(cat "$TMP/olist.json" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||
if route_missing "$O_HTTP" "$O_BODY"; then
|
||
skipped "断言 15 · 面 B 组织列表支持 AsyncList/{id}(根节点 id=0 取一级组织)"
|
||
else
|
||
check 2 "$(json_get dkeys_pl "$O_BODY")" "断言 15 · 面 B 组织列表支持 AsyncList/{id}(根节点 id=0 取一级组织)"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G7 · 面 B 菜单 ModuleBySystem(断言 16)
|
||
# 官方返回 ActionResult<ListVO<MenuListVO>> ⇒ data = {list:[...]}(**不是裸数组**)
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
M_HTTP="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -o "$TMP/mlist.json" -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||
"$B/api/system/Menu/ModuleBySystem" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
M_BODY="$(cat "$TMP/mlist.json" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||
if route_missing "$M_HTTP" "$M_BODY"; then
|
||
skipped "断言 16 · 面 B 菜单 ModuleBySystem 可达且 data.list 是数组"
|
||
else
|
||
M_CODE="$(json_get code "$M_BODY")"
|
||
M_LA="$(json_get listisarray "$M_BODY")"
|
||
if [ "$M_CODE" = "200" ] && [ "$M_LA" = "yes" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 16 · 面 B 菜单 ModuleBySystem 可达且 data.list 是数组" 1 "code=200, data.list=array"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 16 · 面 B 菜单 ModuleBySystem 可达且 data.list 是数组" 0 "code=${M_CODE}, data.list=${M_LA}"
|
||
fi
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G8 · 授权:官方 body 超集(断言 17)+ 官方读用 POST(断言 18)
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
# 🔴 写入用的角色 = role_user,写入内容与面 A 尺子**完全相同**(module=["m_demo"])⇒ 幂等、互不干扰。
|
||
AUTH_WRITE="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -X PUT "$B/api/permission/Authority/Data/role_user" \
|
||
"${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||
-d '{"objectType":"role","module":["m_demo"],"button":[],"column":[],"resource":[],"form":[],"systemIds":[]}')"
|
||
AW_CODE="$(json_get code "$AUTH_WRITE")"
|
||
# 回读:走面 A 的只读端点(两把尺子共用一份数据 ⇒ 这才是真回读)
|
||
ROLE_MODS="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 "$B/api/ssw/sys/Role/Modules?roleId=role_user" -H "$A_AUTH")"
|
||
ROLE_MOD_IDS="$(json_get strarray "$ROLE_MODS")"
|
||
if [ "$AW_CODE" = "200" ] && printf '%s' "$ROLE_MOD_IDS" | tr ',' '\n' | grep -qx 'm_demo'; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 17 · 授权写:官方完整 body(含 button/column/resource/form/systemIds)⇒ code=200 且 module 真落库" 1 "code=200, 回读含 m_demo"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 17 · 授权写:官方完整 body(含 button/column/resource/form/systemIds)⇒ code=200 且 module 真落库" 0 "code=${AW_CODE}, 回读=${ROLE_MOD_IDS:-空}"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# 官方读授权用 **POST**(AuthorizeController.java:100-101),body = DataValuesQuery{type, moduleIds(String), objectType}
|
||
AV_HTTP="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -o "$TMP/aval.json" -w '%{http_code}' \
|
||
-X POST "$B/api/permission/Authority/Data/role_user/Values" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH" \
|
||
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||
-d '{"type":"module","moduleIds":"","objectType":"role"}')"
|
||
AV_BODY="$(cat "$TMP/aval.json" 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||
if route_missing "$AV_HTTP" "$AV_BODY"; then
|
||
skipped "断言 18 · 授权读是 POST(POST .../Data/{id}/Values)⇒ code=200"
|
||
else
|
||
check 200 "$(json_get code "$AV_BODY")" "断言 18 · 授权读是 POST(POST .../Data/{id}/Values)⇒ code=200"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G9 · 多应用:`App-Code` 决定当前应用(断言 19)—— 面 B 与面 A **同一口径**
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# 🔴 只改 `App-Code`(`Vue-Version: 3` 保持不动)⇒ 仍走面 B,但 currentSystemId 必须跟着变。
|
||
# 这钉住的是「头 → 系统解析」这条链路,不是形状(形状由断言 4/5 管)。
|
||
B_CU_APPB="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 "$B/api/oauth/CurrentUser" \
|
||
-H 'Jnpf-Origin: pc' -H 'Vue-Version: 3' -H 'App-Code: app-b' -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
check "app-b" "$(json_get sysid "$B_CU_APPB")" \
|
||
"断言 19 · 多应用:App-Code: app-b ⇒ currentSystemId = app-b(面 B 同一口径)"
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# G10 · 用户 CRUD(断言 20~23)—— 官方 `permission/Users` 那一族
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# 🔴 用**独立账号** `smoke_jnpf_u1`,跑完**软删**(不硬删)⇒ 库里留一行 `f_delete_mark=1`,
|
||
# 下一次跑仍然能重建(查重只看 `f_delete_mark = 0`)⇒ **可重复**。
|
||
# 🔴 断言 22 钉的是「**只 SET body 里出现的键**」:创建时给 `ranks=P5`,
|
||
# 更新时**只发 realName** ⇒ 回读的 `ranks` 必须还在(少写一个 COALESCE 就会变空,
|
||
# 而且前端「编辑用户」一保存就把半个档案清空、**不报错**)。
|
||
|
||
SU_ACC="smoke_jnpf_u1"
|
||
SU_CREATE="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -X POST "$B/api/permission/Users" \
|
||
"${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||
-d "{\"account\":\"${SU_ACC}\",\"realName\":\"面B探针\",\"gender\":\"1\",\"mobilePhone\":\"13800009999\",\"ranks\":\"P5\",\"sortCode\":9,\"enabledMark\":1}")"
|
||
SU_NEW_ID="$(json_get dataid "$SU_CREATE")"
|
||
if [ "$(json_get code "$SU_CREATE")" = "200" ] && [ -n "$SU_NEW_ID" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 20 · 用户建档是 POST /api/permission/Users(JSON body)⇒ code=200 且返回新 id" 1 "code=200, id=${SU_NEW_ID:0:8}…"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 20 · 用户建档是 POST /api/permission/Users(JSON body)⇒ code=200 且返回新 id" 0 "code=$(json_get code "$SU_CREATE"), id=${SU_NEW_ID:-空}"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
if [ -n "$SU_NEW_ID" ]; then
|
||
SU_INFO="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 "$B/api/permission/Users/${SU_NEW_ID}" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
if [ "$(json_get code "$SU_INFO")" = "200" ] && [ "$(json_get pwdleak "$SU_INFO")" = "clean" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 21 · 用户详情 GET /{id} ⇒ code=200 且**不含** password / secretkey" 1 "code=200, 口令列未外泄"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 21 · 用户详情 GET /{id} ⇒ code=200 且**不含** password / secretkey" 0 "code=$(json_get code "$SU_INFO"), 口令=$(json_get pwdleak "$SU_INFO")"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
SU_UPD="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -X PUT "$B/api/permission/Users/${SU_NEW_ID}" \
|
||
"${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||
-d '{"realName":"面B探针改"}')"
|
||
SU_AFTER="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 "$B/api/permission/Users/${SU_NEW_ID}" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
if [ "$(json_get code "$SU_UPD")" = "200" ] && [ "$(json_get dranks "$SU_AFTER")" = "P5" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 22 · 用户改档是 PUT /{id},且**只 SET body 里出现的键**(未发的 ranks 保持 P5)" 1 "code=200, ranks=P5 未被清空"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 22 · 用户改档是 PUT /{id},且**只 SET body 里出现的键**(未发的 ranks 保持 P5)" 0 "code=$(json_get code "$SU_UPD"), ranks=$(json_get dranks "$SU_AFTER")"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
SU_BS="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -X POST "$B/api/permission/Users/BatchUpdateState" \
|
||
"${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||
-d "{\"ids\":[\"${SU_NEW_ID}\"],\"enabledMark\":2}")"
|
||
SU_DEL="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 -X DELETE "$B/api/permission/Users/${SU_NEW_ID}" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
SU_GONE="$(curl --noproxy '*' -s --max-time 10 "$B/api/permission/Users/${SU_NEW_ID}" "${HDR_B[@]}" -H "$B_AUTH")"
|
||
if [ "$(json_get code "$SU_BS")" = "200" ] && [ "$(json_get code "$SU_DEL")" = "200" ] \
|
||
&& [ "$(json_get code "$SU_GONE")" = "400" ]; then
|
||
assert1 "断言 23 · 批量启停 + 软删:BatchUpdateState / DELETE 都 code=200,删后详情 code=400" 1 "启停=200, 删=200, 删后=400"
|
||
else
|
||
assert1 "断言 23 · 批量启停 + 软删:BatchUpdateState / DELETE 都 code=200,删后详情 code=400" 0 "启停=$(json_get code "$SU_BS"), 删=$(json_get code "$SU_DEL"), 删后=$(json_get code "$SU_GONE")"
|
||
fi
|
||
else
|
||
skip_group "断言 21 · 用户详情 GET /{id} ⇒ code=200 且**不含** password / secretkey|断言 22 · 用户改档是 PUT /{id},且**只 SET body 里出现的键**(未发的 ranks 保持 P5)|断言 23 · 批量启停 + 软删:BatchUpdateState / DELETE 都 code=200,删后详情 code=400"
|
||
fi
|
||
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
# 汇总
|
||
# =====================================================================
|
||
|
||
TOTAL=$((PASS + FAIL + SKIP))
|
||
echo
|
||
echo "--------------------"
|
||
# 🔴 **尺子自证**:断言总条数(PASS+FAIL+SKIP)必须等于**契约**登记的条数。
|
||
# 少了 ⇒ 有人删了断言(尺子被改弱);多了 ⇒ 契约没同步。
|
||
# 自证本身**不计入** PASS/FAIL/SKIP(它是元断言,不是业务断言)。
|
||
if [ "${TOTAL}" -eq "${CE_EXP_ASSERTIONS}" ]; then
|
||
echo "✅ 尺子自证:本尺子跑了 ${TOTAL} 条断言 = 契约登记的 ${CE_EXP_ASSERTIONS} 条"
|
||
else
|
||
echo "❌ 尺子自证:本尺子跑了 ${TOTAL} 条断言,契约登记 ${CE_EXP_ASSERTIONS} 条 ⇒ 尺子被改弱了(少了/多了断言)"
|
||
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
|
||
fi
|
||
echo "PASS=${PASS} FAIL=${FAIL} SKIP=${SKIP} / 共 ${TOTAL} 条"
|
||
echo "面 B 覆盖 ${PASS}/${CE_EXP_ASSERTIONS}"
|
||
if [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ] && [ "$SKIP" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||
echo "全绿 ✅(面 B 已达标)"
|
||
exit 0
|
||
fi
|
||
if [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]; then
|
||
echo "无失败,但面 B 尚未全覆盖 ⚠️(${SKIP} 条未落地)"
|
||
exit 1
|
||
fi
|
||
echo "有失败 ❌"
|
||
exit 1
|