//! 权限模型(B4 / D6 之后):**登录态闸门**在,**实体级权限键**没了。 //! //! ## 模型(照上游,v3 spec §5) //! //! | 面 | 判据 | 位置 | //! |---|---|---| //! | 登录态 | 内部令牌 **或** 已登录主体(连接器身份会话 / 本地账号会话) | `platform::auth::require_menu_permission`(= 上游 `requireMenuPermission()`) | //! | 角色码 | `base_role.f_en_code` ∈ {`tdcProvider`,`tdcConsumer`,`tdsReadOnly`} | `tdc::service::account::role_codes` | //! | 管理员位 | `base_user.f_is_administrator = 1`(**fail-closed**) | `tdc::service::account::is_administrator` | //! //! 🔴 **实体级写权限没有隔离**(D6 / D11):任何**登录用户**可写全部 18 个实体。 //! 这是**追平上游**(上游 `TdcCrudController.requireMenuPermission()` 在 //! `permissionGuard == null` 时只校验「有登录态或内部令牌」)⇒ **不是收紧、也不是放权**, //! 而是拆掉一层「看起来在管、实际没管」的假权限层。 //! 风险与部署约束见 `docs/known-limitations.md` L4 与 `docs/contract.md` 权限章节。 //! //! ⚠️ 本测试二进制内共用一个 PGlite 实例(pglite-rs 每进程只允许一个)。 use std::sync::Arc; use axum::http::StatusCode; use pglite::PGlite; use tdc_connector::platform::auth::Principal; use tdc_connector::platform::config::Config; use tdc_connector::platform::session::SessionStore; use tdc_connector::platform::state::AppState; use tdc_connector::tdc::config::TdcConfig; use tdc_connector::tdc::entity; use tdc_connector::tdc::state::{BootstrapIdentity, TdcState}; use tokio::sync::OnceCell; static DB: OnceCell> = OnceCell::const_new(); async fn shared_db() -> Arc { DB.get_or_init(|| async { let db = Arc::new(PGlite::open_temp().await.expect("打开临时 PGlite 失败")); tdc_connector::platform::db::ensure_schema(db.as_ref()) .await .expect("建表失败"); db }) .await .clone() } async fn test_state() -> TdcState { let db = shared_db().await; let config = Config::from_env(std::env::current_dir().unwrap()); TdcState::new( AppState::new(config, db, Arc::new(SessionStore::new())), TdcConfig::default(), BootstrapIdentity::default(), ) } /// 插入一条测试身份(`f_capability` 只用来证明**能力集不再参与写判定**)。 async fn upsert_identity(code: &str, capability: Option<&str>) { let state = test_state().await; let cap = match capability { Some(c) => format!("'{}'", c), None => "NULL".to_string(), }; let id = format!("ID-{}", code); let sql = format!( "INSERT INTO tdc_identity (f_id, f_identity_code, f_name, f_capability) \ VALUES ('{}', '{}', '测试身份', {})", id, code, cap ); // 🔴 所有 DB 访问必须持 `state.db_lock`(PGlite 单 in-process backend,CLAUDE.md 红线) // —— 测试代码也不例外。 let _g = state.db_lock.lock().await; state.db.exec(&sql).await.expect("插入测试身份失败"); } fn session(code: &str) -> Principal { Principal::Session { identity_id: format!("ID-{}", code), identity_code: code.to_string(), } } /// 🔴 **无凭证 ⇒ 403**(登录态闸门还在;文案与上游一致)。 #[tokio::test] async fn no_credential_is_rejected_with_403() { let state = test_state().await; let spec = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里"); let body = serde_json::json!({}); for r in [ tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, spec, &body, None).await, tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::update(&state, spec, "NOT-EXIST", &body, None).await, tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::delete(&state, spec, "NOT-EXIST", None).await, ] { assert_eq!( r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "无凭证必须 403(登录态闸门不许被 D6 顺手删掉)" ); } } /// 🔴 **任何已登录主体都能写实体**(连接器身份会话 / 本地账号会话 / 内部令牌)。 #[tokio::test] async fn any_logged_in_principal_may_write_entities() { let state = test_state().await; let spec = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里"); let body = serde_json::json!({}); let principals = vec![ session("LOGGED-IN-SESSION"), Principal::Account { account_id: "ACCOUNT-1".to_string(), account: "someone".to_string(), }, Principal::Internal { operator: None }, ]; for p in principals { let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, spec, &body, Some(&p)).await; assert_ne!( r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "已登录主体不该被 403(上游同口径:只校验有登录态或内部令牌)" ); } } /// 🔴 **实体级权限键链路已删**:`f_capability` 里只有 `product` 的身份, /// **照样**能写 `Contract`(旧实现会 403「当前身份无「contract」的操作权限」)。 /// /// ⇒ 这条是「把权限键链路加回来」那次变异的**红点**。 #[tokio::test] async fn entity_level_permission_keys_are_gone() { upsert_identity("CAP-PRODUCT-ONLY", Some("product")).await; let state = test_state().await; let contract = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里"); let p = session("CAP-PRODUCT-ONLY"); let body = serde_json::json!({}); let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, contract, &body, Some(&p)).await; assert_ne!( r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "能力集不再参与写判定(D6:删假权限层)" ); } /// 🔴 **写路径的接线自证**:门禁在**函数最开头**(任何 DB 访问之前) /// ⇒ 无凭证时拿到的是 **403**,而不是业务层的「记录不存在或已删除」(200)。 #[tokio::test] async fn crud_write_paths_enforce_the_login_state_gate() { let state = test_state().await; let contract = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里"); let body = serde_json::json!({}); let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, contract, &body, None).await; assert_eq!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "create 无凭证必须 403"); let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::update(&state, contract, "NOT-EXIST", &body, None).await; assert_eq!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "update 无凭证必须 403"); let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::delete(&state, contract, "NOT-EXIST", None).await; assert_eq!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "delete 无凭证必须 403"); }