Files
tdc-rs/tests/permission_gate.rs
T
admin 49e5fcefe4 refactor(b1b-c9): 状态分家 —— 平台 AppState 只留运行态,业务态进 TdcState
影响:平台层不再认识业务类型(引导身份 / 本地账号库 / TDS 客户端 / 业务配置
全部移出 AppState);对外行为零变化(237 条测试全绿、冒烟断言数仍 75)。

改动:
- src/platform/state.rs:AppState 收敛为 {config, db, db_lock, sessions}
- src/tdc/state.rs(新):TdcState = platform + 业务配置 + 引导身份 + 账号库 + TDS 客户端
  · Deref<Target = AppState> => 业务层字段访问(state.db 等)写法不变
  · impl FromRef<TdcState> for AppState => axum 里 State<AppState> 仍可用
- src/main.rs:装配顺序改为 platform -> bootstrap_identity -> TdcState
- 控制器/服务/测试:入参一律换成 &TdcState(bootstrap_identity 仍是 &AppState,
  它跑在装配期,那时 TdcState 还没造出来)
- scripts/check-boundary.sh:新增第 5 个接触点 CP5(平台层不得 use crate::tdc::),
  专门盯这条反向依赖;CP1 只查表名/端点前缀,查不出模块引用
- CLAUDE.md / .workbuddy/memory/2026-10-26.md 同步

设计:FromRef 在 axum::extract(不是 axum::core::extract)=> 手写 impl。
2026-10-26 22:24:54 +08:00

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//! 权限键:能力集解析 + 写操作二次校验。
//!
//! ⚠️ 本测试二进制内共用一个 PGlite 实例(pglite-rs 每进程只允许一个)。
use std::sync::Arc;
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use pglite::PGlite;
use tdc_connector::platform::auth::Principal;
use tdc_connector::platform::config::Config;
use tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::require_write_permission;
use tdc_connector::tdc::service::identity;
use tdc_connector::tdc::entity;
use tdc_connector::platform::session::SessionStore;
use tdc_connector::platform::state::AppState;
use tdc_connector::tdc::config::TdcConfig;
use tdc_connector::tdc::state::{BootstrapIdentity, TdcState};
use tokio::sync::OnceCell;
static DB: OnceCell<Arc<PGlite>> = OnceCell::const_new();
async fn shared_db() -> Arc<PGlite> {
DB.get_or_init(|| async {
let db = Arc::new(PGlite::open_temp().await.expect("打开临时 PGlite 失败"));
tdc_connector::platform::db::ensure_schema(db.as_ref())
.await
.expect("建表失败");
db
})
.await
.clone()
}
async fn test_state() -> TdcState {
let db = shared_db().await;
let config = Config::from_env(std::env::current_dir().unwrap());
TdcState::new(
AppState::new(config, db, Arc::new(SessionStore::new())),
TdcConfig::default(),
BootstrapIdentity::default(),
)
}
/// 插入一条测试身份;`capability` 为 `None` 时该列为 NULL。
async fn upsert_identity(code: &str, capability: Option<&str>) {
let state = test_state().await;
let cap = match capability {
Some(c) => format!("'{}'", c),
None => "NULL".to_string(),
};
let id = format!("ID-{}", code);
let sql = format!(
"INSERT INTO tdc_identity (f_id, f_identity_code, f_name, f_capability) \
VALUES ('{}', '{}', '测试身份', {})",
id, code, cap
);
// 🔴 所有 DB 访问必须持 `state.db_lock`(PGlite 单 in-process backend,CLAUDE.md 红线)
// —— 测试代码也不例外,否则与并行的 `capabilities()` 查询在同一个 backend 上抢。
let _g = state.db_lock.lock().await;
state.db.exec(&sql).await.expect("插入测试身份失败");
}
fn session(code: &str) -> Principal {
Principal::Session {
identity_id: format!("ID-{}", code),
identity_code: code.to_string(),
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn missing_capability_fails_open() {
upsert_identity("NO-CAP", None).await;
let state = test_state().await;
let caps = identity::capabilities(&state, "NO-CAP").await;
assert!(caps.is_none(), "空能力集应解析为 None(⇒ fail-open)");
let spec = entity::find("Product").expect("Product 应在注册表里");
let r = require_write_permission(&state, spec, Some(&session("NO-CAP"))).await;
assert!(r.is_ok(), "能力集解析不出时必须 fail-open 放行");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn parsed_capability_is_enforced_on_write() {
upsert_identity("ONLY-PRODUCT", Some("product")).await;
let state = test_state().await;
let caps = identity::capabilities(&state, "ONLY-PRODUCT").await;
assert_eq!(caps, Some(vec!["product".to_string()]));
let product = entity::find("Product").expect("Product 应在注册表里");
assert!(
require_write_permission(&state, product, Some(&session("ONLY-PRODUCT")))
.await
.is_ok(),
"命中权限键应放行"
);
let contract = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里");
assert!(
require_write_permission(&state, contract, Some(&session("ONLY-PRODUCT")))
.await
.is_err(),
"未命中权限键必须被拒"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn wildcard_capability_allows_everything() {
upsert_identity("ROOT", Some("*")).await;
let state = test_state().await;
let spec = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里");
assert!(
require_write_permission(&state, spec, Some(&session("ROOT")))
.await
.is_ok(),
"通配符应放行全部实体"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn internal_principal_bypasses_the_gate() {
let state = test_state().await;
let spec = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里");
assert!(
require_write_permission(&state, spec, Some(&Principal::Internal { operator: None }))
.await
.is_ok(),
"内部令牌必须直接放行"
);
assert!(
require_write_permission(&state, spec, None).await.is_err(),
"无凭证必须被拒"
);
}
/// 🔴 **接线自证**:三个**写路径**(`create` / `update` / `delete`)真的走了权限键判定。
///
/// 三个写函数都把权限判定放在**函数最开头**(在任何 DB 访问之前)⇒
/// 即便 id 不存在,被拒的也应该是 **403**,而不是业务层的「记录不存在或已删除」(200)。
/// ⇒ 这条用例是「把 `create` 里的 `require_write_permission` 换回 `require_menu_permission`」
/// 那次变异的**红点**(没有它,CRUD 写路径的接线是**测不到**的)。
#[tokio::test]
async fn crud_write_paths_enforce_the_permission_key() {
// ⚠️ 身份码要**唯一**:本测试二进制里的用例并行跑、共用同一个库 ⇒
// 复用别的用例的 `f_identity_code` 会撞主键。
upsert_identity("CAP-PRODUCT-ONLY", Some("product")).await;
let state = test_state().await;
let contract = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里");
let p = session("CAP-PRODUCT-ONLY");
let body = serde_json::json!({});
let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, contract, &body, Some(&p)).await;
assert_eq!(
r.status(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"create 未命中权限键必须 403"
);
let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::update(&state, contract, "NOT-EXIST", &body, Some(&p)).await;
assert_eq!(
r.status(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"update 未命中权限键必须 403"
);
let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::delete(&state, contract, "NOT-EXIST", Some(&p)).await;
assert_eq!(
r.status(),
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"delete 未命中权限键必须 403"
);
}