# xop vs existing tools Detailed positioning against the 5 most relevant alternatives as of 2026-10-01. ## At a glance | Tool | Vault? | Injection method | Stdout mask | Network policy | File policy | OS-auth gate | |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| | **xop** (this) | self (AES-256-GCM, argon2id) | envp (+ askpass P1) | ✅ | ✅ (pf/iptables, stubbed P1) | ✅ (sandbox-exec, stubbed P1) | ✅ Touch ID (biometrics-only; SSH/no-biometric → passphrase; Linux: passphrase-only) | | [secret-agent](https://github.com/paperMoose/secret-agent) | self (age + sqlite) | envp (template) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ (passphrase only) | | [1Password `op run`](https://developer.1password.com/docs/cli/reference/commands/run/) | external (1P only) | envp | ✅ (default) | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (1P account) | | [HashiCorp Vault Agent](https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/docs/agent-and-proxy) | external (Vault) | env file + sidecar | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (Vault token) | | [Bitwarden `bw`](https://bitwarden.com/blog/use-bitwarden-to-keep-track-of-your-ai-agents-credentials/) | external (BW) | envp | ❌ (manual) | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ (BW account) | | [Deno permission](https://docs.deno.com/runtime/reference/cli/run/) | n/a | runtime | n/a | ✅ | ✅ | n/a | ## Where xop wins 1. **OS-level pre-gate before the unlock secret.** secret-agent and other self-hosted vaults only require a passphrase. xop gates with a real Touch ID prompt *first* on the local console (macOS, via `LAContext.evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics)` — biometrics-only, cancelling refuses the operation). The gate's verdict then decides whether the keyring (`~/.x/xop/keyring`, 0600 — silent, agent-friendly) may unlock: only a local biometric pass or a headless automation context (agent/pipe) get silent unlock; **SSH sessions and machines without usable biometrics must type the xop passphrase** — a silent keyring pass there would mean zero identity check. Linux interactive is passphrase-only by design (system-password prompts explicitly forbidden). The gate runs even with a keyring present, so biometric alone never decrypts; a stolen `key.db` still needs the keyring file or the passphrase. (Explicitly NOT macOS Keychain — rejected 2026-10-02: `security(1)` popped system dialogs mid-automation.) 2. **Deno-style policy DSL for arbitrary Unix commands.** secret-agent is great at injection but doesn't constrain *what the child can do*. xop adds `--allow-net=`, `--deny-read=`, etc. — same proven model from Deno runtime. 3. **Zero external dependencies.** xop owns its own encrypted vault. No `op` / `vault` / `security` CLI to set up; no OAuth flows; no per-resolve subprocess overhead. Single binary works on a fresh machine. 4. **LLM-aware guards.** Built specifically for the AI-agent use case. `--on-leak=refuse` is a parse-time check that catches `echo $SECRET` patterns *before* spawn — no other tool does this. 5. **No metadata leakage to `ps`.** v0.1 spawned `op read` per resolve, which leaked `op read op://DevOps/mysql/password` into process listings. v0.2 does all decryption internally — nothing in `ps` reveals what vault items exist. ## Where existing tools win - **secret-agent** has a more mature template engine (`{{NAME}}` substitution in arbitrary command strings) and a richer subcommand surface (create/delete/list/exec/inject/get/env/...). xop only has init/set/list/get/rm + one exec verb. If you need template substitution, secret-agent wins. - **`op run`** is production-grade for the 1Password-only use case. If you're already deep in 1Password, just use `op run` — it has OAuth refresh, device trust, and a decade of hardening. - **Vault Agent** has sidecar mode + auto-renewal + Consul Template integration. If you already run Vault Agent in your infrastructure, you don't need xop for the basic case. - **Deno** is a runtime — it doesn't run arbitrary bash commands. They solve different problems; we just borrow the policy DSL syntax. ## Detailed diff vs secret-agent | Concern | secret-agent | xop (v0.2) | |---|---|---| | Vault storage | age + sqlite, self-managed | AES-256-GCM + argon2id, self-managed | | Auth model | passphrase via `SECRET_AGENT_PASSPHRASE` env or prompt | Touch ID pre-gate (biometrics-only, cancel = refuse) + passphrase prompt | | Reference syntax | bare-key (e.g. `db_pass`) | bare-key (e.g. `db_pass`) | | Injection mechanism | env template (`{{NAME}}` in command string) | `--secret KEY=NAME` flag (envp) | | Stdout sanitization | regex mask by secret name | regex mask by secret name + `--on-leak=kill\|refuse` | | Network policy | none | `--allow-net=` / `--deny-net=` (pf/iptables, stubbed P1) | | File policy | none | `--allow-read=` / `--deny-read=` (sandbox-exec, stubbed P1) | | Dry-run | `secret-agent exec --dry-run` | `xop --dry-run` (shows parsed cmd + effective policy) | | Audit | none | JSONL log with policy_hash for replay | | Sub-command surface | 11 commands (create/delete/list/exec/inject/get/env/...) | 6 (init/set/list/get/rm/help) + one exec verb | | Per-resolve subprocess | none (in-process) | none (in-process) — both avoid spawning CLI per resolve | | Two-factor by default | no (passphrase only) | yes (OS auth + passphrase) | | Library mode | no | planned v0.3 (`use xop::exec`) | ## When NOT to use xop - ❌ You need 1Password / Vault / Bitwarden integration → use those tools directly. - ❌ You need a richer template engine (substituting `{{NAME}}` inside command strings) → use **secret-agent**. - ❌ You're running untrusted *code* (not just untrusted commands) — use **gVisor** / **Firecracker** / proper microVM isolation. ## When to use xop - ✅ You're building or operating an AI agent (Claude Code, Cursor, custom) and want defense-in-depth around what credentials it can touch AND what it can do with them. - ✅ You want a single binary with no external service dependencies (no 1P account, no Vault server). - ✅ You want an OS-level biometric gate (real Touch ID prompt on macOS — no password dialog anywhere in the flow) before the passphrase — two-factor by default. - ✅ You want dry-run mode that shows the effective policy before execution (great for agent self-correction). - ✅ You want audit-grade logs of which refs were used when, without storing values.