24 KiB
xop · Session Handoff
Pick up here in a new session at
/Users/xs/Documents/xop. This doc tells you exactly where the project is, what's done, what's not, and what to do next.
TL;DR for the next session
cd /Users/xs/Documents/xop
# 必须先编译
cargo check --all-targets
# 单元测试(62 个,全跑;无 env 前置)
cargo test --lib
# 集成测试(15 个,需要 XOP_AUTH_BYPASS=1 + XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD=testpass)
# 注意:XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD 旁路只在 `--features test-bypass` 构建中有效;
# release binary 永远不读这个 env。cargo test --test integration 不带 feature 会失败。
XOP_AUTH_BYPASS=1 XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD=testpass \
cargo test --features test-bypass --test integration -- --test-threads=1
# Smoke(默认 release build 不带 test-bypass feature)
cargo build --release
./target/release/xop # banner
./target/release/xop help # 完整帮助
./target/release/xop --dry-run --secret DB_PASS=db_pass --allow-net=db.local:5432 --deny-net=* -- echo hi
./target/release/xop run --secret SSHPASS=s11_pass --allow-net=192.168.1.19:22 --deny-net='*' -- \
sshpass -e ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new [email protected] 'ls /Users'
v0.2.1 status (2026-10-02): working CLI + local vault + real Touch ID gate (LAContext biometrics via JXA — cancel = refuse exit 77, no system password ever; auth::Gate decision: local-biometric/headless → keyring silent, SSH & no-biometric & Linux-interactive → xop passphrase typed, keyring unused) + xop run + xop://KEY argv placeholders + file-keyring passphrase-free unlock (~/.xop/keyring, 0600 — NOT macOS Keychain, rejected after live test popped system dialogs) + real stdout/stderr leak masking (12****【xop禁止将密钥泄漏】) + partial-mask set echo + xop key [--save|--remove]. No external backend dependencies. The single most impactful next step: NetworkGuard / FileGuard OS-level enforcement (pf/iptables/sandbox-exec/landlock) + Askpass injection strategy (P1 below).
1. What's done
v0.2.1 additions (2026-10-02 — user live-test drove 4 fixes)
| Layer | Status | File |
|---|---|---|
set value no longer echoes plaintext (partial mask ab****) |
✅ complete | src/commands/set.rs (rpassword password_feedback_partial_mask) |
File keyring unlock — ~/.xop/keyring 0600 hex key; OS gate runs first and its Gate verdict decides eligibility (biometric pass or headless → silent keyring; SSH/no-biometric → typed passphrase, keyring unused); agent-friendly xop run with zero passphrase |
✅ complete + unit + integration tested | src/vault/keyring.rs + src/vault/mod.rs::open |
| `xop key [--save | --remove]` subcommand (status / enable on old vaults / revoke) | ✅ complete |
Real stdout leak masking (old guard_for_reader was a passthrough stub — that's why raw 123456 reached the user's terminal). Line-buffered filter, mask 12****【xop禁止将密钥泄漏】, kill/refuse → SIGKILL, audit leak_event |
✅ complete + 8 unit + 2 e2e tests | src/guard/stdout.rs |
xop reset --yes cascades keyring deletion |
✅ complete | src/commands/reset.rs |
OS gate rewritten to REAL fingerprint: LAContext .deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics via JXA (biometrics-only — dialog has no password field). LAError classification: cancel/refuse (-128/-5/-12/unknown) → AuthCancelled exit 77 (old code degraded to OK and xop set stored the secret after "用户已取消") |
✅ complete + 8 unit tests | src/auth/touchid.rs |
auth::Gate decision table (live-test #2 fix): authenticate now returns AllowKeyring / RequirePassphrase. Headless(non-TTY, incl. ssh host cmd) → AllowKeyring; SSH pty session → never attempts biometrics (dialog would pop on the local console), requires typed xop passphrase, keyring NOT consulted; local no-biometrics / broken osascript / Linux interactive → same RequirePassphrase. Rationale: silent keyring unlock needs an identity proof behind it. Linux pam.rs deleted (pkexec system password was the old bug) |
✅ complete + 5 unit decide tests + 1 integration | src/auth/mod.rs::decide + src/vault/mod.rs::open |
macOS Keychain approach: implemented, then REJECTED & deleted — security(1) popped system authorization dialogs during background automation (2026-10-02 user veto: 不要放在钥匙串). xop must NEVER call security(1) against the user's keychain |
❌ removed | (git history only) |
v0.2 (2026-10-01)
| Layer | Status | File |
|---|---|---|
| Cargo.toml + deps (no backend crates) | ✅ complete | Cargo.toml |
| CLI arg surface (clap derive, Subcommand enum) | ✅ complete | src/args.rs |
SecretRef parsing (bare KEY=NAME + argv_placeholder flag) |
✅ complete + unit tested | src/secret.rs |
Typed XopError + exit code mapping (BSD sysexits) |
✅ complete | src/error.rs |
Policy (NetPolicy / ReadPolicy / LeakAction) |
✅ complete + unit tested | src/policy.rs |
| Default deny-read list (pre-seeded) | ✅ complete | src/policy.rs::DEFAULT_DENY_READ |
| Local encrypted vault (AES-256-GCM, argon2id, atomic write) | ✅ complete + unit tested | src/vault/{mod,format}.rs |
OS auth gate (v0.2 shipped osascript-admin + pkexec; rewritten in v0.2.1 to LAContext biometrics-only via JXA + Gate eligibility for keyring; SSH & Linux-interactive & no-biometric → typed passphrase — see table above) |
✅ complete | src/auth/{mod,touchid}.rs |
| 6 subcommands (init/set/list/get/rm/reset) | ✅ complete + integration tested | src/commands/{init,set,list,get,rm,reset}.rs |
xop run subcommand (envp inject + xop://KEY argv substitution; single vault open) |
✅ complete + live SSH-verified | src/lib.rs::run_join_and_exec + src/injector.rs::scrub_argv |
TTY-aware passphrase prompt (/dev/tty for real terminal, stdin fallback for agent/pipe/expect) |
✅ complete | src/vault/mod.rs::rpassword_prompt |
test-bypass Cargo feature (gates XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD env to test builds only) |
✅ complete | Cargo.toml::[features] + src/vault/mod.rs cfg-gate |
| Audit log (ref-only, JSONL, invariant test scans 4 keywords) | ✅ complete | src/audit.rs |
secrecy::SecretBox<String> wrapper for values |
✅ complete | src/secret.rs::ResolvedValue |
| StdoutGuard (filter + pipe loop, async tokio) | ✅ complete + unit tested | src/guard/stdout.rs |
| NetworkGuard / FileGuard (interface) | ✅ interface complete, OS impl stubbed | src/guard/{network,file}.rs |
Injector plan + build_envp_delta (real impl, skips argv_placeholder refs) |
✅ complete | src/injector.rs |
| Child env hardening (HISTFILE=/dev/null etc.) | ✅ complete | src/injector.rs::harden_child_envp |
| Spawn pipeline (tokio + pre_exec + RLIMIT_CORE=0) | ✅ complete | src/lib.rs::spawn_child |
| Dry-run mode | ✅ complete | src/lib.rs::run_dry |
| Design / threat-model / comparison / architecture docs | ✅ complete | docs/*.md |
| Examples (init, list, get, ssh, mysql, dry-run) | ✅ complete | examples/*.sh |
| Integration tests (assert_cmd) | ✅ 11 tests, all green (with --features test-bypass) |
tests/integration.rs |
Makefile (build / install / uninstall / test / clippy) |
✅ complete | Makefile |
| secret-agent cloned as reference | ✅ complete | refs/secret-agent/ |
2. What's NOT done
🟡 P1 — Important but not blocking v0.2
| Item | Where | Effort | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
NetworkGuard OS impl (pf / iptables) |
src/guard/network.rs::setup |
2-3 hours | macOS: Command::new("pfctl") + stdin pipe, anchor = xop/<pid>. Linux: iptables -m owner --pid-owner <pid> in OUTPUT chain. |
FileGuard OS impl (sandbox-exec / landlock) |
src/guard/file.rs::setup |
2-3 hours | macOS: build_sandbox_profile exists; need to invoke sandbox-exec -p <profile>. Linux: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) + landlock ruleset before execve. |
Askpass injection strategy |
src/injector.rs |
1-2 hours | Write /tmp/.xop-askpass-$$ chmod 700, body echo "$XOP_SSH_PASSWORD". Set SSH_ASKPASS + SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=force + DISPLAY=:0. srm -m + rm on child exit. |
Fd injection strategy |
src/injector.rs |
30 min | Lower priority — for tools that read password from fd 3. |
| Argv scrubber | src/injector.rs::scrub_argv |
1 hour | Detect --password=<value>, -p<password>, PASSWORD=... patterns in user's argv. |
| Signal forwarding (SIGINT/SIGTERM) | src/lib.rs::spawn_child |
30 min | Command::kill_on_drop(true) already; need separate signal handler task to forward SIGINT/SIGTERM. |
| Entropy-based stdout detection | src/guard/stdout.rs |
4-6 hours | High-entropy string match (gitleaks-style) for unknown leaks that evade name-based regex. |
🟢 P2 — Nice to have
| Item | Where | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Library mode | src/lib.rs |
pub use xop::exec for embedding in xstudio later. |
| Passphrase strength meter (zxcvbn) | src/commands/init.rs |
Warn or refuse weak passphrases during init. |
| Ref-to-hash translation in history | src/lib.rs |
So shell history doesn't reveal which vault items are in use. |
| — | REJECTED 2026-10-02 (user veto after live test: security(1) popped system authorization dialogs mid-automation). Replaced by file keyring ~/.xop/keyring. Do NOT re-litigate. |
3. Key design decisions (v0.2 pivot)
| Decision | Why | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Local vault, no external backends | Avoid per-resolve subprocess (op read, vault kv get) which leaks vault metadata into ps. Single binary, works on fresh machine. |
this doc, docs/design.md §2 P5 |
| OS auth gate (real Touch ID, biometrics-only) + passphrase = 2FA; keyring silent-unlock only where identity is proven | Biometric alone never decrypts; passphrase alone never reaches the vault. Dialog shows NO password option; cancel = exit 77 refusal; never the system login password (user hard rule 2026-10-02). SSH sessions & no-biometric devices must type the xop passphrase — keyring unused there; headless automation may use keyring silently. | docs/design.md §7, docs/threat-model.md T11, src/auth/{mod,touchid}.rs |
| Whole-file single blob (TOML in AES-GCM) | Simple. Atomic write. Re-randomized nonce per save. | docs/architecture.md |
op:///vault:///keychain:// schemes removed |
v0.1 leaked which backend was in use (metadata). v0.2 = bare key names only. | src/secret.rs |
| Master key in vault file (decision 9A) | Simpler than separate keystore. Argon2(passphrase) provides the key; OS auth is just a pre-gate. | docs/design.md §7 |
| Deno-style permission DSL | --allow-net=, --deny-net=. Battle-tested in Deno runtime. |
docs/design.md §3 |
Audit log: NO value/plaintext/ciphertext/passphrase field |
Type-system + scan test enforce it. Invariant I2. | src/audit.rs |
SecretBox<String> for all values |
Debug impl prints <secret>. Prevents accidental println!("{:?}", v) leaks. |
src/secret.rs |
pre_exec for RLIMIT_CORE=0 |
Only way to set rlimit on a tokio::process::Command child (runs after fork, before execve). |
src/lib.rs::spawn_child, docs/architecture.md |
XOP_AUTH_BYPASS=1 for tests only |
Skip OS auth in CI/headless. Passphrase still required (invariant I8). | src/auth/mod.rs |
Atomic vault writes (tmp + rename) |
Survive partial writes / power loss. | src/vault/format.rs::write |
XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD is feature-gated |
Reading this env from a release binary is a backdoor — any process with the env var decrypts the whole vault. Compiled out of release via #[cfg(feature = "test-bypass")]. Verified by strings target/release/xop | grep XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD → empty. |
Cargo.toml::[features] + src/vault/mod.rs |
xop run opens vault exactly once |
--secret env-inject refs and xop://KEY argv placeholders are both SecretRefs (differentiated by argv_placeholder flag), collected by collect_refs and passed to a single resolve_all call. User types passphrase once. |
src/lib.rs::run_join_and_exec + src/secret.rs::SecretRef::argv_placeholder |
| TTY-aware passphrase prompt | is_terminal(stdin) decides: real terminal → /dev/tty (so xop set still reads the secret value from stdin); non-TTY (agent/pipe/expect) → stdin fallback. No env-var backdoor needed. |
src/vault/mod.rs::rpassword_prompt |
4. How to test
cd /Users/xs/Documents/xop
# 1. Unit tests (fast, run often, no env needed)
cargo test --lib
# Expected: 62 tests pass (args, secret, policy, audit, vault::format, vault::mod, vault::keyring, auth(touchid LAError 分类 ×8 + decide 决策表 ×5), stdout-guard, error, injector).
# 2. Integration tests (need built binary + bypass env + test-bypass feature)
# XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD 旁路只在 --features test-bypass 构建中有效
XOP_AUTH_BYPASS=1 XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD=testpass \
cargo test --features test-bypass --test integration -- --test-threads=1
# Expected: 15 tests pass (help, banner, dry-run, bad-ref, secrets-file, env, init-vault, get-unknown, list-empty, run_masks_secret_in_child_stdout, run_masks_argv_placeholder_value, keyring_enables_passphrase_free_unlock, ssh_env_headless_still_unlocks_via_keyring).
# 3. Combined
cargo test --lib && \
XOP_AUTH_BYPASS=1 XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD=testpass \
cargo test --features test-bypass --test integration -- --test-threads=1
# 4. Live smoke — 必须真人跑,两种终端各测一遍
cargo build --release
# (a) 本机 Terminal.app:
./target/release/xop init # 不弹指纹(bootstrap);passphrase ×2 后自动写 keyring
./target/release/xop set DB_PASS # 弹真指纹 → 通过 → 交互输入 secret value(不再问口令)
./target/release/xop list # 弹指纹 → keyring 静默解锁
# (b) SSH 会话(ssh <本机用户>@<host>):
./target/release/xop list # 绝不弹指纹 → 提示输入 Vault passphrase(管理员密码)→ 成功
./target/release/xop set aa # 同上:先输口令再输入值;点取消口令 = 失败
./target/release/xop --dry-run --secret DB_PASS=db_pass --allow-net=db.local:5432 --deny-net=* -- echo hi
./target/release/xop run --secret SSHPASS=ssh_pass \
--allow-net=192.168.1.0/24 --deny-net='*' -- \
sshpass -e ssh user@host 'ls /Users'
# 5. 验证 release binary 没有 XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD 旁路(应空)
strings target/release/xop | grep XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD
5. Common pitfalls for the next session
-
bash expands
$VAR—xop ssh user:$SSH_PASSWORD@hostgets expanded by bash before xop sees it. Always use--secret KEY=NAMEflag. -
rpassword::prompt_passwordrequires a real TTY — can't be called from CI or piped stdin. Currentrpassword_promptis TTY-aware: stdin is TTY →/dev/tty(hidden), stdin is NOT TTY → stdin fallback (no env-var backdoor). Integration tests runcargo test --features test-bypassto enable theXOP_VAULT_PASSWORDenv bypass. -
macOS Touch ID =
osascript -l JavaScript(JXA) 调 LAContext,不是 admin 弹窗 — 旧写法do shell script "..." with administrator privileges是系统登录密码框(红线禁止),且 osascript 命中 admin 授权缓存造成"看起来免密"的假象。正确姿势:ctx.evaluatePolicyLocalizedReasonReply(1, reason, fn)(policy 1 = biometrics-only,弹窗无密码选项)+ 主线程NSRunLoop.runUntilDate自旋等 block 回调;JXA 会把私有队列的回调 marshal 回 JS 线程(实测 NSOperationQueue 探针 107ms)。LAContext 无缓存,每次真弹指纹。 -
Linux 交互 = 直接输 xop passphrase(
pam.rs已删) — 旧实现pkexec -- true弹的是 polkit 系统登录密码框,违反"任何时候不要让用户输入系统密码"红线。Linux 没有可移植的"纯指纹"CLI 闸门(pam_fprint 罕见且发行版绑定),身份无法被生物特征证明 →decide(tty=true, ssh=false, bio=None)=RequirePassphrase,keyring 也不参与(否则等于零验证)。headless 自动化仍走 keyring 静默。 -
pre_execforRLIMIT_CORE=0—tokio::process::Commanddoesn't exposesetrlimit. Must usecmd.pre_exec(|| setrlimit(...))closure (runs after fork, before execve). Pattern insrc/lib.rs::spawn_child. -
Secret<String>in secrecy 0.10 =SecretBox<String>— don't follow 0.8 docs. -
stdout mask uses
Vec<u8>notString— child stdout may be UTF-8 invalid (binary data); bytes avoidfrom_utf8panic. -
audit log flush before child exits —
AuditLog::write_eventcalls.flush(). If child crashes mid-exec, audit isn't lost. -
osascript -l JavaScript调用姿势 — 用Command::new("/usr/bin/osascript").arg("-l").arg("JavaScript").arg("-e").arg(JXA_SCRIPT).arg(reason):reason 走 argv 而非字符串拼接,完全没有 shell 引号转义问题。JXA 里 enum 名(LAPolicyDeviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics)不一定桥接成功,用数字 1 稳定。详见src/auth/touchid.rs::JXA_SCRIPT。 -
Argon2 parameters —
m=64 MiB, t=3, p=4is standard. Don't tune down (defeats offline brute force). Eachxopinvocation pays ~250ms per unlock. -
Vault file is per-user —
~/.xop/key.dbresolves via$HOME. CI tests must setHOMEto a temp dir before running, which is why--test-threads=1matters. -
XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD是 release 后门,必须 feature-gated — v0.2 早期版本把它当 CI/agent 旁路直接读 env,等于"任何有 env 的进程都能解密 vault"。当前用#[cfg(feature = "test-bypass")]包住;release 永远不编译这段。校验手段:strings target/release/xop | grep XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD必须空。 -
TTY-aware passphrase prompt —
is_terminal(stdin)决定走/dev/tty还是 stdin fallback。如果用/dev/tty文件存在性检测会误判(SSH 下文件存在但不可用)。用std::io::IsTerminal(POSIXisatty(fd))才是真信号。 -
vault 不要开两次 — 早期
xop run内部先expand_xop_placeholders开一次 vault,再run_exec开一次,导致用户输两次 passphrase。修复:让expand_xop_placeholders只收集名字(不开 vault),把 placeholder 加进SecretRef::argv_placeholder=true的列表,让run_exec::collect_refs一次性带去resolve_all。原则:vault 整个进程最多 open 一次。 -
SecretRef::argv_placeholder区分两种注入 —--secret KEY=NAME(envp) vsxop://KEY(argv)。两者走同一个 vault resolve,但build_envp_delta跳过 placeholder,scrub_argv处理 placeholder。ResolvedValue镜像标志位。 -
绝不调 macOS Keychain /
security(1)— 实测:agent 后台会话里security add/find/delete-generic-password会弹系统授权对话框("xop wants to modify/delete keys"),用户体验等同攻击,整个 keychain 方案 2026-10-02 被否决删除。免密解锁 =~/.xop/keyring0600 文件(存 argon2 派生密钥 hex,非 passphrase 本身;mode 不合规直接拒用)。OS 预闸门顺序写死在 keyring 读取之前,且闸门结论决定 keyring 资格——本地指纹通过或 headless 才免输;SSH/无指纹交互必须输口令,keyring 根本不读。 -
lib 单元测试禁止 set_var 全局 env —
cargo test --lib默认并行;keyring 测试曾用set_var("HOME", tmpdir)+set_var("XOP_NO_KEYRING"),4 个测试随机红(别的测试同时读到被改的 HOME)。解法:文件逻辑抽成路径显式的save_at/load_at/remove_at(&Path)纯函数,wrapper 才解析path()+env 门控;测试只打 tempdir 路径。决策逻辑同理抽成auth::decide(tty, ssh, bio)纯函数,测 SSH/headless 分支不碰 env。(集成测试单进程串行 + 子进程 env 隔离,set_var HOME 仍安全,保持--test-threads=1。) -
SSH 会话
isatty(0)也是 true——TTY ≠ 本地控制台 — sshd 分配的 pty 让isatty(0)/is_terminal()返回 true,旧闸门据此在 SSH 会话里调 LAContext:Touch ID 弹窗只会出现在本机物理控制台,远程用户看不到也点不了,等于卡死/错弹(2026-10-02 实测抱怨"ssh 状态也让输入指纹")。检测用SSH_TTY/SSH_CONNECTION/SSH_CLIENTenv(sshd 注入,本地 Terminal.app 没有)。语义:SSH 交互会话 →Gate::RequirePassphrase(输 xop 管理员密码,keyring 不参与——没有指纹现证就没有任何身份验证垫底);ssh host cmd无 pty 的自动化 → 仍 headless → keyring 静默(xop run无人值守不受影响)。判断顺序!tty → ssh → bio,headless 检查必须在 ssh 之前。
6. Where to look first (file map)
| Question | File |
|---|---|
| How is the CLI parsed? | src/args.rs |
What does a ref look like (incl. argv_placeholder flag)? |
src/secret.rs |
| What does the policy look like? | src/policy.rs |
| How is the vault encrypted? | src/vault/mod.rs + src/vault/format.rs |
How does the fingerprint gate work (LAContext via JXA; Outcome/classify)? 闸门结论怎么决定 keyring 能否静默(Gate/Bio/decide(tty,ssh,bio) 纯决策表:headless→静默 · SSH/无指纹→强制输 passphrase · 取消→exit 77)? |
src/auth/mod.rs + src/auth/touchid.rs |
What's in each subcommand (incl. reset, key)? |
src/commands/{init,set,list,get,rm,reset,key}.rs |
| How does passphrase-free unlock work (file keyring, NOT Keychain)? | src/vault/keyring.rs + src/vault/mod.rs::open(顺序:OS gate → Gate::AllowKeyring 才读 keyring;RequirePassphrase 直接手输,keyring 不参与) |
How does xop run coordinate env-inject + xop:// placeholders in one vault open? |
src/lib.rs::run_join_and_exec + expand_xop_placeholders |
| How does argv placeholder substitution work? | src/injector.rs::scrub_argv |
| What guards run around the child? | src/guard/mod.rs + src/guard/{stdout,network,file}.rs |
| Where's the audit invariant enforced? | src/audit.rs (test scans 4 keywords) |
| How is the child spawned? | src/lib.rs::spawn_child |
| How is stdout filtered? | src/guard/stdout.rs::pipe_filter_loop |
How does passphrase prompt choose /dev/tty vs stdin? |
src/vault/mod.rs::rpassword_prompt |
Where is XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD test bypass gated? |
Cargo.toml::[features] + src/vault/mod.rs #[cfg(feature = "test-bypass")] block |
| What's the overall flow? | docs/architecture.md |
| What's the threat model? | docs/threat-model.md |
| How does this compare to existing tools? | docs/comparison.md |
7. Next-step path (P1 work, 1-2 sessions)
If you have 2-3 hours and want the NetworkGuard wired up:
- Implement
NetworkGuard::setupfor macOS (pfctl+ anchor) and Linux (iptables+ owner match). - Test: launch
xop --allow-net=db.local:5432 --deny-net=* -- curl -s db.local:5432and verify it succeeds;xop ... -- curl -s evil.comshould fail. - Implement
FileGuard::setupfor macOS (sandbox-exec) and Linux (landlock). - Askpass strategy for SSH: write askpass script, set
SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=force+DISPLAY=:0,srm -mon exit.
That gets v0.2 to a fully-enforced posture (XIP, FS, network all live). Phase 2 adds entropy detection, signal forwarding, library mode.
8. Future: connecting to xstudio
xop is standalone. When (if) xstudio wants xop as its secrets layer:
- xstudio already has a
xstudio.ai.runAgentLoopMCP tool. - Add a new MCP tool
xstudio.secrets.execthat callsxop::run(args)internally. - Or expose xop as a CLI that xstudio's agent runtime shells out to.
- The
library modeitem in P2 is exactly for this —pub use xop::execfor embedding.
For now xop doesn't know xstudio exists. Keep it that way until there's a concrete integration ask.
9. Quick reference
| What | Where |
|---|---|
| Project root | /Users/xs/Documents/xop |
| Reference impl | refs/secret-agent/ |
| Design docs | docs/*.md |
| CLI entry | src/main.rs |
| Orchestrator | src/lib.rs::run |
| Vault module | src/vault/mod.rs |
| Audit invariant test | src/audit.rs::tests::no_value_field_in_any_event |
| Tests require | integration: --features test-bypass build + XOP_AUTH_BYPASS=1 XOP_VAULT_PASSWORD=testpass |