11 KiB
11 KiB
xop · Architecture
Module dependency graph
main.rs
│
▼
lib.rs (run orchestrator)
│
┌────────────┬────────┼────────┬─────────────┬───────────────┐
│ │ │ │ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼
args.rs secret.rs audit.rs policy.rs guard.rs injector.rs
(clap) (refs) (JSONL) (DSL types) (runtime) (env/askpass/fd)
│
│
┌────────────┼─────────────┐
│ │ │
▼ ▼ ▼
auth/ vault/ commands/
│ │ │
├─ mod.rs ├─ mod.rs ├─ mod.rs
│ (Gate/ ├─ keyring.rs├─ init.rs
│ decide) └─ format.rs ├─ set.rs
└─ touchid.rs ├─ list.rs
├─ get.rs
├─ rm.rs
├─ reset.rs
└─ key.rs
backend/ was removed in v0.2 — the local vault replaces all four external backends.
Data flow: a typical invocation
$ xop --secret DB_PASS=db_pass \
--allow-net=db.local:5432 \
--deny-net=* \
-- mysql -h db.local -u app -e 'SELECT 1'
1. CLI parse (args.rs)
Args {
subcmd: None,
secrets: [("DB_PASS", "db_pass")],
allow_net: ["db.local:5432"],
deny_net: ["*"],
on_leak: Mask,
dry_run: false,
exec_command: ["mysql", "-h", "db.local", "-u", "app", "-e", "SELECT 1"],
}
2. Ref resolution (secret.rs)
Ref { key: "db_pass", name: "db_pass" } // bare key, no scheme
3. Policy build (policy.rs)
Policy {
net: NetPolicy { allow: ["db.local:5432"], deny: ["*"] },
read: ReadPolicy { deny: ["/proc/self/environ", "~/.ssh/id_*", ...] },
leak: Mask,
}
4. Vault resolve (vault::resolve_all)
→ auth::authenticate() → Gate // headless(non-TTY)→AllowKeyring; SSH pty→RequirePassphrase (never remote biometric);
// local TTY: LAContext fingerprint — pass→AllowKeyring, cancel→exit 77, no-biometrics→RequirePassphrase
→ Gate::AllowKeyring ∧ keyring::load() // ~/.xop/keyring (0600) hit → key, no typing
→ Gate::RequirePassphrase ∨ no keyring // rpassword::prompt_password() → derive_key = argon2id(passphrase, salt)
→ AES-GCM decrypt → entries["db_pass"] = "hunter2"
→ ResolvedValue { key: "DB_PASS", name: "db_pass", backend: "vault", value: Secret("hunter2") }
5. Injector (injector.rs)
Strategy: Envp (mysql reads MYSQL_PWD natively)
envp_delta: [("DB_PASS", "hunter2"), ("HISTFILE", "/dev/null"), ...]
argv_scrubbed: ["mysql", "-h", "db.local", "-u", "app", "-e", "SELECT 1"]
6. Audit pre-event (audit.rs)
{"ts":"...","event":"spawn","refs":["db_pass"],"policy_hash":"sha256:abc...",
"child_argv":["mysql","-h","db.local","-u","app","-e","SELECT 1"]}
7. Network policy application (guard/network.rs)
macOS: pf rule → block all outbound from PID <x> except to db.local:5432
Linux: iptables -m owner --pid-owner <x> rule
(STUB in v0.2 — runtime TBD)
8. File policy application (guard/file.rs)
sandbox-exec profile → deny file-read* /proc/*/environ, ~/.ssh/id_*
(STUB in v0.2)
9. Spawn (tokio::process::Command)
cmd.pre_exec(|| { setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, 0, 0); Ok(()) }) // no core dumps
cmd.spawn() with:
- env_clear() + envs(parent_env) + envs(envp_delta)
- stdout: piped to xop's stdout filter
- stderr: piped to xop's stdout filter
- stdin: inherited from parent
- kill_on_drop(true)
10. Stdout filter (guard/stdout.rs)
Read chunk from child's stdout pipe.
For each chunk, check against secret value patterns.
If match: replace with [REDACTED:DB_PASS] (Mask) or SIGKILL (Kill).
Write to inherited stdout.
11. Audit post-event
{"ts":"...","event":"exit","child_pid":12345,"exit_code":0,"duration_ms":42}
12. waitpid() → exit code 0 propagated to xop's caller
Subcommand flow (zdata vault operations)
$ xop set DB_PASS (value piped via stdin)
1. args.rs → Subcmd::Set { key: "DB_PASS", force: false }
2. commands::set::run("DB_PASS", false)
a. auth::authenticate("set DB_PASS in vault") → Gate
headless (no TTY) → AllowKeyring (automation path; no osascript call)
SSH_TTY/SSH_CONNECTION set → RequirePassphrase (never prompt biometrics remotely)
local TTY + macOS → LAContext.evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics)
pass → AllowKeyring · cancel → exit 77 abort · no biometrics → RequirePassphrase
local TTY + Linux → RequirePassphrase (system password prompt forbidden)
b. Gate::RequirePassphrase → rpassword::prompt_password("Vault passphrase: ") (keyring ignored)
Gate::AllowKeyring + keyring present → silent; no keyring → prompt
c. vault::Vault::open(path)
key = keyring::load() ∨ argon2id(passphrase, salt)
plaintext = AES-GCM-decrypt(ciphertext, nonce, key)
entries = toml::from_str(plaintext) → HashMap<String, String>
d. read stdin to EOF → get new value (up to 256 chars)
e. if !force && entries.contains_key("DB_PASS"): error KeyAlreadyExists
f. entries.insert("DB_PASS", value)
g. vault.save()
serialize entries to TOML
re-randomize nonce
encrypt with derived key
atomic write: tmp + rename
h. audit::vault_set("DB_PASS")
i. zeroize passphrase buffer (Drop guard)
Other subcommands follow the same shape:
list: open + enumerate + audit (no stdout for values)
get: open + lookup + print + audit (value to stdout, single line)
rm: open + delete + save + audit (TTY confirm unless --force)
Audit log format (JSONL, one event per line)
{"ts":"2026-10-01T12:34:56.123Z","event":"spawn","refs":["db_pass"],"backends":["vault"],"policy_hash":"sha256:9f2a...","child_argv":["mysql","-h","db.local","-u","app","-e","SELECT 1"],"net_allow":["db.local:5432"],"net_deny":["*"],"leak_action":"mask"}
{"ts":"2026-10-01T12:34:56.165Z","event":"stdout_mask","child_pid":12345,"ref":"db_pass","action":"masked","bytes_replaced":11}
{"ts":"2026-10-01T12:34:56.198Z","event":"exit","child_pid":12345,"exit_code":0,"duration_ms":75}
Vault subcommand events:
{"ts":"...","event":"vault_init","path":"/home/x/.xop/key.db"}
{"ts":"...","event":"vault_unlock","auth":"touchid","success":true}
{"ts":"...","event":"vault_set","name":"DB_PASS"}
{"ts":"...","event":"vault_get","name":"DB_PASS","ok":true}
{"ts":"...","event":"vault_rm","name":"DB_PASS"}
Invariant (I2): no value, plaintext, ciphertext, or passphrase field exists in any event. secrecy::Secret never crosses this boundary — only refs, names, and metadata.
Trait surfaces
// src/auth/mod.rs
#[async_trait]
pub trait Auth: Send + Sync {
async fn authenticate(&self, reason: &str) -> Result<()>;
}
// src/vault/mod.rs
pub struct Vault { path, salt, nonce, key, entries }
impl Vault {
pub async fn open(path: &Path) -> Result<Self>;
// open order is FIXED: auth::authenticate() FIRST, then keyring::load()
// (~/.xop/keyring, 0600 — NOT macOS Keychain) — falls back to typed
// passphrase + argon2id only when the keyring is absent/XOP_NO_KEYRING=1.
pub async fn create(path: &Path, passphrase: &str) -> Result<Self>;
// create writes the vault AND saves the derived key to the keyring.
pub fn key_bytes(&self) -> &[u8; 32]; // for `xop key --save`
pub fn get(&self, key: &str) -> Option<&str>;
pub fn set(&mut self, key: &str, value: &str);
pub fn rm(&mut self, key: &str) -> bool;
pub fn list(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = (&str, &str)>; // (key, created_at)
pub async fn save(&self) -> Result<()>;
}
// src/guard/mod.rs
#[async_trait]
pub trait Guard: Send + Sync {
fn name(&self) -> &'static str;
async fn setup(&self, policy: &Policy) -> Result<()>;
async fn teardown(&self) -> Result<()>;
}
Lifecycle of a Secret<T>
vault::get(key) ──► Option<&str> (borrowed, never exposed to LLM)
│
▼
injector::build_envp_delta ──► Vec<(String, Secret<String>)>
│ │
▼ ▼
SecretBox::expose_secret() ◄──┘ tokio::Command envs iter
│ │
▼ ▼
String child copy at execve String dropped after spawn
│
▼
guard::stdout::filter ──► regex match against child
stdout bytes; never
logs value
│
▼
audit::log_event ──► writes ref/name only;
type system forbids
value field
The secrecy::SecretBox type provides:
Debugimpl that prints<secret>(so accidentalprintln!("{:?}", s)is safe).ExposeSecrettrait — explicit.expose_secret()required to read.Dropimpl that zeroizes innerT(whenT: Zeroize).
Vault file format (binary)
Offset Size Field
------ ---- ----------------------------------------------------------
0 4 magic = b"XOP\x01"
4 4 version = 1 (u32 LE)
8 16 salt = argon2id salt (random per vault)
24 12 nonce = AES-GCM nonce (random per save)
36 N ciphertext = AES-256-GCM(key, nonce, plaintext) output
36+N 16 tag = AES-GCM auth tag (appended by aes-gcm crate)
HEADER_LEN = 4 + 4 + 16 + 12 = 36
Plaintext = UTF-8 TOML: `entries = { key_name = "value", ... }`
Write path: encrypt → write to key.db.tmp.<pid> → fsync → rename to key.db.
Read path: open → read header → read ciphertext → decrypt → parse TOML.