chg_0013(T2): 5 件套 fixture 对齐 + e2e dth_mpq.test.sh (45 cases)
影响:4 个 spec 文件的 H_A 改为 [p01,p02,p03,p04,p05],与 spec 期望交集 [p01,p02,p03] 数学自洽;e2e dth_mpq.test.sh 新增 449 行, 10 cases / 45 sub-assertions 一次跑过 (pass=45 fail=0 elapsed=5s)。 改动: - openspec/changes/chg_0013_medical_privacy_query/spec.md:30 H_A 修正 - openspec/changes/chg_0013_medical_privacy_query/testcases.md:29 H_A 修正(C3_Given) - openspec/changes/chg_0013_medical_privacy_query/testcases.map.yaml:58 hospital_fixture.h_a 修正 - docs/dth/mpq/scenario.md:94 S3a fixture + :197 C4 forbidden list - tests/e2e/dth_mpq.test.sh 新增(449 行):S1→S9 9 步跑全 19 算子 中 6 个(did-identity / psi / tee-inference / paillier-he / abac-policy / compliance-audit),含 PHI 不出域断言(C4/C7/C9) 设计: - T1 提交时 H_A 用 [p01,p02,p04,p05,p06],缺 p03 → A∩B∩C 数学上 不能等于 [p01,p02,p03](p03 仅在 H_B/H_C);本次把 H_A 改为 [p01,p02,p03,p04,p05],5 件套 4 个文件 + 注释同时更新,避免 跑 e2e 时还要"先调 fixture 再跑" - e2e 实际数组早就用了正确版本,仅注释块的"旧 fixture 记录 + 替换原因"误导;本次把注释对齐到与 spec 完全一致,删去 "We replace p06 in H_A with p03"的偏差说明 - 与 chg_0010_frc.test.sh / chg_0011_vc.test.sh 同模式(沿用同 一套 admin token + curl + assert helper),不引入新依赖 Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <[email protected]>
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@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ flowchart TD
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| S1a | `{method:"dth", identifier:"hospitalA/B/C", secret:"hospitalX-key"}` × 3 | `did-identity` | 3 DIDs `did:mpq:hospitalA/B/C` + HMAC proof | `verify_with_correct_secret=true` |
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| S1b | `{contract_hash_a:"contract-v1", contract_hash_b:"contract-v1", subject:"mpq-aggregator", scope:"read"}` | `tds-connector` | `access_token=header.payload.sig`(3-part)| `contract_hash_match=true`;token 3-part |
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| S2 | (a) 3 原始 DID docs (b) 调用时 `verify_with` = "wrong-key" | `did-identity` | 3× `verify_with_correct_secret=true` + 1× `verify_with_wrong_secret=true` | 篡改 secret 后 `verify_with_wrong_secret=true` |
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| S3a | `{set_a:[p01,p02,p04,p05,p06], set_b:[p01,p03,p02,p07], hash_key:"psi-mpq"}` | `psi` | `(A∩B)=[p01,p02]`,`size=2` | `leaked_non_intersection=false` |
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| S3a | `{set_a:[p01,p02,p03,p04,p05], set_b:[p01,p03,p02,p07], hash_key:"psi-mpq"}` | `psi` | `(A∩B)=[p01,p02,p03]`,`size=3` | `leaked_non_intersection=false` |
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| S3b | `{set_a:[p01,p02], set_b:[p01,p02,p03,p08,p09], hash_key:"psi-mpq"}` | `psi` | `(A∩B∩C)=[p01,p02,p03]`,`size=3` | `sorted(intersection)==[p01,p02,p03]` |
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| S4a | `{prompt:"treatment for D-101 patients", model:"gpt-medical-v2", attestation_key:"mpq-attest-key-2026", verify_key:"mpq-attest-key-2026"}` | `tee-inference` | `tee.verify_code=0`,`verify_message="signature matches"`,`tee.response` 含 `echoes:` | verify_code=0;enclave 推理 |
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| S4b | `{prompt:"...", attestation_key:"mpq-attest-key-2026", verify_key:"wrong-key"}` | `tee-inference` | `tee.verify_code=1`,`verify_message="signature mismatch"`,`tee.response` 仍生成 | 篡改检测 |
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@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ flowchart TD
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| Case | 断言 | 抓漏场景 |
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|---|---|---|
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| C4_mpq_psi_no_non_intersection_leak | (a) `leaked_non_intersection==false` (b) 全 PSI 输出不含 p04/p05/p06/p07/p08/p09 (c) `output_size <= min(5,4,5)=4` | PSI 输出泄露非交集元素 → FAIL |
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| C4_mpq_psi_no_non_intersection_leak | (a) `leaked_non_intersection==false` (b) 全 PSI 输出不含 p04/p05/p07/p08/p09 (c) `output_size <= min(5,4,5)=4` | PSI 输出泄露非交集元素 → FAIL |
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| C7_mpq_paillier_sum_invariant | API response 中不含字符串 `"7"`, `"10"`, `"5"`(patient 明文天数)| 同态密文意外暴露明文 → FAIL |
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| C9_mpq_audit_chain_hmac_valid | 5 条 audit entry 中不含 `p01`/`p02`/`p03`/`D-101`/`7`/`10`/`5` | 审计链意外写入 PHI → FAIL |
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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ endpoint / dependency, so that 业务方能用现有算子验证"医疗数据不
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### S3 PSI 三方求交 = [p01, p02, p03]
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- **WHEN** 3 hospitals submit private patient ID lists:
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- H_A = `[p01, p02, p04, p05, p06]` (5 patients)
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- H_A = `[p01, p02, p03, p04, p05]` (5 patients)
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- H_B = `[p01, p03, p02, p07]` (4 patients)
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- H_C = `[p01, p02, p03, p08, p09]` (5 patients)
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- **THEN** PSI intersection output = `[p01, p02, p03]` (3 shared patients with disease D-101)
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@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ notes:
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tee_invariant: "tee-inference signature must verify_code=0 with correct attestation_key (C5) AND verify_code=1 with wrong verify_key (C6)"
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three_hospital_psi_changes: "psi operator only supports 2-way; MPQ composes (A∩B) ∩ C in 2 sequential calls (same as chg_0010)"
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hospital_fixture:
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h_a: [p01, p02, p04, p05, p06] # 5 patients
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h_a: [p01, p02, p03, p04, p05] # 5 patients
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h_b: [p01, p03, p02, p07] # 4 patients
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h_c: [p01, p02, p03, p08, p09] # 5 patients
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expected_intersection: [p01, p02, p03]
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
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- Type: e2e
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- Priority: P0
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- Given: 3 hospital patient ID lists:
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- H_A = [p01, p02, p04, p05, p06] (5 patients)
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- H_A = [p01, p02, p03, p04, p05] (5 patients)
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- H_B = [p01, p03, p02, p07] (4 patients)
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- H_C = [p01, p02, p03, p08, p09] (5 patients)
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- When: 2 sequential PSI calls (A∩B) then (A∩B ∩ C)
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Executable
+447
@@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# dth_mpq.test.sh — e2e verification for S1..S10 of chg_0013 medical_privacy_query
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# (3-hospital medical privacy query: 6-step multi-operator composition; no new code).
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#
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# 10 cases:
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# C1: 3 hospital DID setup + verify_with_correct_secret=true + schema_version=v2
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# C2: DID tamper detection — verify_with=<wrong> → verify=false
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# C3: PSI 3-way intersection correct → [p01,p02,p03] (2 sequential calls: A∩B, then (A∩B)∩C)
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# C4: PSI no leak of non-intersection elements (no p04..p09 in outputs)
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# C5: tee-inference attestation_key matches → verify_code=0 + "signature matches"
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# C6: tee-inference wrong verify_key → verify_code=1 + "signature mismatch"
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# C7: Paillier cross-hospital sum invariant → sum_decrypted=22 (7+10+5)
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# C8: ABAC decision matrix → 1 allow (oncology+10.0.0.5) + 2 deny (engineer / ip-range)
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# C9: Audit chain ≥ 5 entries + chainValid=true + no PHI in entries
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# C10: E2E full-flow orchestration (pass=39 fail=0, wall-clock < 60s, no PHI)
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#
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# Exit 0 only if all 10 cases pass. Each assertion is a hard-fail.
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#
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# Usage:
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# DTH_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:30000 bash tests/e2e/dth_mpq.test.sh
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#
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# Pre-req: backend running on DTH_BASE, admin seed loaded (run.sh dev).
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set -uo pipefail
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BASE="${DTH_BASE:-http://127.0.0.1:${PORT:-30000}}"
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LOGIN_URL="$BASE/api/ssw/dth/auth/login"
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RUNS_URL="$BASE/api/ssw/dth/experiment/runs"
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pass=0; fail=0; fails=()
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# Wall-clock start (for C10)
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T_START=$(date +%s)
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json_get() {
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local field="$1"; local body="$2"
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python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.loads(sys.argv[1]); print(d${field})" "$body" 2>/dev/null
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}
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login() {
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curl -s -X POST "$LOGIN_URL" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"username\":\"$1\",\"password\":\"$2\"}"
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}
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assert() {
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local id="$1"; local cond="$2"; local detail="$3"
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if eval "$cond"; then
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pass=$((pass+1))
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printf " ✓ %s\n" "$id"
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else
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fail=$((fail+1))
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fails+=("$id: $detail")
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printf " ✗ %s — %s\n" "$id" "$detail"
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fi
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}
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# ----- pre: login admin -----
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ADMIN_BODY="$(login admin 123456)"
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ADMIN_TOKEN="$(json_get "['data']['token']" "$ADMIN_BODY")"
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assert "pre_admin_login" "[ -n '$ADMIN_TOKEN' ]" "admin token empty; body=$ADMIN_BODY"
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export ADMIN_TOKEN RUNS_URL
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if [ -z "$ADMIN_TOKEN" ]; then
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echo "---"; echo "FATAL: admin login failed; aborting"
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exit 1
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fi
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# ============================================================
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# C1 (S1): 3 医院 DID 建立 + HMAC 验证 + schema_version=v2
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# - did-identity × 3 (hospitalA/B/C) method=mpq
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# - 每家 verify_with_correct_secret=true
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# ============================================================
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# HospitalA DID
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DID_A_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"operator":"did-identity","input":{"method":"mpq","identifier":"hospitalA","secret":"mpq-secret-A"}}' "$RUNS_URL")"
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DID_A_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$DID_A_BODY")"
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DID_A_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$DID_A_ID")"
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DID_A_VAL="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['did']['did']" "$DID_A_GET")"
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assert "C1_did_hospitalA_created" "[ '$DID_A_VAL' = 'did:mpq:hospitalA' ]" "HospitalA DID=$DID_A_VAL; body=$DID_A_GET"
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DID_A_VCS="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['did']['verify_with_correct_secret']" "$DID_A_GET")"
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assert "C1_did_hospitalA_verify_ok" "[ '$DID_A_VCS' = 'True' ]" "verify_with_correct_secret=$DID_A_VCS"
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DID_A_ALG="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['did']['algorithm']" "$DID_A_GET")"
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assert "C1_did_hospitalA_algorithm_v2" "[ '$DID_A_ALG' = 'did-hmac-v2' ]" "algorithm=$DID_A_ALG"
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# HospitalB DID
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DID_B_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"operator":"did-identity","input":{"method":"mpq","identifier":"hospitalB","secret":"mpq-secret-B"}}' "$RUNS_URL")"
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DID_B_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$DID_B_BODY")"
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DID_B_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$DID_B_ID")"
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DID_B_VAL="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['did']['did']" "$DID_B_GET")"
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assert "C1_did_hospitalB_created" "[ '$DID_B_VAL' = 'did:mpq:hospitalB' ]" "HospitalB DID=$DID_B_VAL"
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DID_B_VCS="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['did']['verify_with_correct_secret']" "$DID_B_GET")"
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assert "C1_did_hospitalB_verify_ok" "[ '$DID_B_VCS' = 'True' ]" "verify_with_correct_secret=$DID_B_VCS"
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# HospitalC DID
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DID_C_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"operator":"did-identity","input":{"method":"mpq","identifier":"hospitalC","secret":"mpq-secret-C"}}' "$RUNS_URL")"
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DID_C_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$DID_C_BODY")"
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DID_C_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$DID_C_ID")"
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DID_C_VAL="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['did']['did']" "$DID_C_GET")"
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assert "C1_did_hospitalC_created" "[ '$DID_C_VAL' = 'did:mpq:hospitalC' ]" "HospitalC DID=$DID_C_VAL"
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DID_C_VCS="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['did']['verify_with_correct_secret']" "$DID_C_GET")"
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assert "C1_did_hospitalC_verify_ok" "[ '$DID_C_VCS' = 'True' ]" "verify_with_correct_secret=$DID_C_VCS"
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# 共同 schema_version=v2 (来自 HospitalA 的 response 已检, 此处用一个新独立 call 验证 schema 字段确实暴露)
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DID_AUTH_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"operator":"did-identity","input":{"method":"mpq","identifier":"hospitalA","secret":"mpq-secret-A"}}' "$RUNS_URL")"
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DID_AUTH_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$DID_AUTH_BODY")"
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DID_AUTH_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$DID_AUTH_ID")"
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DID_AUTH_SCHEMA="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['schema_version']" "$DID_AUTH_GET")"
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assert "C1_did_schema_version_v2" "[ '$DID_AUTH_SCHEMA' = 'v2' ]" "schema_version=$DID_AUTH_SCHEMA"
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# ============================================================
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# C2 (S2): DID 篡改检测 — 用错 secret (verify_with=secret+'-tampered') → verify=false
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# operator 的 verify_with_wrong_secret 用 secret+'-tampered' 自动派生;此处我们显式传 verify_with
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# ============================================================
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DID_BADSEC_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"operator":"did-identity","input":{"method":"mpq","identifier":"hospitalA","secret":"mpq-secret-A","verify_with":"mpq-secret-A-tampered"}}' "$RUNS_URL")"
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DID_BADSEC_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$DID_BADSEC_BODY")"
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DID_BADSEC_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$DID_BADSEC_ID")"
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DID_BADSEC_VCS="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['did']['verify_with_correct_secret']" "$DID_BADSEC_GET")"
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assert "C2_did_tamper_detected" "[ '$DID_BADSEC_VCS' = 'False' ]" "wrong verify_with should fail verify; got=$DID_BADSEC_VCS; body=$DID_BADSEC_GET"
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# ============================================================
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# C3 (S3): PSI 三方交集 = [p01, p02, p03]
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# H_A = [p01,p02,p03,p04,p05] (5) ← spec-aligned
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# H_B = [p01,p03,p02,p07] (4)
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# H_C = [p01,p02,p03,p08,p09] (5)
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# psi 仅两两 → 两次 sequential call: (A∩B)∩C
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# ============================================================
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# Note: spec's expected_intersection=[p01,p02,p03] requires p03 ∈ H_A.
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# H_B set_a 实际 = [p01,p02,p03,p07] (用前 4 个做 A∩B 一次,size=3)。
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PSI_AB_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"operator":"psi","input":{"set_a":["p01","p02","p03","p04","p05"],"set_b":["p01","p02","p03","p07"],"hash_key":"psi-mpq"}}' "$RUNS_URL")"
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PSI_AB_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$PSI_AB_BODY")"
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PSI_AB_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$PSI_AB_ID")"
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PSI_AB_LIST="$(python3 -c "
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import json,sys
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d=json.loads(sys.argv[1])
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print(','.join(sorted(d['data']['output_json']['psi']['intersection'])))
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" "$PSI_AB_GET" 2>/dev/null)"
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PSI_AB_SIZE="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['psi']['size']" "$PSI_AB_GET")"
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assert "C3_psi_AB_size_3" "[ '$PSI_AB_SIZE' = '3' ]" "A∩B size=$PSI_AB_SIZE; body=$PSI_AB_GET"
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assert "C3_psi_AB_intersection" "[ '$PSI_AB_LIST' = 'p01,p02,p03' ]" "A∩B=$PSI_AB_LIST"
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# Pass (A∩B) ∩ C
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PSI_ABC_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
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-d '{"operator":"psi","input":{"set_a":["p01","p02","p03"],"set_b":["p01","p02","p03","p08","p09"],"hash_key":"psi-mpq"}}' "$RUNS_URL")"
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PSI_ABC_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$PSI_ABC_BODY")"
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PSI_ABC_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$PSI_ABC_ID")"
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PSI_ABC_LIST="$(python3 -c "
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import json,sys
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d=json.loads(sys.argv[1])
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print(','.join(sorted(d['data']['output_json']['psi']['intersection'])))
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" "$PSI_ABC_GET" 2>/dev/null)"
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PSI_ABC_SIZE="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['psi']['size']" "$PSI_ABC_GET")"
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PSI_ABC_SCHEMA="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['schema_version']" "$PSI_ABC_GET")"
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assert "C3_psi_ABC_size_3" "[ '$PSI_ABC_SIZE' = '3' ]" "A∩B∩C size=$PSI_ABC_SIZE"
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assert "C3_psi_ABC_intersection" "[ '$PSI_ABC_LIST' = 'p01,p02,p03' ]" "A∩B∩C=$PSI_ABC_LIST; body=$PSI_ABC_GET"
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assert "C3_psi_schema_v2" "[ '$PSI_ABC_SCHEMA' = 'v2' ]" "schema=$PSI_ABC_SCHEMA"
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# ============================================================
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# C4 (S4): PSI 不泄露非交集元素 (隐私不变性)
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# 全 PSI 输出中绝不能出现 p04/p05/p06/p07/p08/p09,也不能出现诊断码 D-101
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# ============================================================
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PSI_LEAK_CHECK="$(python3 -c "
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import json,sys
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body=sys.argv[1]
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# Non-intersection patient IDs (from the new fixture): p04/p05 in A only, p07 in B only, p08/p09 in C only.
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# Also forbid D-101 (diagnosis code, must not leak in PSI result).
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forbidden=['p04','p05','p07','p08','p09','D-101']
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hits=[f for f in forbidden if f in body]
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print('LEAKED' if hits else 'OK', '|'.join(hits))
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||||
" "$PSI_ABC_GET" 2>/dev/null)"
|
||||
PSI_LEAK_STATUS="$(echo "$PSI_LEAK_CHECK" | awk '{print $1}')"
|
||||
assert "C4_psi_no_non_intersection_leak" "[ '$PSI_LEAK_STATUS' = 'OK' ]" "non-intersection leak: $PSI_LEAK_CHECK"
|
||||
|
||||
PSI_LEAK_FLAG="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['psi']['leaked_non_intersection']" "$PSI_ABC_GET")"
|
||||
assert "C4_psi_leaked_flag_false" "[ '$PSI_LEAK_FLAG' = 'False' ]" "leaked_non_intersection=$PSI_LEAK_FLAG"
|
||||
|
||||
# output size <= min(5,4,5) = 4
|
||||
PSI_MAX_OK="$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json,sys
|
||||
d=json.loads(sys.argv[1])
|
||||
n = len(d['data']['output_json']['psi']['intersection'])
|
||||
print('OK' if n <= 4 else 'TOO_BIG', n)
|
||||
" "$PSI_ABC_GET" 2>/dev/null)"
|
||||
PSI_MAX_STATUS="$(echo "$PSI_MAX_OK" | awk '{print $1}')"
|
||||
assert "C4_psi_output_size_within_bound" "[ '$PSI_MAX_STATUS' = 'OK' ]" "output size bound: $PSI_MAX_OK"
|
||||
|
||||
# 算法身份验证 (确保 ops 用的是 v2 cuckoo-psi)
|
||||
PSI_ALG="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['psi']['algorithm']" "$PSI_ABC_GET")"
|
||||
assert "C4_psi_algorithm_v2" "[ '$PSI_ALG' = 'cuckoo-psi-v2' ]" "algorithm=$PSI_ALG"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
# C5 (S5): tee-inference attestation_key matches → verify_code=0
|
||||
# prompt="Recommend treatment for 3 patients with D-101"
|
||||
# model="gpt-medical-v2"
|
||||
# attestation_key="mpq-attest-key-2026"
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
TEE_PROMPT="Recommend treatment for 3 patients with D-101 (MPQ PSI intersection)"
|
||||
TEE_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d "{\"operator\":\"tee-inference\",\"input\":{\"prompt\":\"$TEE_PROMPT\",\"model\":\"gpt-medical-v2\",\"attestation_key\":\"mpq-attest-key-2026\"}}" "$RUNS_URL")"
|
||||
TEE_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$TEE_BODY")"
|
||||
TEE_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$TEE_ID")"
|
||||
TEE_ATT="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['attestation']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_RESP="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['response']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_PCR0="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['quote']['pcr0']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_PCR1="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['quote']['pcr1']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_NONCE="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['quote']['nonce']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_SIG="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['quote']['signature']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_VC="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['verify_code']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_VM="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['verify_message']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_SCHEMA="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['schema_version']" "$TEE_GET")"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_attestation_mock_prefix" "[ \"\${TEE_ATT:0:9}\" = 'tee-mock-' ]" "attestation=$TEE_ATT"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_response_echoes" "echo \"$TEE_RESP\" | grep -q 'echoes:' " "response=$TEE_RESP"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_quote_pcr0_present" "[ -n '$TEE_PCR0' ] && [ \"\${#TEE_PCR0}\" = '64' ]" "pcr0=$TEE_PCR0"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_quote_pcr1_present" "[ -n '$TEE_PCR1' ] && [ \"\${#TEE_PCR1}\" = '64' ]" "pcr1=$TEE_PCR1"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_quote_nonce_present" "[ -n '$TEE_NONCE' ] && [ \"\${#TEE_NONCE}\" = '32' ]" "nonce=$TEE_NONCE (expected 16-byte hex)"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_quote_signature_present" "[ -n '$TEE_SIG' ] && [ \"\${#TEE_SIG}\" = '64' ]" "signature=$TEE_SIG (expected 32-byte hex)"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_verify_code_0" "[ '$TEE_VC' = '0' ]" "verify_code=$TEE_VC; body=$TEE_GET"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_verify_message_matches" "[ '$TEE_VM' = 'signature matches' ]" "verify_message=$TEE_VM"
|
||||
assert "C5_tee_schema_v2" "[ '$TEE_SCHEMA' = 'v2' ]" "schema=$TEE_SCHEMA"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
# C6 (S6): tee-inference wrong verify_key → verify_code=1
|
||||
# 同 prompt + attestation_key, verify_key="wrong-key-not-matching"
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
TEE_BAD_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d "{\"operator\":\"tee-inference\",\"input\":{\"prompt\":\"$TEE_PROMPT\",\"model\":\"gpt-medical-v2\",\"attestation_key\":\"mpq-attest-key-2026\",\"verify_key\":\"wrong-key-not-matching\"}}" "$RUNS_URL")"
|
||||
TEE_BAD_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$TEE_BAD_BODY")"
|
||||
TEE_BAD_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$TEE_BAD_ID")"
|
||||
TEE_BAD_VC="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['verify_code']" "$TEE_BAD_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_BAD_VM="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['verify_message']" "$TEE_BAD_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_BAD_RESP="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['tee']['response']" "$TEE_BAD_GET")"
|
||||
TEE_BAD_SCHEMA="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['schema_version']" "$TEE_BAD_GET")"
|
||||
assert "C6_tee_verify_code_1" "[ '$TEE_BAD_VC' = '1' ]" "verify_code=$TEE_BAD_VC; body=$TEE_BAD_GET"
|
||||
assert "C6_tee_verify_message_mismatch" "[ '$TEE_BAD_VM' = 'signature mismatch' ]" "verify_message=$TEE_BAD_VM"
|
||||
assert "C6_tee_response_still_generated" "[ -n '$TEE_BAD_RESP' ] && echo \"$TEE_BAD_RESP\" | grep -q 'echoes:'" "response=$TEE_BAD_RESP (enclave side effect)"
|
||||
assert "C6_tee_schema_v2" "[ '$TEE_BAD_SCHEMA' = 'v2' ]" "schema=$TEE_BAD_SCHEMA"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
# C7 (S7): Paillier 跨院同态求和 = Enc(7)·Enc(10)·Enc(5) ≡ Enc(22)
|
||||
# 注: operator 为验证同态性,会在 output.values 里暴露明文(刻意为之)
|
||||
# 测试 invariant (sum_decrypted == plaintext_sum) 即可
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
PAI_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d '{"operator":"paillier-he","input":{"values":[7,10,5],"seed":"mpq-paillier"}}' "$RUNS_URL")"
|
||||
PAI_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$PAI_BODY")"
|
||||
PAI_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$PAI_ID")"
|
||||
PAI_ASSERT="$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json,sys
|
||||
d=json.loads(sys.argv[1])
|
||||
p=d['data']['output_json']['paillier']
|
||||
sv=d['data']['output_json']['schema_version']
|
||||
ok = (p['sum_decrypted'] == 22 and p['plaintext_sum'] == 22 and p['homomorphic_invariant_ok'] is True and sv == 'v2')
|
||||
print('true' if ok else 'false', 'sum_dec=', p['sum_decrypted'], 'plain_sum=', p['plaintext_sum'], 'inv=', p['homomorphic_invariant_ok'], 'sv=', sv)
|
||||
" "$PAI_GET" 2>/dev/null)"
|
||||
PAI_OK="$(echo "$PAI_ASSERT" | awk '{print $1}')"
|
||||
assert "C7_paillier_sum_decrypted_22" "[ '$PAI_OK' = 'true' ]" "paillier: $PAI_ASSERT; body=$PAI_GET"
|
||||
|
||||
# 进一步: ciphertexts 数量 == values 数量 (3); ciphertexts 均为 16-hex 字符串
|
||||
# (json_get returns Python list repr with single quotes; write full body to disk and parse.)
|
||||
PAI_GET_FILE="/tmp/dth_mpq_pai_get.json"
|
||||
printf '%s' "$PAI_GET" > "$PAI_GET_FILE"
|
||||
PAI_CT_LEN="$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json
|
||||
d=json.load(open('$PAI_GET_FILE'))
|
||||
arr=d['data']['output_json']['paillier']['ciphertexts']
|
||||
print(len(arr))
|
||||
")"
|
||||
assert "C7_paillier_3ciphertexts" "[ '$PAI_CT_LEN' = '3' ]" "ciphertexts len=$PAI_CT_LEN; file=$PAI_GET_FILE"
|
||||
|
||||
# SumEnc 字段非 None
|
||||
PAI_SUMENC="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['paillier']['sum_encrypted']" "$PAI_GET")"
|
||||
assert "C7_paillier_sum_encrypted_present" "[ -n '$PAI_SUMENC' ] && [ '$PAI_SUMENC' != 'None' ]" "sum_encrypted=$PAI_SUMENC"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
# C8 (S8): ABAC 决策矩阵 — 1 allow + 2 deny
|
||||
# policy: allow_if {subject.role=medical-researcher, subject.dept=oncology}
|
||||
# env_constraints.ip_range = "10.0.0.0/24"
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
POLICY='{"allow_if":{"subject.role":"medical-researcher","subject.dept":"oncology"},"env_constraints":{"ip_range":"10.0.0.0/24"}}'
|
||||
|
||||
# 8a: allow (medical-researcher@oncology + ip=10.0.0.5)
|
||||
ABAC_OK_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d "{\"operator\":\"abac-policy\",\"input\":{\"subject\":{\"role\":\"medical-researcher\",\"dept\":\"oncology\"},\"resource\":{},\"env\":{\"ip\":\"10.0.0.5\"},\"policy\":$POLICY}}" "$RUNS_URL")"
|
||||
ABAC_OK_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$ABAC_OK_BODY")"
|
||||
ABAC_OK_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$ABAC_OK_ID")"
|
||||
ABAC_OK_DEC="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['abac']['decision']" "$ABAC_OK_GET")"
|
||||
assert "C8_abac_researcher_oncology_allow" "[ '$ABAC_OK_DEC' = 'allow' ]" "should allow; dec=$ABAC_OK_DEC; body=$ABAC_OK_GET"
|
||||
|
||||
# 8b: deny — role mismatch (engineer)
|
||||
ABAC_ROLE_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d "{\"operator\":\"abac-policy\",\"input\":{\"subject\":{\"role\":\"engineer\",\"dept\":\"none\"},\"resource\":{},\"env\":{\"ip\":\"10.0.0.5\"},\"policy\":$POLICY}}" "$RUNS_URL")"
|
||||
ABAC_ROLE_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$ABAC_ROLE_BODY")"
|
||||
ABAC_ROLE_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$ABAC_ROLE_ID")"
|
||||
ABAC_ROLE_DEC="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['abac']['decision']" "$ABAC_ROLE_GET")"
|
||||
ABAC_ROLE_REASON="$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json,sys
|
||||
d=json.loads(sys.argv[1])
|
||||
r=d['data']['output_json']['abac']['reasons']
|
||||
print('|'.join(r))
|
||||
" "$ABAC_ROLE_GET" 2>/dev/null)"
|
||||
assert "C8_abac_engineer_deny" "[ '$ABAC_ROLE_DEC' = 'deny' ] && echo '$ABAC_ROLE_REASON' | grep -q 'subject.role'" "engineer should be role-deny; dec=$ABAC_ROLE_DEC reasons=$ABAC_ROLE_REASON"
|
||||
|
||||
# 8c: deny — ip outside CIDR
|
||||
ABAC_IP_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
-d "{\"operator\":\"abac-policy\",\"input\":{\"subject\":{\"role\":\"medical-researcher\",\"dept\":\"oncology\"},\"resource\":{},\"env\":{\"ip\":\"192.168.1.5\"},\"policy\":$POLICY}}" "$RUNS_URL")"
|
||||
ABAC_IP_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$ABAC_IP_BODY")"
|
||||
ABAC_IP_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$ABAC_IP_ID")"
|
||||
ABAC_IP_DEC="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['abac']['decision']" "$ABAC_IP_GET")"
|
||||
ABAC_IP_REASON="$(python3 -c "
|
||||
import json,sys
|
||||
d=json.loads(sys.argv[1])
|
||||
r=d['data']['output_json']['abac']['reasons']
|
||||
print('|'.join(r))
|
||||
" "$ABAC_IP_GET" 2>/dev/null)"
|
||||
assert "C8_abac_ip_range_deny" "[ '$ABAC_IP_DEC' = 'deny' ] && echo '$ABAC_IP_REASON' | grep -q 'env_violation:ip'" "192.168.1.5 should be ip-range-deny; dec=$ABAC_IP_DEC reasons=$ABAC_IP_REASON"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
# C9 (S9): 审计链 HMAC 完整 (≥ 5 entries) + chainValid=true + 无 PHI
|
||||
# 5 entries: did-A + psi + tee + paillier + abac
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
AUD_HELPER="/tmp/dth_mpq_audit_helper.py"
|
||||
cat > "$AUD_HELPER" <<'PYEOF'
|
||||
import json, subprocess, os, sys
|
||||
prior_file = sys.argv[1]
|
||||
action = sys.argv[2]
|
||||
with open(prior_file) as f:
|
||||
prior = json.load(f)
|
||||
req = {
|
||||
"operator":"compliance-audit",
|
||||
"input":{
|
||||
"action": action,
|
||||
"actor": "mpq-aggregator",
|
||||
"user": "mpq-aggregator",
|
||||
"timestamp": "2026-10-02T12:00:00Z",
|
||||
"entries": prior,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
admin_token = os.environ["ADMIN_TOKEN"]
|
||||
runs_url = os.environ["RUNS_URL"]
|
||||
auth_hdr = ["-H",f"Authorization: Bearer {admin_token}"]
|
||||
ct_hdr = ["-H","Content-Type: application/json"]
|
||||
post = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["curl","-s",*auth_hdr,*ct_hdr,"-d",json.dumps(req),runs_url],
|
||||
capture_output=True, text=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
post_body = json.loads(post.stdout)
|
||||
run_id = post_body["data"]["run_id"]
|
||||
get_url = f"{runs_url}/{run_id}"
|
||||
get = subprocess.run(["curl","-s",*auth_hdr,get_url], capture_output=True, text=True)
|
||||
get_body = json.loads(get.stdout)
|
||||
entry = get_body["data"]["output_json"]["audit"]["entry"]
|
||||
print(json.dumps(entry))
|
||||
PYEOF
|
||||
|
||||
append_audit() {
|
||||
local action="$1"
|
||||
local prior_file="$2"
|
||||
python3 "$AUD_HELPER" "$prior_file" "$action"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
echo '[]' > /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_0.json
|
||||
AUD_E1="$(append_audit 'mpq.s1.did.hospitalA' /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_0.json)"
|
||||
echo "[$AUD_E1]" > /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_1.json
|
||||
AUD_E2="$(append_audit 'mpq.s3.psi.summary' /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_1.json)"
|
||||
echo "[$AUD_E1,$AUD_E2]" > /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_2.json
|
||||
AUD_E3="$(append_audit 'mpq.s5.tee.attest' /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_2.json)"
|
||||
echo "[$AUD_E1,$AUD_E2,$AUD_E3]" > /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_3.json
|
||||
AUD_E4="$(append_audit 'mpq.s7.paillier' /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_3.json)"
|
||||
echo "[$AUD_E1,$AUD_E2,$AUD_E3,$AUD_E4]" > /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_4.json
|
||||
AUD_E5="$(append_audit 'mpq.s8.abac.allow' /tmp/dth_mpq_aud_prior_4.json)"
|
||||
|
||||
# Sanity: each AUD_E* must be non-empty JSON.
|
||||
for VAR in AUD_E1 AUD_E2 AUD_E3 AUD_E4 AUD_E5; do
|
||||
if [ -z "${!VAR}" ]; then
|
||||
echo "FATAL: $VAR empty — audit chain construction failed"
|
||||
fail=$((fail+1))
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
# Verify chain via second helper script (file-based).
|
||||
AUD_V_HELPER="/tmp/dth_mpq_audit_verify_helper.py"
|
||||
cat > "$AUD_V_HELPER" <<'PYEOF'
|
||||
import json, os, sys
|
||||
entries = []
|
||||
for v in ["AUD_E1","AUD_E2","AUD_E3","AUD_E4","AUD_E5"]:
|
||||
s = os.environ.get(v, "")
|
||||
if not s: sys.exit(f"missing env var {v}")
|
||||
entries.append(json.loads(s))
|
||||
print(json.dumps({"operator":"compliance-audit","input":{"verify":True,"entries":entries}}))
|
||||
PYEOF
|
||||
AUD_V_REQ_FILE="/tmp/dth_mpq_audit_verify.json"
|
||||
AUD_E1="$AUD_E1" AUD_E2="$AUD_E2" AUD_E3="$AUD_E3" AUD_E4="$AUD_E4" AUD_E5="$AUD_E5" \
|
||||
python3 "$AUD_V_HELPER" > "$AUD_V_REQ_FILE"
|
||||
AUD_V_BODY="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
|
||||
--data-binary "@$AUD_V_REQ_FILE" "$RUNS_URL")"
|
||||
AUD_V_ID="$(json_get "['data']['run_id']" "$AUD_V_BODY")"
|
||||
AUD_V_GET="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADMIN_TOKEN" "$RUNS_URL/$AUD_V_ID")"
|
||||
AUD_V_VALID="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['audit']['chainValid']" "$AUD_V_GET")"
|
||||
AUD_V_N="$(json_get "['data']['output_json']['audit']['entries_verified']" "$AUD_V_GET")"
|
||||
assert "C9_audit_chainValid" "[ '$AUD_V_VALID' = 'True' ]" "chainValid=$AUD_V_VALID; body=$AUD_V_GET"
|
||||
assert "C9_audit_entries_5" "[ '$AUD_V_N' = '5' ]" "entries_verified=$AUD_V_N (expected 5)"
|
||||
|
||||
# prev_hash linkage: E2.prev_hash == E1.hash
|
||||
LINK_OK="$(AUD_E1="$AUD_E1" AUD_E2="$AUD_E2" python3 -c "
|
||||
import json, os
|
||||
e1 = json.loads(os.environ['AUD_E1'])
|
||||
e2 = json.loads(os.environ['AUD_E2'])
|
||||
print('OK' if e2.get('prev_hash') == e1.get('hash') else 'BROKEN', e1.get('hash')[:16], '->', e2.get('prev_hash','')[:16])
|
||||
")"
|
||||
LINK_STATUS="$(echo "$LINK_OK" | awk '{print $1}')"
|
||||
assert "C9_audit_prev_hash_linked" "[ '$LINK_STATUS' = 'OK' ]" "E1-E2 link: $LINK_OK"
|
||||
|
||||
# No PHI in audit entries (no patient IDs p01-p09, no diagnosis D-101, no hospitalization days 7/10/5)
|
||||
# Concatenate all 5 entries via env-var prefix pattern (python's os.environ).
|
||||
PHI_CHAIN="$AUD_E1$AUD_E2$AUD_E3$AUD_E4$AUD_E5"
|
||||
PHI_LEAK="$(PHI_CHAIN="$PHI_CHAIN" python3 -c "
|
||||
import os
|
||||
all_entries = os.environ['PHI_CHAIN']
|
||||
forbidden=['p01','p02','p03','p04','p05','p06','p07','p08','p09','D-101','\"7\"','\"10\"','\"5\"']
|
||||
hits=[f for f in forbidden if f in all_entries]
|
||||
print('LEAKED' if hits else 'OK', '|'.join(hits))
|
||||
")"
|
||||
PHI_LEAK_STATUS="$(echo "$PHI_LEAK" | awk '{print $1}')"
|
||||
assert "C9_audit_no_phi_in_entries" "[ '$PHI_LEAK_STATUS' = 'OK' ]" "PHI leak: $PHI_LEAK"
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
# C10 (S10): E2E 端到端 — pass=N fail=0 + wall-clock < 60s + no PHI in API
|
||||
# ============================================================
|
||||
T_END=$(date +%s)
|
||||
T_ELAPSED=$((T_END - T_START))
|
||||
assert "C10_e2e_full_flow_pass" "[ $fail -eq 0 ]" "downstream case failed before reaching C10 (current fail=$fail)"
|
||||
assert "C10_e2e_wallclock_under_60s" "[ $T_ELAPSED -lt 60 ]" "wall-clock=${T_ELAPSED}s (must < 60s)"
|
||||
|
||||
# 联合断言 ≥ 25 sub-assertion (10 case × 子断言;预期 ~39)
|
||||
assert "C10_e2e_subassertion_ge_25" "[ $pass -ge 25 ]" "sub-assertion count = $pass (must ≥ 25)"
|
||||
|
||||
echo "---"
|
||||
echo "e2e dth_mpq: pass=$pass fail=$fail elapsed=${T_ELAPSED}s"
|
||||
if [ $fail -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
printf 'FAILED:\n'; printf ' - %s\n' "${fails[@]}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user