chg_0011: vehicle_cloud_compliance 提案 — 车云数据合规场景(5 件套,无新代码,与 chg_0010 互补)
影响:业务方可用现有算子验证"数据出域可追溯"的车云合规场景;
chg_0010+0011 复用 14/19 算子(74%),覆盖多方不出域 + 数据出域两大威胁模型
场景:50 车 OEM telemetry → TDS 合约 → 字段脱敏 → 水印嵌入 → fleet 聚合 → ABAC → 审计
10 case e2e (S1-S10) 覆盖 6 算子(tds-connector / data-masking / data-watermark /
horizontal-fedavg / abac-policy / compliance-audit)
4 不变性断言:脱敏可逆 / 水印 roundtrip / 水印长度不变 / 审计链 valid
1 隐私不变性:C10 NO cleartext GPS/车牌/车主ID 出域
算子互补矩阵(vs chg_0010):
- chg_0011 exclusive: data-masking, horizontal-fedavg
- chg_0010 exclusive: psi, paillier-he, threshold-sig, did-identity
- shared: tds-connector, abac-policy, data-watermark, compliance-audit
约束:
- 不改 backend 代码(19 算子齐备,0 新依赖,0 新接口)
- 不加前端(backend-only e2e)
- 复用 /experiment/runs 一个一个跑算子
- admin token 全程,per-vehicle 标签在 input 里传
handoff §4 优先级 2 之 B 候选(车云数据合规)闭环。
实施待 sandbox dispatch(T1 architect → T5 pm)。
Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <[email protected]>
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---
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change_id: chg_0011
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status: proposed
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owner: pm@team
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stakeholders: [pd, tm, qa, dev]
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priority: P1
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target_release: v0.7
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created: 2026-09-29
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skip_coverage: false
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---
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# chg_0011 vehicle_cloud_data_compliance — 车云数据合规场景
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## Why
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chg_0010 金融联合风控覆盖了"数据不出域"的多方计算场景,但**车云数据流通**是反向场景——
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**数据必须出域**(车端 → 云端聚合),出域前必须:合约授权 + 字段脱敏 + 水印嵌入 + 审计追溯。
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需求 §5 提到三个候选场景(金融联合风控 / 医疗隐私查询 / 车云数据合规)。chg_0010 已落地金融
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联合风控(侧重"多方不出域");chg_0011 选 **车云数据合规**(侧重"数据出域可追溯"),覆盖
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互补威胁模型。
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**算子互补性**(与 chg_0010 比):
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- chg_0010 重用 8/10 chg_0009 算子:did-identity / psi / tds-connector / paillier-he /
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threshold-sig / abac-policy / data-watermark / compliance-audit
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- chg_0011 重用 6 算子,其中 2 个与 chg_0010 互补(chg_0010 几乎没用):
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- **data-masking**(chg_0011 重度使用)—— GPS / 车牌 / 车主 ID 脱敏
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- **horizontal-fedavg**(chg_0010 没用到)—— 车云 fleet 均值聚合
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- chg_0011 不重用:mpc-beaver / model-watermark / psi / paillier-he / threshold-sig /
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did-identity / secure-mlp / model-watermark
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**约束**(与 chg_0010 一致):
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- 不改 backend 代码(19 算子已齐备,0 新依赖,0 新接口)
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- 不加前端(backend-only e2e)
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- 复用 chg_0006 LMS 的多实体建模思路:admin token + per-vehicle 标签模拟车队
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## Scope
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**做**:
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1. **场景设计文档** `docs/dth/vc/scenario.md`:定义 VC 场景的 6 步流程图 + 数据流图
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+ 不变性约束 + 与既有算子的映射表 + 出域 PII 清单。
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2. **集成 e2e 测试** `tests/e2e/dth_vc.test.sh`:10 case 串起 6 个算子,覆盖:
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- S1: 车云 TDS 合约匹配(tds-connector: match=true + JWT)
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- S2: 车云 TDS 合约 hash 不匹配 → 流程拒绝(tds-connector error="contract-mismatch")
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- S3: GPS / 车牌 / 车主 ID 字段脱敏 + 业务字段保留(data-masking)
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- S4: 脱敏后 SHA256 hash 可逆(data-masking hash 字段 → 还原原始值)
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- S5: 聚合报告零宽水印嵌入 + 提取 roundtrip(data-watermark)
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- S6: 聚合报告可见长度不变(data-watermark 零宽字符不变可见长度)
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- S7: Fleet-wide 均值聚合(horizontal-fedavg: 50 车均值 + σ)
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- S8: ABAC 合规分析师通过 + 工程师拒绝(abac-policy)
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- S9: 审计链 HMAC 完整(compliance-audit: 6 步 chainValid=true)
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- S10: E2E 端到端(S1→S9 全程跑通 + 总耗时 < 60s)
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3. **5 件套 + map.yaml**:spec.md / tasks.md / testcases.md / testcases.map.yaml
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**不做**:
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- ❌ 新建 VC 专属 endpoint(直接复用 `POST /experiment/runs`)
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- ❌ 新加 operator(19 算子全够用)
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- ❌ 新加依赖(纯 shell + python3 + curl)
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- ❌ 改 abac / auth(admin token 全程,per-vehicle 标签在 input 里传)
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- ❌ 真车端模拟器(用 admin token + JSON payload 模拟 50 辆车 telemetry)
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- ❌ 真云端聚合引擎(horizontal-fedavg 已实现 mock + Gaussian DP 噪声,无需新代码)
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## Acceptance
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- 10 case e2e 全 PASS(chg_0011 自身)
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- 7 回归 e2e 全 PASS(chg_0002/0005/0006/0007/0008/0009/0010)
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- gate `PROJECT_ROOT=. bash openspec/scripts/check_spec_coverage.sh` gap=0
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- `tsc --noEmit` 0 error(除预存 chg_0002 vertical-lr.ts:52)
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- 文档 `docs/dth/vc/scenario.md` 包含:mermaid 流程图 + 数据流表 + 算子映射表 + 不变性清单 +
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**出域 PII 清单**(明确每字段是否出域 + 脱敏方式)
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## 与 handoff / chg_0010 的对应
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- handoff §4 优先级 2(chg_0011 设计候选 B):本 chg 闭环
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- 与 chg_0010 互补:chg_0010 = 数据不出域(多方计算),chg_0011 = 数据出域可追溯
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- 算子复用矩阵:chg_0010 用 8 算子(psi/paillier/threshold/did/tds/abac/watsonmark/audit),
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chg_0011 用 6 算子(tds/data-masking/watermark/fedavg/abac/audit),**重叠 4**(tds/abac/watermark/audit),
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**互补 2**(masking/fedavg vs psi/paillier/threshold/did)
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- 跑完 chg_0010 + chg_0011 = 14/19 算子(74%),剩余 5(mpc-beaver / model-watermark / secure-mlp
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仍待场景)
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## 后续候选
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- **chg_0012 候选**:
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- A. 医疗隐私查询(PSI + paillier + secure-mlp)—— 复用 chg_0010 同款算子
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- B. chg_0010 F2B 扩展(ABAC region 细分 + watermark capacity 升级)
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- C. 多方安全聚合(3+ 方 psi + mpc-beaver + threshold-sig)
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- chg_0012 决策在 chg_0011 合并后做,避免一次设计太多场景导致饱和
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# Spec: experiment_platform
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## Requirement
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THE SYSTEM SHALL provide a vehicle-to-cloud data compliance (VC) scenario that composes
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6 existing operators (tds-connector / data-masking / data-watermark / horizontal-fedavg /
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abac-policy / compliance-audit) into a 6-step end-to-end telemetry egress flow for a 50-vehicle
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fleet, proving that **vehicle PII never leaves the OEM boundary in clear text** and **all
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downstream cloud consumption is traceable + access-controlled + auditable**, WITHOUT any new
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operator / endpoint / dependency, so that 业务方能用现有算子验证"数据出域可追溯"的车云合规场景。
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## ADDED Scenarios
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### S1 车云 TDS 合约匹配
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- **WHEN** OEM cloud operator calls tds-connector.match() with matching `contract_hash`
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(车端合约 = 云端合约)
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- **THEN** output `{match: true, token: <3-part JWT>}` (Bearer for downstream auth)
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- **AND** schema_version = "v2"
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- **AND** token is non-empty + has 3-part JWT structure
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### S2 车云 TDS 合约 hash 不匹配 → 流程拒绝
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- **WHEN** tds-connector.match() is called with `contract_hash_oem ≠ contract_hash_cloud`
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- **THEN** output `{match: false, error: "contract-mismatch"}`
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- **AND** the VC flow is aborted at step 1 (no masking / aggregation runs)
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### S3 GPS / 车牌 / 车主 ID 字段脱敏 + 业务字段保留
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- **WHEN** vehicle telemetry `{v1: "京A12345", gps: "39.9,116.4", owner_id: "13800138000",
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speed_kmh: 65, energy_kwh: 18.5, anomaly_code: 0}` is passed through data-masking
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- **THEN** output:
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- `v1` → masked (e.g., "京A*****5")
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- `gps` → masked (e.g., "39.9****" or hash-based)
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- `owner_id` → masked (e.g., "138****8000")
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- `speed_kmh` → unchanged (业务字段保留)
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- `energy_kwh` → unchanged
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- `anomaly_code` → unchanged
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- **AND** masked fields are NEVER the same as original (except for empty)
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- **AND** schema_version = "v2"
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### S4 脱敏后 SHA256 hash 可逆
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- **WHEN** data-masking outputs a `{field, mask_type, hash}` triple for owner_id
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- **THEN** `mask_type === "sha256-truncate"` or `"sha256-reversible"`
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- **AND** the hash field, when reversed via the operator's inverse (lookup), yields the
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original value
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- **AND** the masking is deterministic (same input → same hash)
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### S5 聚合报告零宽水印嵌入 + 提取 roundtrip
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- **WHEN** the cloud aggregator embeds `payload = "VC|2026-09-29|oem-id-OEM123"` into a
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fleet-wide report via data-watermark
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- **THEN** the report's visible length is **unchanged** (zero-width chars U+200B/200C/200D/FEFF)
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- **AND** data-watermark.extract(report) recovers the **exact** payload string
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- **AND** schema_version = "v2"
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### S6 聚合报告可见长度不变(不可见字符纯隐身)
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- **WHEN** S5 watermark is embedded
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- **THEN** the visible (non-zero-width) character count of the report equals the pre-embed count
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- **AND** the byte/char delta is entirely zero-width (U+200B/200C/200D/FEFF)
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- **AND** the report renders identically in a non-ZW-aware viewer
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### S7 Fleet-wide 均值聚合(horizontal-fedavg)
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- **WHEN** 50 simulated vehicles submit `energy_kwh` values
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- **THEN** `final_weights` is a single averaged value (mean across 50 vehicles)
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- **AND** Gaussian DP noise is added (trace `noise_scale` exposed)
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- **AND** running the same fleet 100 times, stddev of final_weights is in range
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`[0.5*σ, 2.0*σ]`
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- **AND** schema_version = "v2"
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### S8 ABAC 合规分析师通过 + 工程师拒绝
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- **WHEN** ABAC policy requires `subject.role === "compliance-analyst"` AND
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`subject.region in ["BJ","SH","GZ"]` AND `env.timewindow 09:00-18:00` AND
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`resource.classification in ["public","internal"]`
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- **THEN** request from `{role: "compliance-analyst", region: "BJ", time: "10:00",
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resource: "internal"}` returns `{allow: true}`
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- **AND** request from `{role: "engineer", region: "BJ", time: "10:00",
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resource: "internal"}` returns `{allow: false, reason: "role-deny"}`
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- **AND** request from `{role: "compliance-analyst", region: "NY", time: "10:00",
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resource: "internal"}` returns `{allow: false, reason: "region-deny"}`
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- **AND** request from `{role: "compliance-analyst", region: "BJ", time: "20:00",
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resource: "internal"}` returns `{allow: false, reason: "timewindow-deny"}`
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### S9 审计链 HMAC 完整(6 步)
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- **WHEN** the full VC flow runs through steps S1→S8
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- **THEN** compliance-audit chain contains ≥ 6 entries (one per VC step:
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tds-match / masking / watermark / fedavg / abac / auth)
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- **AND** each entry has HMAC-SHA256 chain linkage (`prev_hash` references the prior entry)
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- **AND** `chainValid === true` on full replay
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- **AND** any tampered entry triggers `chainValid === false`
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### S10 E2E 端到端 6 步不变性
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- **WHEN** a single shell run executes S1→S9 in order with the canonical 50-vehicle fixture
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- **THEN** every intermediate assertion in S1..S9 passes
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- **AND** the final output reports `e2e dth_vc: pass=N fail=0` (N = 10 main cases + sub-assertions)
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- **AND** total wall-clock time for the e2e is < 60s
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- **AND** NO cleartext GPS / 车牌 / 车主 ID appears in any cloud-side output (privacy invariant)
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# Tasks (DAG)
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- id: T1
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type: architect
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depends_on: []
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output: docs/dth/vc/scenario.md
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verification:
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- mermaid 流程图(6 步:合约 → 脱敏 → 水印 → 聚合 → ABAC → 审计)
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- 数据流表(每步:输入 → 算子 → 输出 → 不变性)
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- 算子映射表(每算子:何时被调用 / 输入 schema / 输出 schema)
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- 不变性清单(S1-S10 → 对应算子 + 测试断言)
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- **出域 PII 清单**(明确每字段:是否出域 + 脱敏方式 + 反向验证手段)
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- 复用矩阵(既有 19 算子的复用率 ≥ 30%,新增 chg_0010+0011 复用 ≥ 70%)
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- id: T2
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type: implementer
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depends_on: [T1]
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output: |
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tests/e2e/dth_vc.test.sh (10 case e2e shell 脚本)
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verification:
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- 脚本无 set -e(每条 assertion 独立计数)
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- 使用 DTH_BASE=${DTH_BASE:-http://127.0.0.1:30000}
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- 每条 assert 用 python3 json_get(与 chg_0008/0009/0010 一致)
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- 包含 admin token login (pre_admin_login)
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- 10 case 覆盖 S1..S10
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- 总耗时 < 60s
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- 复用既有 helpers(不要重写 json_get / assert / login)
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- 含 4 不变性断言(脱敏可逆 / 水印 roundtrip / 水印长度不变 / 审计链 valid)
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- 含 1 拒绝路径(TDS mismatch → 流程拒绝)
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- 含 1 跨车 E2E 串联(S10 = S1→S9 一气呵成)
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- id: T3
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type: tester
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depends_on: [T2]
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output: |
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1 次完整 e2e 跑通(bash tests/e2e/dth_vc.test.sh 10/0)
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verification:
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- pass=10 fail=0
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- 含 4 不变性断言(脱敏可逆 / 水印 roundtrip / 水印长度不变 / 审计链 valid)
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- 含 1 篡改检测(audit chain 篡改 → chainValid=false)
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- 含 1 拒绝路径(TDS mismatch → 流程拒绝)
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- 含 1 跨车 E2E 串联(S10 = S1→S9 一气呵成)
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- 含 1 隐私不变性(NO cleartext GPS/车牌/车主ID 出域)
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- id: T4
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type: qa
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depends_on: [T3]
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output: |
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PROJECT_ROOT=. bash openspec/scripts/check_spec_coverage.sh
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7 e2e 套件全跑(chg_0002/0005/0006/0007/0008/0009/0010/0011 = 8 套)
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verification:
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- gate gap = 0
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- tsc --noEmit 0 error(除预存 chg_0002 vertical-lr.ts:52)
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- 7 回归 + 1 新 = 8 e2e 套件全 PASS
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- 总断言数 ≥ 157(147 旧 + 10 新 = 157)
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- 报告落 /tmp/chg_0011-qa.log
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- id: T5
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type: pm
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depends_on: [T4]
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output: |
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openspec/changes/chg_0011_vehicle_cloud_compliance/.xstudio-report.md
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chg_0011 实施说明(取舍 + 与 chg_0010 算子复用对比 + 后续 chg_0012 候选)
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verification:
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- 报告含 改动文件清单 + 门禁结果 + 算子复用率(与 chg_0010 互补矩阵)+ 是否建议合并
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- 报告大小 ≥ 30 行
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- chg_0011 任务全部完成
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# Notes
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- 无 backend 代码改动(19 算子已齐备)
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- 无 frontend 代码改动(业务场景 e2e only)
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- 无新依赖
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- 测试端口 30000(与既有 e2e 一致;DTH_BASE env 可覆盖)
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- 提交顺序建议:T1 (docs) → T2 (test script) → T3 (test PASS) → T4 (gate + regressions) → T5 (report)
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- 与 chg_0009/0010 的边界:不动 OperatorsService / ExperimentModule 注册,仅新增 test 脚本 + 文档
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- 与 chg_0010 互补:chg_0010 = "数据不出域",chg_0011 = "数据出域可追溯",两者复用不同算子子集
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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
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# spec: experiment_platform@chg_0011
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scenarios:
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- id: S1
|
||||
cases: [C1_vc_tds_contract_match]
|
||||
- id: S2
|
||||
cases: [C2_vc_tds_mismatch_abort]
|
||||
- id: S3
|
||||
cases: [C3_vc_field_aware_masking]
|
||||
- id: S4
|
||||
cases: [C4_vc_masking_reversible]
|
||||
- id: S5
|
||||
cases: [C5_vc_watermark_embed_extract_roundtrip]
|
||||
- id: S6
|
||||
cases: [C6_vc_watermark_invisible_length_invariant]
|
||||
- id: S7
|
||||
cases: [C7_vc_fleet_fedavg_aggregation]
|
||||
- id: S8
|
||||
cases: [C8_vc_abac_compliance_analyst]
|
||||
- id: S9
|
||||
cases: [C9_vc_audit_chain_hmac]
|
||||
- id: S10
|
||||
cases: [C10_vc_e2e_full_flow_6_steps]
|
||||
gate:
|
||||
blocking_gap_tolerance: 0
|
||||
implementation_files:
|
||||
- tests/e2e/dth_vc.test.sh
|
||||
- docs/dth/vc/scenario.md
|
||||
test_files:
|
||||
- tests/e2e/dth_vc.test.sh
|
||||
notes:
|
||||
reuses_operators_no_new_code: true
|
||||
operator_coverage: "6 of 19 existing operators (32%) + 2 complementary to chg_0010"
|
||||
operators_used:
|
||||
- tds-connector (S1, S2)
|
||||
- data-masking (S3, S4)
|
||||
- data-watermark (S5, S6)
|
||||
- horizontal-fedavg (S7, chg_0008)
|
||||
- abac-policy (S8)
|
||||
- compliance-audit (S9)
|
||||
invariant_assertions: 4
|
||||
- C4 vc_masking_reversible (可逆)
|
||||
- C5 vc_watermark_roundtrip (roundtrip)
|
||||
- C6 vc_watermark_invisible_length (不可见)
|
||||
- C9 vc_audit_chain_valid (审计链)
|
||||
privacy_invariant: C10 NO cleartext GPS/车牌/车主ID in cloud-side output
|
||||
complements_chg_0010: true
|
||||
complementary_operators_vs_chg_0010:
|
||||
- chg_0011 exclusive: data-masking, horizontal-fedavg
|
||||
- chg_0010 exclusive: psi, paillier-he, threshold-sig, did-identity
|
||||
- shared: tds-connector, abac-policy, data-watermark, compliance-aaudit
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
|
||||
### C1_vc_tds_contract_match
|
||||
- Scenario: S1
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0
|
||||
- Given: backend running on 30000, admin token, matching contract_hash
|
||||
- When: POST /experiment/runs with operator=tds-connector
|
||||
- Then: response.match=true + token non-empty (3-part JWT)
|
||||
- And: schema_version=v2
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C2_vc_tds_mismatch_abort
|
||||
- Scenario: S2
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P1
|
||||
- Given: contract_hash_oem ≠ contract_hash_cloud
|
||||
- When: POST with operator=tds-connector
|
||||
- Then: response.match=false, error="contract-mismatch"
|
||||
- And: VC flow stops at step 1 (no masking/aggregation runs)
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C3_vc_field_aware_masking
|
||||
- Scenario: S3
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0
|
||||
- Given: telemetry {v1, gps, owner_id, speed_kmh, energy_kwh, anomaly_code}
|
||||
- When: POST with operator=data-masking
|
||||
- Then: PII fields (v1/gps/owner_id) masked, business fields (speed_kmh/energy_kwh/anomaly_code) unchanged
|
||||
- And: masked values ≠ original values
|
||||
- And: schema_version=v2
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C4_vc_masking_reversible
|
||||
- Scenario: S4
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0 (privacy invariant)
|
||||
- Given: masked owner_id with hash field
|
||||
- When: data-masking inverse lookup via hash
|
||||
- Then: recovered value === original owner_id
|
||||
- And: same input → same hash (deterministic)
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C5_vc_watermark_embed_extract_roundtrip
|
||||
- Scenario: S5
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0
|
||||
- Given: fleet-wide report text, watermark payload="VC|2026-09-29|oem-id-OEM123"
|
||||
- When: POST data-watermark (embed), then POST same text (extract)
|
||||
- Then: report visible length unchanged (zero-width chars)
|
||||
- And: extract returns exact payload string
|
||||
- And: schema_version=v2
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C6_vc_watermark_invisible_length_invariant
|
||||
- Scenario: S6
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0 (visibility invariant)
|
||||
- Given: original report (no watermark)
|
||||
- When: embed payload, then count visible chars (filter out U+200B/200C/200D/FEFF)
|
||||
- Then: visible_char_count_after === visible_char_count_before
|
||||
- And: byte_delta > 0 (watermark chars present) but visible_delta = 0
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C7_vc_fleet_fedavg_aggregation
|
||||
- Scenario: S7
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0
|
||||
- Given: 50 vehicle energy_kwh values
|
||||
- When: POST with operator=horizontal-fedavg 100 times
|
||||
- Then: final_weights is single averaged value (~mean)
|
||||
- And: trace.noise_scale exposed
|
||||
- And: across 100 runs, stddev of final_weights ∈ [0.5*σ, 2.0*σ]
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C8_vc_abac_compliance_analyst
|
||||
- Scenario: S8
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0
|
||||
- Given: ABAC policy role=compliance-analyst AND region∈[BJ,SH,GZ] AND time∈[09:00,18:00] AND resource.classification∈[public,internal]
|
||||
- When: 4 POSTs with combinations (allow / 3× deny)
|
||||
- Then: allow for {role:compliance-analyst, region:BJ, time:10:00, resource:internal}
|
||||
- And: deny "role-deny" for {role:engineer}
|
||||
- And: deny "region-deny" for {region:NY}
|
||||
- And: deny "timewindow-deny" for {time:20:00}
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C9_vc_audit_chain_hmac
|
||||
- Scenario: S9
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0
|
||||
- Given: 6 VC step entries (tds-match / masking / watermark / fedavg / abac / audit-read)
|
||||
- When: POST with operator=compliance-audit, action=verify_chain
|
||||
- Then: chain length ≥ 6
|
||||
- And: each entry has prev_hash link
|
||||
- And: chainValid=true
|
||||
- And: tampered entry → chainValid=false
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T2
|
||||
|
||||
### C10_vc_e2e_full_flow_6_steps
|
||||
- Scenario: S10
|
||||
- Type: e2e
|
||||
- Priority: P0
|
||||
- Given: canonical 50-vehicle fixture (telemetry + masked hashes + watermark + fedavg outputs + ABAC subjects)
|
||||
- When: 1 shell run executes all 9 steps in sequence (C1-C9 in order)
|
||||
- Then: pass=10 fail=0 (10 main cases)
|
||||
- And: total wall-clock < 60s
|
||||
- And: NO cleartext GPS/车牌/车主ID in any cloud-side output (privacy invariant)
|
||||
- Automated: true
|
||||
- Bound Task: T3 (E2E orchestration test)
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user