账号层从本机 JSON 文件迁到 `base_user` 表,口令改用官方双 md5 公式, 并把从来没在管的「实体 → 权限键」那一层整条拆掉(D6 / D11)。 改动: - `src/tdc/service/account.rs`(重写):账号读写 `base_user` / `base_role` / `base_role_relation`;口令 `f_password = md5(lower(md5(明文)) + lower(f_secretkey))` (上游 `PasswordTokenGranter.java:186`),`f_secretkey` 每账号随机 UUID v4, 改密不换 secretkey;引导幂等;管理员位 = `f_is_administrator=1`,查询异常 ⇒ false。 - `src/tdc/controller/account.rs`(重写):登录改走官方公式比对;`require_admin` 改异步、 按 `f_is_administrator` fail-closed;出参形状不变、不回显口令与 secretkey。 - `src/tdc/entity/mod.rs`:删 `PERMISSION_KEYS` / `permission_key()`(18 条实体级权限键)。 - `src/tdc/service/identity.rs`:删 `capabilities()`;`/Auth/Me` 加 `roles` 键 (上游 `AuthController#me:207` 同款),角色码 SQL 逐字照抄上游。 - `src/tdc/service/crud.rs`:删 `require_write_permission()`,写路径改用 `require_menu_permission()`(与上游 `TdcCrudController.requireMenuPermission()` 同构)。 - `src/main.rs` / `src/tdc/state.rs` / `src/tdc/config.rs`:账号层改由 `bootstrap_account_layer()` 引导;`data/accounts.json` 保留但不再读取。 - `tests/permission_gate.rs` → `tests/permission_model.rs`(断言模型换成登录态闸门)。 影响: - 登录 / 用户管理 6 端点的数据源从 JSON 文件变成 `base_user` 表;出参形状不变。 - 实体级写权限**敞开**(任何登录用户可写全部 18 个实体)—— 与上游同构, 显式记账在 `docs/known-limitations.md` L4;部署退出门槛 = 账号只发给受信人。 - 存量 `data/accounts.json` 的账号**不导入**(D8)。 实测:cargo test 236 项全绿 0 failed · smoke.sh PASS=80 FAIL=0(基线 75 ⇒ +5)· check-boundary.sh exit 0 · check-entity.sh PASS=13 FAIL=0。 Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <[email protected]>
160 lines
6.7 KiB
Rust
160 lines
6.7 KiB
Rust
//! 权限模型(B4 / D6 之后):**登录态闸门**在,**实体级权限键**没了。
|
||
//!
|
||
//! ## 模型(照上游,v3 spec §5)
|
||
//!
|
||
//! | 面 | 判据 | 位置 |
|
||
//! |---|---|---|
|
||
//! | 登录态 | 内部令牌 **或** 已登录主体(连接器身份会话 / 本地账号会话) | `platform::auth::require_menu_permission`(= 上游 `requireMenuPermission()`) |
|
||
//! | 角色码 | `base_role.f_en_code` ∈ {`tdcProvider`,`tdcConsumer`,`tdsReadOnly`} | `tdc::service::account::role_codes` |
|
||
//! | 管理员位 | `base_user.f_is_administrator = 1`(**fail-closed**) | `tdc::service::account::is_administrator` |
|
||
//!
|
||
//! 🔴 **实体级写权限没有隔离**(D6 / D11):任何**登录用户**可写全部 18 个实体。
|
||
//! 这是**追平上游**(上游 `TdcCrudController.requireMenuPermission()` 在
|
||
//! `permissionGuard == null` 时只校验「有登录态或内部令牌」)⇒ **不是收紧、也不是放权**,
|
||
//! 而是拆掉一层「看起来在管、实际没管」的假权限层。
|
||
//! 风险与部署约束见 `docs/known-limitations.md` L4 与 `docs/contract.md` 权限章节。
|
||
//!
|
||
//! ⚠️ 本测试二进制内共用一个 PGlite 实例(pglite-rs 每进程只允许一个)。
|
||
|
||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||
|
||
use axum::http::StatusCode;
|
||
use pglite::PGlite;
|
||
use tdc_connector::platform::auth::Principal;
|
||
use tdc_connector::platform::config::Config;
|
||
use tdc_connector::platform::session::SessionStore;
|
||
use tdc_connector::platform::state::AppState;
|
||
use tdc_connector::tdc::config::TdcConfig;
|
||
use tdc_connector::tdc::entity;
|
||
use tdc_connector::tdc::state::{BootstrapIdentity, TdcState};
|
||
use tokio::sync::OnceCell;
|
||
|
||
static DB: OnceCell<Arc<PGlite>> = OnceCell::const_new();
|
||
|
||
async fn shared_db() -> Arc<PGlite> {
|
||
DB.get_or_init(|| async {
|
||
let db = Arc::new(PGlite::open_temp().await.expect("打开临时 PGlite 失败"));
|
||
tdc_connector::platform::db::ensure_schema(db.as_ref())
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("建表失败");
|
||
db
|
||
})
|
||
.await
|
||
.clone()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
async fn test_state() -> TdcState {
|
||
let db = shared_db().await;
|
||
let config = Config::from_env(std::env::current_dir().unwrap());
|
||
TdcState::new(
|
||
AppState::new(config, db, Arc::new(SessionStore::new())),
|
||
TdcConfig::default(),
|
||
BootstrapIdentity::default(),
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// 插入一条测试身份(`f_capability` 只用来证明**能力集不再参与写判定**)。
|
||
async fn upsert_identity(code: &str, capability: Option<&str>) {
|
||
let state = test_state().await;
|
||
let cap = match capability {
|
||
Some(c) => format!("'{}'", c),
|
||
None => "NULL".to_string(),
|
||
};
|
||
let id = format!("ID-{}", code);
|
||
let sql = format!(
|
||
"INSERT INTO tdc_identity (f_id, f_identity_code, f_name, f_capability) \
|
||
VALUES ('{}', '{}', '测试身份', {})",
|
||
id, code, cap
|
||
);
|
||
// 🔴 所有 DB 访问必须持 `state.db_lock`(PGlite 单 in-process backend,CLAUDE.md 红线)
|
||
// —— 测试代码也不例外。
|
||
let _g = state.db_lock.lock().await;
|
||
state.db.exec(&sql).await.expect("插入测试身份失败");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn session(code: &str) -> Principal {
|
||
Principal::Session {
|
||
identity_id: format!("ID-{}", code),
|
||
identity_code: code.to_string(),
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// 🔴 **无凭证 ⇒ 403**(登录态闸门还在;文案与上游一致)。
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn no_credential_is_rejected_with_403() {
|
||
let state = test_state().await;
|
||
let spec = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里");
|
||
let body = serde_json::json!({});
|
||
for r in [
|
||
tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, spec, &body, None).await,
|
||
tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::update(&state, spec, "NOT-EXIST", &body, None).await,
|
||
tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::delete(&state, spec, "NOT-EXIST", None).await,
|
||
] {
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
r.status(),
|
||
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
|
||
"无凭证必须 403(登录态闸门不许被 D6 顺手删掉)"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// 🔴 **任何已登录主体都能写实体**(连接器身份会话 / 本地账号会话 / 内部令牌)。
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn any_logged_in_principal_may_write_entities() {
|
||
let state = test_state().await;
|
||
let spec = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里");
|
||
let body = serde_json::json!({});
|
||
let principals = vec![
|
||
session("LOGGED-IN-SESSION"),
|
||
Principal::Account {
|
||
account_id: "ACCOUNT-1".to_string(),
|
||
account: "someone".to_string(),
|
||
},
|
||
Principal::Internal { operator: None },
|
||
];
|
||
for p in principals {
|
||
let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, spec, &body, Some(&p)).await;
|
||
assert_ne!(
|
||
r.status(),
|
||
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
|
||
"已登录主体不该被 403(上游同口径:只校验有登录态或内部令牌)"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// 🔴 **实体级权限键链路已删**:`f_capability` 里只有 `product` 的身份,
|
||
/// **照样**能写 `Contract`(旧实现会 403「当前身份无「contract」的操作权限」)。
|
||
///
|
||
/// ⇒ 这条是「把权限键链路加回来」那次变异的**红点**。
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn entity_level_permission_keys_are_gone() {
|
||
upsert_identity("CAP-PRODUCT-ONLY", Some("product")).await;
|
||
let state = test_state().await;
|
||
let contract = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里");
|
||
let p = session("CAP-PRODUCT-ONLY");
|
||
let body = serde_json::json!({});
|
||
let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, contract, &body, Some(&p)).await;
|
||
assert_ne!(
|
||
r.status(),
|
||
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
|
||
"能力集不再参与写判定(D6:删假权限层)"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// 🔴 **写路径的接线自证**:门禁在**函数最开头**(任何 DB 访问之前)
|
||
/// ⇒ 无凭证时拿到的是 **403**,而不是业务层的「记录不存在或已删除」(200)。
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn crud_write_paths_enforce_the_login_state_gate() {
|
||
let state = test_state().await;
|
||
let contract = entity::find("Contract").expect("Contract 应在注册表里");
|
||
let body = serde_json::json!({});
|
||
|
||
let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::create(&state, contract, &body, None).await;
|
||
assert_eq!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "create 无凭证必须 403");
|
||
let r =
|
||
tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::update(&state, contract, "NOT-EXIST", &body, None).await;
|
||
assert_eq!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "update 无凭证必须 403");
|
||
let r = tdc_connector::tdc::service::crud::delete(&state, contract, "NOT-EXIST", None).await;
|
||
assert_eq!(r.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "delete 无凭证必须 403");
|
||
}
|