Files
xop/docs/comparison.md
xop-botandClaude Code 7660b92d70 v0.5: 描述元数据 + list 免引号搜索 + 元数据操作免闸门
影响: key 多了人/AI 可读的用途说明(存加密 vault 内,不落明文文件);
`xop list` 的搜索不用再打引号; `xop list` / `xop desc` 只碰元数据、
永不吐 value,因此不再弹指纹、不再问口令 —— agent 跑 xop 不会被打断。
118 unit + 40 integration 全绿。

改动:
- 新增 `xop desc KEY [TEXT...]`: 描述存 vault 的 `__meta__` TOML 子表;
  文字用空格 join(不用引号), 真打进 vault 的一层引号会被剥掉;
  不写文字 = 清除描述(不用敲空引号 "")
- `xop list [TERM...]`: 搜索默认改成大小写不敏感的子串匹配, 命中 key 名
  或描述, 不用引号、不用通配符; 含 `*` `?` `[` 的词仍切 glob 语义
  (老写法 `xop list 'git_*'` 行为不变); 多词取并集
- 新增 `Vault::open_metadata` / `open_metadata_at`: 只开元数据路径,
  0600 keyring 静默解锁, 无 keyring 才回落手输 passphrase;
  `get`/`set`/`rm`/`run` 仍走 `Vault::open` 全套闸门
- 新增 `auth::Intent` + `auth::needs_gate(intent)`: 把"哪些操作要闸门"
  写成纯函数; `Vault::open` 与 `open_metadata` 共享 `decrypt_with` 核心
- 新增 `src/glob.rs`: 轻量匹配器, `*` 任意长 / `?` 单字符, 零新依赖;
  搜索用的 `has_meta` / `matches_ignore_case` / `contains_ignore_case` /
  `contains_glob_ignore_case`
- 新增 `src/datadir.rs`: 数据目录 `~/.xop/` → `~/.x/xop/`, 迁移是
  **复制不移动**(旧目录留作备份), 新 vault 已存在则跳过
- `keyring::load_at` / `save_at` 改 pub(路径显式化, 单测不碰全局 HOME)
- `audit.rs` 新增 `vault_desc(name)`: 只记 key 名, 描述文字不入日志(I2)
- 集成测试新增 pty 回归 `list_under_a_tty_never_prompts_for_biometrics`:
  `script -q /dev/null` 起真 pty + 30s 超时, 闸门若回来则失败而非挂死
- 版本 0.4.0 → 0.5.2; AGENTS.md / HANDOFF.md / docs/* 同步;
  examples 里 v0.5 搬家前的 `~/.xop/` 残留路径一并修正

设计: "搜索要打引号"的根因是 shell 通配符(`*` 在 zsh 下没匹配文件直接
`no matches found`), 不是 xop —— 所以正解不是"少打引号", 而是让日常
搜索根本不需要通配符: 默认子串匹配, `*`/`?`/`[` 只在用户显式写了时才
切回 glob。免闸门只给元数据操作: 闸门的意义是"释放真值前确认有人在场",
而 list/desc 永不吐 value; 值路径(get/set/rm/run)一行没动。

Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <[email protected]>
2026-10-22 17:03:12 +08:00

6.2 KiB

xop vs existing tools

Detailed positioning against the 5 most relevant alternatives as of 2026-10-01.

At a glance

Tool Vault? Injection method Stdout mask Network policy File policy OS-auth gate
xop (this) self (AES-256-GCM, argon2id) envp (+ askpass P1) ✅ ✅ (pf/iptables, stubbed P1) ✅ (sandbox-exec, stubbed P1) ✅ Touch ID (biometrics-only; SSH/no-biometric → passphrase; Linux: passphrase-only)
secret-agent self (age + sqlite) envp (template) ✅ ❌ ❌ ❌ (passphrase only)
1Password op run external (1P only) envp ✅ (default) ❌ ❌ ✅ (1P account)
HashiCorp Vault Agent external (Vault) env file + sidecar ❌ ❌ ❌ ✅ (Vault token)
Bitwarden bw external (BW) envp ❌ (manual) ❌ ❌ ✅ (BW account)
Deno permission n/a runtime n/a ✅ ✅ n/a

Where xop wins

  1. OS-level pre-gate before the unlock secret. secret-agent and other self-hosted vaults only require a passphrase. xop gates with a real Touch ID prompt first on the local console (macOS, via LAContext.evaluatePolicy(.deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics) — biometrics-only, cancelling refuses the operation). The gate's verdict then decides whether the keyring (~/.x/xop/keyring, 0600 — silent, agent-friendly) may unlock: only a local biometric pass or a headless automation context (agent/pipe) get silent unlock; SSH sessions and machines without usable biometrics must type the xop passphrase — a silent keyring pass there would mean zero identity check. Linux interactive is passphrase-only by design (system-password prompts explicitly forbidden). The gate runs even with a keyring present, so biometric alone never decrypts; a stolen key.db still needs the keyring file or the passphrase. (Explicitly NOT macOS Keychain — rejected 2026-10-02: security(1) popped system dialogs mid-automation.)

  2. Deno-style policy DSL for arbitrary Unix commands. secret-agent is great at injection but doesn't constrain what the child can do. xop adds --allow-net=, --deny-read=, etc. — same proven model from Deno runtime.

  3. Zero external dependencies. xop owns its own encrypted vault. No op / vault / security CLI to set up; no OAuth flows; no per-resolve subprocess overhead. Single binary works on a fresh machine.

  4. LLM-aware guards. Built specifically for the AI-agent use case. --on-leak=refuse is a parse-time check that catches echo $SECRET patterns before spawn — no other tool does this.

  5. No metadata leakage to ps. v0.1 spawned op read per resolve, which leaked op read op://DevOps/mysql/password into process listings. v0.2 does all decryption internally — nothing in ps reveals what vault items exist.

Where existing tools win

  • secret-agent has a more mature template engine ({{NAME}} substitution in arbitrary command strings) and a richer subcommand surface (create/delete/list/exec/inject/get/env/...). xop only has init/set/list/get/rm + one exec verb. If you need template substitution, secret-agent wins.
  • op run is production-grade for the 1Password-only use case. If you're already deep in 1Password, just use op run — it has OAuth refresh, device trust, and a decade of hardening.
  • Vault Agent has sidecar mode + auto-renewal + Consul Template integration. If you already run Vault Agent in your infrastructure, you don't need xop for the basic case.
  • Deno is a runtime — it doesn't run arbitrary bash commands. They solve different problems; we just borrow the policy DSL syntax.

Detailed diff vs secret-agent

Concern secret-agent xop (v0.2)
Vault storage age + sqlite, self-managed AES-256-GCM + argon2id, self-managed
Auth model passphrase via SECRET_AGENT_PASSPHRASE env or prompt Touch ID pre-gate (biometrics-only, cancel = refuse) + passphrase prompt
Reference syntax bare-key (e.g. db_pass) bare-key (e.g. db_pass)
Injection mechanism env template ({{NAME}} in command string) --secret KEY=NAME flag (envp)
Stdout sanitization regex mask by secret name regex mask by secret name + --on-leak=kill|refuse
Network policy none --allow-net= / --deny-net= (pf/iptables, stubbed P1)
File policy none --allow-read= / --deny-read= (sandbox-exec, stubbed P1)
Dry-run secret-agent exec --dry-run xop --dry-run (shows parsed cmd + effective policy)
Audit none JSONL log with policy_hash for replay
Sub-command surface 11 commands (create/delete/list/exec/inject/get/env/...) 6 (init/set/list/get/rm/help) + one exec verb
Per-resolve subprocess none (in-process) none (in-process) — both avoid spawning CLI per resolve
Two-factor by default no (passphrase only) yes (OS auth + passphrase)
Library mode no planned v0.3 (use xop::exec)

When NOT to use xop

  • ❌ You need 1Password / Vault / Bitwarden integration → use those tools directly.
  • ❌ You need a richer template engine (substituting {{NAME}} inside command strings) → use secret-agent.
  • ❌ You're running untrusted code (not just untrusted commands) — use gVisor / Firecracker / proper microVM isolation.

When to use xop

  • ✅ You're building or operating an AI agent (Claude Code, Cursor, custom) and want defense-in-depth around what credentials it can touch AND what it can do with them.
  • ✅ You want a single binary with no external service dependencies (no 1P account, no Vault server).
  • ✅ You want an OS-level biometric gate (real Touch ID prompt on macOS — no password dialog anywhere in the flow) before the passphrase — two-factor by default.
  • ✅ You want dry-run mode that shows the effective policy before execution (great for agent self-correction).
  • ✅ You want audit-grade logs of which refs were used when, without storing values.